BA - BL

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/10 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100010001-2

Bates
X War
X Service

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

In reply refer to: Bates, Arthur Seymour

July 30, 1942

Subject: Appointment in the Army of the United States.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Under the provisions of AR 605-10, it is recommended that the following named person be appointed in the Army of the United States in the grade and for duty as indicated below:

a. ARTHUR SEYMOUR BATES.

b. Grade for which recommended: Second Lieutenant for duty with the Strategic Services Command, branch immaterial.

c. The proposed appointment is within the procurement authorized by letter AG 210.1 (3-21-42) MR, Subject: "Procurement Objective for Commissioned Officers", dated April 3, 1942.

d. Type of service or character of duty: The duty proposed is of a secret nature, in connection with the work being undertaken by this organization under authority of directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in letter dated February 24, 1942.

e. Applicant's special qualifications: This man possesses special ability of a technical and professional nature qualifying him for duty as a commissioned officer in the particular overhead assignment for which he is recommended, which duty cannot be performed by him as an enlisted man. He has been especially trained by this command to perform his contemplated duties; his appointment is therefore especially to be desired.

f. Citizenship: Applicant is a citizen of the United States by birth.

g. Applicant is not a civilian officer or employee of the United States or of the District of Columbia.

h. Waiver recommended: none required.

Subject: Arthur Seymour

Ltr. SS HQ: Agnt. in the A.U.S., to the A.G.O. dated 7-30-42 Cont'd

3. If appointed, it is recommended that he be ordered to extended active duty at Washington, D.C., with the Strategic Services Command.

3. Waiver of fourteen days notice for active duty is requested.

4. Applicant enlisted in the Army of the United States on February 11, 1942.

William J. Donovan
Director.

4 Incls
Incl #1 AGO Form No. 0840
Incl #2 AGO Form No. 178
Incl #3 AGO Form No. 88
Incl #4 Waiver of 14 days notice.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Serial 3189016

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

AUG 27 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I wish to acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter of August 11, 1942, advising me that it had been discovered that the Japanese Fisheries training vessels NANKO MARU and HAKUYO MARU made repeated visits to the Aleutian Islands and Bering Sea area over the period from 1931 onward.

These Japanese Fisheries training vessels were accustomed to visit the Aleutian Islands and the Bering Sea areas annually every summer for the past 20 years or more. As these ships were public vessels of the Japanese Government, in each instance where they touched United States territory the visits were authorized as a result of formal representation on the subject by the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

Details as to Japanese activities outside of United States jurisdiction were not formally indicated to this government, as such action would have been contrary to the usually accepted practice among maritime nations.

Very sincerely yours,

N. C. Train.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

August 11, 19

Captain Harold Train,
Director of Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Captain Train:

It has been brought to my attention that since 1931 there have been repeated visits (it is supposed annually) of a Japanese ship, the Hakuyo Maru, 1357 tons, to the Aleuts and Bering Sea. The vessel is a training ship for the Imperial Fisheries School at Tokyo, and in addition to her crew carried each year to the Bering Sea thirty to forty senior students who were finishing their preparation for entering the Japanese fishing service. The winter cruise of this same ship out of Tokyo took this class to Indonesia, where the Hakuyo Maru was wont to visit Manila, Davao, and points further south. In support of what has recently been repeatedly mentioned, that the Japanese for some years have been acquainting themselves with the Bering, there would seem to be the probability that this school and training ship have produced in ten or eleven years between three

thousand and four thousand fishing masters who know the waters and islands from which the Japanese are now hoping to oust us.

It was also told me that in addition to the Hakoyo Maru there is a Japanese scouting or patrol ship of 350 tons, the Hendro Maru, which has been repeatedly observed in the Bering, and particularly at Attu Island, Atka, St. Paul and St. George. It is said this information was primarily drawn from the United States Bureau of Fisheries' report on Alaska, and also from the Japanese Fisheries Year Book, published in Japanese.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

COPY for Colonel Donovan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

[redacted]

[redacted]

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
ROOM 1706, 703 MARKET STREET

August 7, 1942

Mr. Edward W. Allen
Allen, Hilen, Froude & De Carmo
1308-1316 Northern Life Tower
Seattle, Washington

Dear Mr. Allen:

I have just had occasion to refer again to your letter of April 16th, which you accompanied with your analysis of the Alaska-Siberia-Japan situation. I have re-read this with great interest and with appreciation of the discernment shown in your observations made last April. I judge that the Senate commission now en route through this state to Seattle to investigate the military situation in Alaska and the Aleuts will have recourse to you for information, and I hope they will listen to your views.

There is a Mr. Gordon Howes, a graduate student in the Department of Anthropology at the University of California, whose anthropological research started with aboriginal fishing techniques and has moved out into a study of Japanese fisheries, who has been appointed by the Office of Strategic Services as a special investigator in this field. I furnished him with the names of organizations and individuals which you gave me and told him about your own authoritative knowledge, gained through your many years of service in the Bureau of International Fisheries.

He talked to me today about something which probably is well known to you but was not known to me, namely, the repeated visits, annually I think, since 1931, of a Japanese [illegible] the Nakura Maru, 1337 tons, to the Aleuts and Bering Sea. The vessel is a training ship for the Imperial Fisheries School at Tokyo, and in addition to the crew carried each year to the Bering Sea thirty to forty senior students who have finishing their preparation for entering the Japanese fishing service. The winter cruise of this same ship out of Tokyo took this class to Indonesia, where the Nakura Maru may want to visit Manila, Davao, and points further south. In support of what has recently been repeatedly mentioned, that the Japanese for some years have been concentrating themselves with the herring, there would seem to be the probability that this school and training ship have produced in two or three years between three thousand and four thousand fishing masters who know the waters and islands from which the Japanese are now hoping to start out.

Mr. Howes also told me that in addition to the Hakuyo Maru there is a Japanese mounting or patrol ship of 350 tons, the Hakubo Maru, which has been repeatedly observed in the Bering, and particularly at Attu Island, Atka, St. Paul, and St. George. Mr. Howes' information seems to be primarily drawn from the United States Bureau of Fisheries' report on Alaska, but also from the Japanese Fisheries Year Book, published in Japanese.

I went up last week-end to the Grove play, and thought repeatedly of you and wished that you and your friends could have been present for that interesting pageant.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:RP
Cc. to Colonel Donovan
Major David Bruce

Baxter plus [illegible]

MEMORANDUM

January 9, 1943

FROM: C. W. Barnes

TO: Dr. James P. Baxter, 3rd.

RE: Request for Extension of Travel Order

Your request for an extension of Travel Order No. 931-43, dated November 20, 1942, has been executed except that the use of personally-owned automobile at the rate of five cents per mile may not be allowed in accordance with Decision No. B-50368 from the Comptroller General of the United States, dated December 7, 1942. The pertinent parts of the Decision state:

> "Where the statutory authority to pay the transportation expenses of persons serving while away from their homes in an advisory capacity without other compensation from the United States is limited to actual expenses of transportation, such a person who performs official travel by privately owned automobile is entitled only to the actual expenses of operation thereof, and not to a commutation in the form of a mileage allowance in lieu of such actual expenses, 21 Comp. Gen. 402, amplified."

I regret that the regulations prohibit reimbursement on a mileage basis but trust you will be able to fulfill your necessary functions for this agency by utilization of common carriers.

DHOgan:fsw;CWBarnes:jmd

cc: Col Donovan
Mr. D. W. Ogan
Mrs. Freuenheim
Fiscal Office
Mr. Barnes
Mails & Files

Bonter 1748
File

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Copy to Langer 8/5

C
O
P
Y

July 30, 1941

American Embassy
London.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

We arrived here Friday night as you know, and as the Connaught was full, put up at Claridges. We're much impressed with the fine team O.S.S. has here, and with the great merit of its delightful chief. He has already reported on the various conferences we've had with MacLeish and Warburg by cable to you, and will succeed, I am sure, in handling that situation without any row and in accordance with your wishes. Ambassador Winant, General Winant, Admiral Stark and Admiral Kirk all gave us a cordial welcome. I found that Stark's Assistant Chief of Staff, Captain Wentworth, was an old acquaintance, and have asked him to dinner tonight to meet Evans and Dow, who have both been doing a good job.

I called on Colonel Vickers of M.E.W., with Despres and Dorr, and lunched with two other men I knew in that group, and expect to be able to leave that agency to Despres, who is getting on well with them and with Somerville and has started some work at the Air Ministry on a very satisfactory basis. I shall see Vickers again later and follow up the Air Ministry connection.

Your friend Admiral Godfrey, who sends you his warm regards, gave a very pleasant dinner for me Tuesday night at his flat, asking Allen Evans, and two of his own aides, Commander Shawcross and Lieutenant Foster. This was a most agreeable and amusing party, after which Godfrey said he'd take me through the new part of the Admiralty and would ask the C. in C. at Portsmouth to send me to sea for a short trip, which I certainly hope fervently can be arranged. Foster took me down to Greenwich for lunch this noon at the Naval College and will take me to Oxford tomorrow for the weekend, to see the I.S.T.D. staff there. On the way we stop at M--to see the Air Force collection of photographs. I shall stay at Christ Church in the set of rooms occupied by Lewis Carroll, and expect to see Toynbee (?) and others of the Chatham House group as well as the I.S.T.D. crowd and some of my academic friends. Next weekend I shall go to Cambridge to see Admiral Richmond.

My young friend Martin MacLaren, a Captain in the Guards, took me to dinner at the Guards Club and asked me to stay with him in Clarendon Place, which I may do towards the end of our stay here. He's in the Plans Division of the home forces, and has a lot of interesting slants on British morale, which he thinks vastly better than in 1917-18, in part on account of the low casualties. His stepfather, General Freyberg, who commanded in Crete, is laid up with a bullet through his neck but is coming along O.K.

I had a talk with Gerold Robinson before I left about the subject of your cable received today, and urged him to send one of our Russian experts with me or a bit later, to try to iron out differences. I'm clearer than ever now that, though we doesn't want to spare a man, the best place to check up with the British is here where their materials are, if for no other reason because there are so many different people here working on Russia. Allan Evans and I however, will explore this question very thoroughly.

Monday afternoon I went with MacLeish and Evans to a tea given by the people operating the microfilming for the Association of Special Libraries and the Interdepartmental Committee. To my distress I had learned that there were fear at work here and perhaps in Washington to divorce this project completely from the Donovan organization, which I think would be unfortunate for both. We are sending a cable on this tonight.

- We have had two air raid alerts, plus two air raids as bombers returning rom the midlands passed over London and were brought under fire. Ned got out of bed quicker than I could, to watch the shell burst, sniffing the fray like an old warhorse at the sound of the trumpet. We've had a grand time together, and are looking forward eagerly to Elmo's arrival.

Will you please show this letter to Bill Langer and ask him to convey my best regards to all in R & A.

With every good wish,

Gratefully and affectionately,

/s/ Jim

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

July 3 [illegible]

Secret

Confidential Source

[illegible] Monday night [illegible]

[illegible] Connaught we fell [illegible]

[illegible] much we passed [illegible]

[illegible] here, and the great [illegible]

delightful trip [illegible] has already [illegible]

[illegible] we've been [illegible]

and Monique [illegible] to you [illegible]

[illegible] that [illegible]

[illegible] coordinate with [illegible]

[illegible] Gen. Donovan [illegible]

[illegible] Kim [illegible] gave us [illegible]

[illegible] for that [illegible]

[illegible] to [illegible]

[illegible] have [illegible]

[illegible] Col. Vickers of [illegible]

[illegible] launched with [illegible]

[illegible] group and expect [illegible]

[illegible] for Sculpers.

[illegible] agency

[illegible] Theatre [illegible] with

[illegible]

has started some work at the Air Ministry on a very satisfactory basis. I shall see if this is borne out and follow up the Air Ministry experiment.

Your friend Admiral Godfrey, who sends you his warm regards, gave a very fine dinner at his flat for me Tuesday night at his flat, attending [illegible] Evans, and two of his own aides [illegible] and Lt. Foster. It was a most agreeable and amusing party, after which Godfrey said he would take me through the new part of the Admiralty and would ask the C in C Portsmouth to detail me to sea for a short trip, which I certainly hope fervently can be arranged. Today I took the Queen to Greenwich for lunch this at the Naval College and will take me to [illegible] tomorrow for the [illegible] to see the [illegible] staff there. On Monday we stop at Wi[illegible] see the Cup Tour. Afterwards of photographs I shall stay at Chipperchurch in the set of [illegible] occupied by Lord Carol, and expect to see Ingersoll and others of the Chatham House group as well as the [illegible] and some of my scientific friends. [illegible] weekend I shall go to Cambridge to see Admiral Richmond.

My young friend Martin Maitland is a captain in the guards, took me to dinner at the Guards

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

This could colored me to stay in have an Chinese place which they do together to the end of my stay time. He said Chiang Kai-shek, Dixsow of the Chinese forces, the backbone of interesting [illegible] morale, who he thinks really [illegible] the British [illegible] on account of the [illegible] [illegible] neighbors who [illegible] to lead up with [illegible] [illegible] to come along OK.

Then he talked with period Robinson before I left about the subject of your [illegible] [illegible] and to send other to me [illegible] to [illegible] reports with me [illegible] in clearer than [illegible] our differences. [illegible] to spare [illegible] to check up with [illegible] their materials are, if for [illegible] because there are so many [illegible] working on Russia [illegible] with explosive [illegible]

Monday afternoon I went with [illegible] and [illegible] to a tea given by the people [illegible] working for the Association of Special Libraries and the Interdepartmental Committee. To my distress I had learned that [illegible] in Washington [illegible] pretty closely by [illegible] organization, which I think [illegible] both. We are sending [illegible] tonight.

We have had two dirt roads [illegible] as bombers [illegible] roads passed over towards [illegible] for [illegible] bed [illegible] to [illegible] the shell burst [illegible] like an old [illegible] a grand [illegible] trumpet. We [illegible] eagerly [illegible] and are hoping to [illegible] original.

Bill gives Whipple [illegible] this letter to Bill Langer and asks him to convey [illegible] best regards to all [illegible] Washington [illegible]

Gratefully and affectionately [illegible]

Com. Pomeroy
Operate
Navy Train

Dec 17 11 31 AM '42 7652
Bacchia

Dec 15 12 57 PM '42
Com. Navy

In reply address not the signer of this letter but Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Refer to No. [redacted]

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 13, 1942.

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.

To: [redacted]

Via: Director of Naval Officer Procurement, [redacted]

Subject: Active duty with pay and allowances - chargeable against appropriation, "Pay, Subsistence and Transportation of Naval Personnel".

References:
(a) Executive Order of September 8, 1939.
(b) Naval Appropriation Act for current fiscal year.
(c) ALNAV 114, dated November 22, 1940.
(d) Art. H-1711, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual.
(e) [redacted]

Enclosures:
(A) Affidavit re pension or disability allowance.
(B) Form N. Nav. 17.

1. Upon acceptance of appointment as [redacted], U. S. Naval Reserve, and in accordance with the references, you will proceed to such place and report to such medical officer as may be designated by the Director of Naval Officer Procurement in your District for physical examination. You are hereby ordered to active duty for this purpose and will be considered in an active duty status during the time required for physical examination and for travel necessary for compliance with these orders. In view of the provisions of reference (d), and since physical defects were waived by reference (e), further waiver will not be required if the disabilities are essentially the same as to character and degree.

2. If found not physically qualified, you will immediately return to the home address and upon arrival consider yourself released from active duty. In this event the examining medical officer will advise the Bureau of Naval Personnel by dispatch, stating the defects in detail together with his recommendation.

3. If found physically qualified, or if the disabilities are essentially the same as to character and degree as waived by reference (e), you will further proceed [redacted] Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C., for active duty in the office of [redacted].

RANDALL JACOBS

Becchio - 7652

file x Commission

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

178598

AUG 4 1942

My dear Colonel:

This is with reference to your letter of July 28, 1942, in the interest of Mr. Norman Becchio of your office, who has made application for appointment in the U. S. Naval Reserve.

I am pleased to inform you that Mr. Becchio's application has been approved and he will be ordered to duty in the Office of Strategic Services, as you have requested.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

7652

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 28, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Norman Becchio of this office has made application for a commission in the U. S. Navy Reserve.

Mr. Becchio has been with us from the early days of our organization. He came as an assistant in our Central Information Division and was soon promoted to the important work of making up our lists of secret and confidential documents. He has proved to be a man of exceptional initiative and thoroughness. His loyalty to the United States Government is beyond question. If it is found that he meets the requirements for a commission in the Reserve Corps, it is respectfully requested that he [illegible] signed to this office for duty.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

Dr Lewis

IN REPLY REFER TO D:P:EJS

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1942

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

See

Mr. James Murphy,
Office of the Coordinator of Information,
Room 124, Administration Building,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

There is enclosed herewith for your information a copy of a letter from the supervising customs agent at Baltimore, dated July 22, 1942, stating that George Balanos, wireless operator on the Greek SS MASTER ELIAS KULUKUNDIS arrived at Baltimore on July 13, 1942, that prior to his departure he was searched, with negative results, and that his name is being placed on the collector's lookout list so that he will receive special attention on any future arrival.

Very truly yours,

John W. Bulkley
Acting Deputy Commissioner of Customs.

Enclosure

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 of f.6.3

DAVIS

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

July 24, 1942

Mr. James Murphy,
Office of the Coordinator of Information,
Room 124, Administration Building,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

There is enclosed herewith for your information a copy of a letter from the supervising customs agent at Baltimore, dated July 22, 1942, stating that George Balanos, wireless operator on the Greek SS MASTER ELIAS KOKUNDIS arrived at Baltimore on July 13, 1942, that prior to his departure he was searched, with negative results, and that his name is being placed on the collector's lookout list so that he will receive special attention on any future arrival.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) John W. Bulkley

Enclosure

Acting Deputy Commissioner of Customs.

EJS:LRS 7-24-42

CUSTOMS AGENCY SERVICE
SUBMISSING CUSTOMS AGENT
401 CUSTOMHOUSE

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE

BALTIMORE, MD.

July 22, 1942.

Commissioner of Customs,
Division of Investigations and Patrol,
Treasury Department,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter of July 7, 1942, addressed to the Supervising Customs Agent at New York, copy of which was furnished this office, advising that George Balanos, wireless operator on a Greek ship operating under the Swiss flag, secured in Lisbon, Portugal, [illegible] of two thousand dollars for delivery to an unidentified [illegible] in the United States.

In connection with the above, you are advised that the above named subject arrived at Baltimore on July 13, 1942, as wireless operator on the Greek [illegible] steamship [illegible], at which time he [illegible] United States currency [illegible] in the [illegible] deposited in [illegible] Customs.

[illegible] was given [illegible] surveillance while in port, [illegible] and a [illegible] [illegible] subject's [illegible] was [illegible] in being placed on the [illegible] list and he will receive special attention on any future arrival.

Respectfully,

[illegible] A. [illegible],
Special Agent.

[illegible] Supervisor.

[illegible] in Charge.

Blumel

MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

For such interest as it may present:

Mme. Suzanne Blum was enabled by Mr. Dulles to speak on the telephone with Switzerland a day or two ago, and learned that Andre Blumel and Jules Moch are now on the Mediterranean Coast, in or near Perpignan, and are in great danger of arrest. An urgent appeal is made that they be rescued.

Andre Blumel, although he did not entirely share Leon Blum's views, worked with the latter as a law partner and assisted him in his political activities. In 1936, Blumel was appointed Director of Cabinet, later enlisting in the French Army.

Jules Moch, a naval engineer and graduate of the Ecole Politique, held the post of Secretary General to the Prime Minister in Blum's cabinet and represented Herault in the Chamber of Deputies. Both men are distinctly persona non grata with the Germans and with the present French regime.

Adrien Tixier became acquainted with Blumel when the latter went to Geneva and London with Albert Thomas in 1920, in connection with the organization of an international labor

office. Tixier is thinking of cabling de Gaulle in London and he might be able to arrange for them to be taken off at a channel port. However, the trip through Occupied France might be fatal. Mme. Blum hopes that, if possible, they can be picked up at some convenient point on the Mediterranean Coast. This, of course, would involve a dangerous naval operation.

John C. Wiley.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

In reply refer to
FA

July 22, 1942

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services and acknowledges receipt of letters of July 15, 1942, concerning the appointment of the Honorable William Phillips, Mr. David Williamson, and Miss Evangeline Bell to London as representatives of the Office of Strategic Services.

The Secretary of State is pleased to advise that the Embassy in London has been instructed to give these representatives all appropriate assistance and to make payments of the expenditures outlined in the letters under reference upon the presentation of vouchers certified by Mr. Fisher Howe, certifying officer in the Office of Strategic Services in London.

Copies - Kimball
Bloom
Ogata
Reinhardt

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
[redacted]

Bell Evangeline

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL

DATE JULY 17 1942

TO: MR. MURPHY

SUBJECT:

With reference to the duplicating and conflicting letters concerning Miss Evangeline Bell's salary, I find that the trouble arose from the fact that Mr. Barnes wrote one letter which was submitted to us in accordance with established procedure for checking. Mr. Williamson wrote another letter together with several others concerning Phillips and himself, and he carried these directly to the Colonel for signature without my having seen them.

W. A. K.

July 15, 1942

Honorable G. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Shaw:

This office is desirous of dispatching Miss Pauline Hall, Senior Administrative Assistant, to London, England to act as the Administrative Assistant for this office and as secretary to the Director. Miss Hall's salary will be $5200 per annum.

It is requested that $5200 (less the 5% retirement deduction) of Miss Hall's salary be paid by the American Embassy in London, England, effective as of July 15, 1942. The 5% deduction for the retirement fund will be made by the Office of Strategic Services in Washington, D. C. Travel and other necessary expenses should also be paid through the American Embassy at London. Miss Hall's per diem allowance will be on the following basis:

$6.00 - within the continental limits of the United States

$14.00 - outside the continental limits of the United States, to terminate at the expiration of 60 days after her arrival in London, England (except July 21.00 will be allowed while on travel ship where meals are furnished).

Upon the expiration of 60 days after arrival, Miss Hall's per diem allowance will be $4.00 while in London, England, while on duty. A per diem allowance of $2.00 will apply for travel outside of London, England, when not on duty, under instructions to this Embassy in Washington.

In order to facilitate this employee's travel to London, England and her activities after arrival at that location, it will be appreciated if arrangements will be made by the Department whereby the proper officials at the American Embassy in London, England will be authorized to honor all salary, travel and other expense vouchers for Miss Bell, when properly certified by this office's London representative, who has been bonded as a certifying officer. The Office of Strategic Services will reimburse the State Department in accordance with Sec. 3, V-40 of the Foreign Service Regulations for all pay vouchers made by the American Embassy in London in behalf of Miss Bell.

Any assistance which the representatives of your office may render to Miss Bell to facilitate the performance of her activities abroad will be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

Enclosure

cc State Dept.
Mr. Ogata
Col. Donovan
G. W. Barnes
John Stacy
Mr. Limbs
Major Bruce
Col. Goodfellow
Dr. Meier

[illegible]

7/16/42

Honorable G. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Shaw:

In connection with the work of this Office, I desire to send Miss Evangeline Bell to London as administrative assistant to Mr. William Phillips. I have addressed a separate letter to you indicating my desire to send Mr. Phillips to London as my representative.

Miss Bell's salary, and all travel and other expenses incurred by her, will be paid directly by the Office of Strategic Services. Under this arrangement there will be no necessity for State Department accounting in connection with this particular appointment.

Bruce

Williamson

A biographical sketch of Miss Bell is transmitted herewith.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Basle:rrr
7-15-42

EVANGELINE BELL

Birth: November 27, 1914, London, England.

Education: Cours Fenelon, Paris
French School, Stockholm
French Convent, Rome
Chatelard School, Switzerland
Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Mass.

Experience: February 1938 to November 1938. Organizing Secretary of the Anglo-French Art and Travel Society, London.
1939. Wrote articles for News Chronicle, London.
1940. Wrote radio script and broadcasted in French for Station WHDL in Boston.
September 1940 to December 1940. Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, New York City
December 1940 to January 1942. Private Secretary to Attorney General Francis Biddle.
January 1942. Office of Coordinator of Information.

Other: Studied Japanese language and drama.

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary
Washington

August 14, 1942

Dear Bill:

In answer to your letter of August 5, 1942, in which you requested the assignment of Lieutenant George L. Graveson, C-V(S), U. S. N. R., to the Office of Strategic Services, I am glad to be able to tell you that Lieutenant George L. Graveson has been ordered to your office and should report on or about August 18,1942.

The requirements of the fleet are such as to make it impracticable to assign a radioman 3c. to your office.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategi c Services
Washington, D. C.

copies To:
Lowman
Barnes
OPS.Ala
Acott - 8/7

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

JUL 18 1942

MM-646-59-54

My dear Colonel Donovan:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of July 13, 1942, with reference to the desired assignment of G. H. Blackmore, Radioman Third Class, U.S.N.R. to the Office of Strategic Services of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The requirements of the Fleets are such as to make impracticable the assignment of a Radioman Third Class to the duty requested.

In view of your interest I regret that my reply cannot be favorable.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

Colonel William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/10 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100010001-2

XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 13, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

It is respectfully requested that G. H. Blackmore, Seaman, Newport Trade Schools, USN Training Station, Administration Building, Newport, Rhode Island, Serial No. 6465954, be assigned to the Office of Strategic Services of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to handle special communications work of a highly secret and confidential nature.

Mr. Blackmore is specially qualified for a particular assignment of an urgent nature and your consideration of this transfer will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

//////////////////////////

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 9, 1942

Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey
Selective Service System
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Hershey:

In connection with certain plans now under way in which both this office and the State Department are vitally interested and which concern the war effort, it is necessary that the services of a man by the name of Leone Fumasoni Biondi be available. The nature of this service is so highly confidential that it cannot be disclosed in writing. I understand that he registered in the draft sometime in January but that he has not yet been classified. He has now been called upon to fill out certain alien personal history statements. He has filed application for citizenship which it is expected will be granted in

the near future. It is respectfully requested that he be given such classification in selective service in order that his services may continue to be available to us.

Of course I should be glad to tell you in person all of the facts, or to have someone from my office convey that information orally to you or your representative.

If this request meets with your approval, I should greatly appreciate it if you would notify local draft board No. 9 in the District of Columbia of the action which you decide to take.

Very sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Barrie 1166
X Woodring
Washington

July 1, 1942

Mr. K. M. Woodring
Asst. Chief, Budget & Finance Division
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Woodring:

In accordance with the authority vested in me as Director, Office of Strategic Services, I hereby delegate to you the following authorities:

(1) To direct and approve travel of employees of the Office of Strategic Services. This authority is to include both domestic and foreign travel.

(2) To approve applications for advances of funds not exceeding $1,000 in any one instance.

The authorities herein delegated are to become effective immediately.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

July 1, 1942

Mr. C. M. Barnes
Chief, Budget & Finance Division
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Barnes:

In accordance with the authority vested in me as Director, Office of Strategic Services, I hereby delegate to you the following authorities:

(1) To direct and approve travel of employees of the Office of Strategic Services. This authority is to include both domestic and foreign travel.

(2) To approve applications for advances of funds not exceeding $1,000 in any one instance.

The authorities herein delegated are to become effective immediately.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

[redacted]

Office of

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan:

At breakfast the other morning, I discussed with you Comdr. Robert W. Berry, USN.

Attached you will find a biography of this man.

It is my opinion that he and Captain Lovette are exceptionally good Public Relations men.

Regards,

Commander John J. Bergen,
USNR.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Col. Donovan

6/3/42

COMMANDER ROBERT W. BERRY, USN

Commander Berry was born in New York City, December 13, 1898, and served as an enlisted man in the U.S. Marine Corps from September 18, 1914, until June 20, 1917. He participated in the Haitian Campaign and the Haitian Expeditionary Force from August, 1915, until August, 1916.

He was appointed to the Naval Academy (at large) from the United States Marine Corps by the Secretary of the Navy on June 20, 1917, and served as midshipman in the USS WISCONSIN with the Atlantic Fleet from June to September, 1918. During midshipmen's practice cruises of 1919 and 1920, he served in the USS KEARSARGE and the USS CONNECTICUT. He was commissioned Ensign upon graduation on June 3, 1921, when he was assigned to the USS NEVADA. He was commissioned Lieutenant (junior grade) in 1924. In May, 1925, he was detached from the NEVADA, and, after completing course of instruction in submarines at New London, Connecticut, and having served in the USS S-21, was assigned to duty in the USS R-10, Pearl Harbor, T.H., and was in command of her from May, 1927, until June, 1929. During the next two years, he was assistant professor, Department of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, on duty in connection with the Naval R.O.T.C. Unit. In September, 1931, he was given command of the USS S-31, then assigned to the Asiatic Fleet, and which returned to Pearl Harbor in May, 1932. After detachment from that command, he was on duty at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H., as Ship's Service Officer from June, 1934, until June, 1937, when he became Aide and Flag Secretary on the staff of the Commander, Submarine Force, Rear Admiral Joseph R. Defrees, USN, and later Rear Admiral Charles S. Freeman, USN.

He was navigator of the USS MILWAUKEE from June, 1939, until March, 1940, when he reported for duty as Officer in Charge of Press Relations, Public Relations Branch, Navy Department. He has been Assistant to the Director of Public Relations since the fall of 1941.

Commander Berry has the following service medals:

Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal
Haitian Campaign Medal, 1915 - 1916
Victory Medal and Atlantic Fleet Clasp, USS WISCONSIN, World War.

Home address: Honolulu, T.H.
Washington address: 1017 South Oakcrest Road, Arlington, Virginia.

* * * * * *

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: W. A. Roseborough

DATE June 18, 1942

TO: Colonel Buxton

SUBJECT:

file

I refer to Allen Dulles' memorandum to you of June 15, 1942, a copy of which came to my desk after I had the talk reported in the attached memorandum. I am sending copies of the attached memorandum, as well as copies of this note, to Allen Dulles for his information.

As the subject of the attached memorandum has, I understand, already seen and talked with Commander Vanderbilt I suggest that such further talks as we may have with him should be coordinated so that all of us connected with this organization will keep our stories as straight as possible and not add to subject's confusion with respect to the organization on the part of our government with respect to the services in connection with which he is interested.

WAR

Copies to:

Mr. Allen Dulles
Mr. David Williamson
Mr. Robert Cresswell

Copy No. 1 of 3.

June 17, 1942

Re: M. Bernard

I have just had a conversation, lasting an hour and a half, with B., who claims to be the active leader of the French resistance groups centered around the Clandestine publication "Liberation". He further claims to have come from France very recently by way of England, where he has been in close touch with the deGaullist leaders and the English M.I.6 and S. O. E. Services.

It appears that B. arrived in this country by means of transportation placed at his disposal by the English and that since he has been here he has seen and talked with General Strong, Admiral Wilkinson, Harry Hopkins, Major Rodrigo, Commander Vanderbilt and others.

He has also seen Tixier, but states that he has not seen and does not wish to any other members of any of the French movements or factions and, indeed, wishes to reduce to the very minimum the number of people he does see, as he naturally wishes to maintain, to the greatest extent possible, secrecy as to his presence and mission here. B. was introduced to me by Dr. Henry Field, at whose home we met.

Our conversation covered a rather wide range and it was regrettably impossible in the time which he had avail-

able to go into any of the matters in the detail which might have been desirable.

1. It would appear that B., and his followers in France, have accepted deGaulle as at least the symbolical leader of all French resistance and military action, both within and without France. B. Emphasized the necessity for the unification of the French military and resistance action and deprecated any action on the part of either the Foreign Office or the State Department which might tend to jeopardize this unity or encourage disunity. He referred, in particular, to the tendency of the State Department and the Foreign Office to magnify the dissatisfaction of individual Frenchmen as indicative of lack of unity in the deGaulle movement and deGaulle's inability to control the movement. He also referred to an abortive attempt by one of our military attachés in Vichy to set up another French General as a competitor of deGaulle. B. admitted that deGaulle and his movement had their weaknesses and had committed certain errors, but stated that deGaulle was definitely the symbol of French resistance and was so accepted by the vast majority of the French, both within and without France.

2. B. stated that arrangements had been completed to set up in London a committee upon which deGaulle, M.I. 6 and S.O.E. would have representatives in addition to one representative from the resistance groups in France; the latter to be changed at least every month in order that he might not lose contact with the actual

situation in France. The functions of this committee would be to coordinate the activities of the services and groups represented. B. intimated, without so stating, that in the past the cooperation of the British with the French resistance groups had not been too satisfactory, but stated that it was now very much better. He expressed doubt, however, as to the ability of the British to place at the disposition of the French all of the material and technical assistance which would be needed and expressed the hope and desire that in some way close cooperation between us and his groups could be established and maintained. He suggested that an American representative be placed on the above mentioned committee or that a similar committee be set up with representatives of the American services in London and that an operational base be established in Gibraltar where at least two American representatives and one representative of the French resistance groups could make their headquarters.

3. B. stated that he and his collaborators had studied in great detail the various available methods of communication and transportation of personnel and material. In his opinion a good deal of unrealistic talk had been indulged in in this connection. The use of fishing boats and submarines was unsatisfactory because of the slowness and relative vulnerability of these types of vessels. His suggestion was that fast long-range speed boats of small tonnage should be used to operate between the base at Gibraltar and the French Coast which, particularly between Marseilles and Cannes, was well organized to receive, hide and transport both men and materials.

If boats of this type do not presently exist, with a range sufficient to make the round trip, B. believes that it would be possible to establish caches of fuel on the numerous small, uninhabited rocky islands between the Spanish main land and the Balearic Islands.

4. B. also emphasized the necessity of having two or, at most, three men in our Consul or diplomatic services who would serve as points of contact between us and his groups within unoccupied France. It was his thought that it would probably not be possible in this war for us to organize units which could effectively carry out operations within France, but that we should concentrate upon establishing and maintaining contact with the resistance groups and furnishing them the means and materials with which to do the active work.

B. also felt that it would be extremely useful if we could organize in our various industrial plants research sections for discovering feasible methods which could be used in the clandestine sabotage of plants and their products in the occupied countries, as well as in Germany, where the foreign labor battalions could be used for this purpose. As an illustration of what he had in mind, he suggested the possibility of developing some method or process by which the resistance characteristics or tensile strength of aluminum could be substantially reduced by the introduction of some chemical into the bauxite at some stage of its processing. He also suggested that some method might be devised for the surrepti-

tious sabotage of optical instruments which could be used but not easily detected during the process of manufacture.

* * * * *

On the whole, my impressions of B. were very favorable. We did not touch in any detail upon his activities in connection with clandestine publications. He did state, however, the dropping of pamphlets and leaflets over France had been rather ineffective. They seem either to disintegrate in the air or disappear after they have landed, and in all his work he has seen virtually none in circulation amongst the French people.

There would appear to be virtually no question as to B.'s genuineness and good faith. If this stands up under further check he obviously represents an invaluable contact around which we should, as quickly as possible, build a concrete program for action in France. The program must obviously be a joint one in so far as the two branches of this organization is concerned and must be correlated with similar activities of the British through contact with them and the French in London. Any such program will require the active cooperation of the armed services, especially the Navy and Air Corps, and should be studied and planned in conjunction with them.

B. planned to return to New York shortly after I talked with him and expected to return to Washington early next week. He

Copy No. 1 of 3.

is scheduled to leave for London the latter part of next week and stated that he expected to remain there only four days before returning to France. It was understood that he would get in touch with me through Dr. Field upon his return from New York, and it is hoped that a further and more detailed talk may be arranged at that time.

W. A. Roseborough

Note with special reference to the memorandum of June 15, 1942 from Allen Dulles to Colonel Buxton:

During my discussion with B. he intimated that there might be a certain mutual lack of cordiality between him and Vignaux. B. feels that V. has been out of France for so long that he has lost touch with the actual situation there, and intimated that V.'s attitude toward deGaulle and his movement might be colored somewhat by the feeling that he had not received the place in the movement which he expected or hoped for. V's comments on B. will be interesting but should be read in the light of this situation.

W.A.R.

Copies to:

Mr. Allen Dulles
Col. Buxton

Routed to:

Mr. Robert Cresswell
Mr. David Williamson

SECRET
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

June 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Edward Buxton

FROM : Allen W. Dulles

When I was in your office Friday you inquired with regard to a Frenchman, Jean Bernard. I did not know, at the time, the origin of the inquiry addressed to you on the subject.

Since my return to New York I have learned that Jean Bernard is reputed to be a representative of the French underground anti-Fascist movement, "Liberation". I understand he recently arrived in this country from London. Further information with regard to Bernard can be obtained from M. Tixier, Free French representative in Washington.

In any event, I shall have more precise information about Bernard in a couple of days, as M. Vignaux, who is one of our important French contacts here, and who is thoroughly familiar with the French underground movement, is going to Washington tomorrow, at the suggestion of Tixier, to see Bernard. Vignaux promises to give me a full report, which I shall pass on to you.

A.W.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL

DATE JUNE 6 1942

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN

SUBJECT:

Pursuant to your request, I shall endeavor to make a report on my interview with A. A. Berle today. This report will appear disjointed, but, if so, it reflects the lack of continuity and sequence in the conversation. "Conversation" hardly describes the interview in that I spent most of the time listening, and only injected a word her and there in an effort to have my presumable interest serve as a jog to Mr. Berle's desire to talk.

The reason for my seeing him was to present a memorandum suggesting additional questions to be pursued by Dr. Ora Morgan in his contemplated trip to Syria and Lebanon, as proposed in Mr. Berle's letter of May 18th.

After perusing these suggestions, Mr. Berle expressed his entire accord with our proposals. I suggested that he might wish to amplify these with ideas of his own. He stated that this entire problem in Palestine was a very big one and that it involved among other things the possibility of ameliorating the condition of the farmers through government appropriation for irrigation and other purposes, and tended toward giving them a status of land-owners rather than tenant farmers. Mr. Berle stated that he would reflect on this over the week-end and would put in memorandum form his ideas on this subject if he felt it advisable to pursue them. In any case he will proceed with the suggestions contained in our memorandum.

On concluding these statements, he surprised me by saying: "I understand that I am Public Enemy No. One in the COI." I said: "As long as you have raised that subject, would you like to pursue it?" He indicated that he would like to continue to talk, which he did at length concerning some subjects with which I was familiar, but also on subjects concerning which I had no background information. I therefore played the role of listener and provided only enough stimulus to keep the conversation going.

He implied that any disagreement which existed between himself and the COI resulted from a policy originally established by the President in which the areas of interest of the F.B.I., Rockefeller group and COI were defined. In his efforts to interpret this policy he had, he stated, incurred Colonel Donovan's ill will. He went over this matter in some detail and related the old story of how it was Colonel Donovan's idea that in a total war it was impossible to define areas and that therefore [redacted] he had to have representation in South America. I then indicated that even though Colonel Donovan might have had this idea originally, nevertheless I was certain that once the policy had been established, Colonel Donovan had restricted his activities accordingly and had sincerely complied with the majority judgment in this policy. Berle then went into a rather lengthy and rambling narration of how this policy of area restriction was hooked up with the activities of the British and other countries in the U. S.

He stated that "no red blooded American wants to feel that any country, be it neutral or enemy, is maintaining a spy service in the United States". He stated that he knew as a certainty that the British and others had maintained a secret service in the United States which had for its purpose to spy on U. S. officials. They also spied on the representatives of other countries in the U.S. When they carried this to the extent of planning the assassination of the president of a friendly country, they felt that that had gone too far and that it had to be stopped. He added that if they wished to deal in this way with neutral countries such as Spain and Portugal, etc., it naturally didn't make much difference, but obviously they should not be permitted to plan such activities against friendly countries through agents in this country.

He then reverted to the Latin American situation and stated that it was his belief that any misunderstanding in regard to our having agents in Latin America was a hang-over resulting from Wallace Phillip's former connection with the Navy. I stated that this was obviously one of the causes of the misunderstanding and that those few remnant connections of Wallace Phillip had been liquidated as rapidly as possible. He referred to the South American situation, and I stated that I was fairly close to Colonel Donovan, attended his staff meetings, was familiar with most of the operations of many of the sections of COI, and I certainly would have known of any COI agents in South America, had there been any. Mr. Berle said "Well, I believe that the South American situation has been satisfactorily cleared up."

He then went into a rather rambling dissertation on the reasons back of the McKellar Act and again referred to the activities

of the British and others which had been stopped in this country. I stated that it was my belief that British activities had been thoroughly curtailed as a result of the McKellar Act. He said that the McKellar Act actually had in no way changed the situation in that the laws in force prior to the presentation of that bill were ample to restrict the agents of any country and that had the government wished to enforce those laws they could have arrested most of the British representatives in the United States. He stated that all that the McKellar Act did was to crystallize in the minds of everyone that such laws existed and that they had to be careful. He then went on to say that in spite of this Act, British activities here still continued and that they had merely found ways to cover up their activities.

(His next statement frankly I did not comprehend, even though I asked him to repat it. I had no knowledge of any such activities and therefore could not comment and merely appeared interested.) He stated that the British were now communicating their information through COI radio channels. I stated that I did not believe this to be the case. He mentioned a figure of 1200 words a day going out. I said that I did not think this was possible, to which he replied that they had requested us to have all British communications go through regular Embassy channels, but had been refused; they then asked us to have copies of all British communications sent to them, which had been refused. I couldn't neither pursue nor discuss this subject with him for I had no knowledge whatsoever concerning the matter beyond the fact that I had never heard of any such procedure and so stated to him.

He then asked me about my work as Liaison Officer, and I told him of my association with FIS, Colonel Goodfellow, David Bruce and also Colonel Donovan. I also emphasized my relationship with Mr. Shaw and the basic policy of that relationship which had been a desire for complete frankness and honesty in our mutual dealings. I stated that my instructions from Colonel Donovan had been at the time of my appointment as Liaison Officer that I was to cooperate fully with State and to honestly give them all information requested, and that I knew that policy had been maintained.

Through all of this Mr. Berle showed his inclination to be extremely friendly and stated that if ever he could be of service to me as Colonel Donovan's Liaison Officer, I should call on him at any time. The foregoing summarizes this meeting as closely as I can give it on the basis of recollection. I believe it to be accurate as to principle, although in details of wording it may be at variance with the actual statements made.

I want to emphasize the point that at no time in my talk with Mr. Berle did I ever intimate that I had come to see him on Colonel Donovan's request, nor did I mention that Colonel Donovan had personally considered the subject matter in his letter concerning Dr. Morgan. I stated that this question had been studied by our Research and Analysis group, and as a result of such study I was presenting such findings to him as the COI Liaison Officer.

The specific business matter of my visit could have been settled in three minutes. I was with Mr. Berle almost an hour, and I personally said very little. It is my impression that he was seeking an opportunity to talk to someone concerning the fundamentals involved in his relationship with COI.

WAK
W. A. K.

W.E.H.Beale:rrc

June 20, 1949

Major Donald Jones, U.S.M.C.
Castle and Cook Building
Honolulu, T. H.

Dear Donald:

You have already met and talked with the bearer of this letter, Mr. W. E. H. Beale. In accordance with our understanding, Mr. Beale has been sent out to study the part that the Special Activities Branch can play in the project we have under consideration.

Mr. Beale has been instructed to consult with you and such other persons as you believe should be consulted regarding this project. Upon his return he will report to me and action will be taken after consideration of his report.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information

W.E.H.Beale:rrc

RC

June 30, 1942

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Mr. Wilson Z. M. Beale is accredited as a representative of the Coordinator of Information for the Territory of Hawaii. His mission is to act as an observer for this office. Upon his return he will report to me regarding the results of his observations.

William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information

[Expires 45 D.F.C.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Copies to Kimball
Williamson
Goodfellow

In reply refer to
800.20200/20

JUN 10 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

The Department of State transmits to the following the attached information in the hope that it will be of value:

Military Intelligence Division

~~Office of Naval Intelligence~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation

✓ Coordinator of Information

Enclosure:

Copy of paraphrase of telegram no. 804, dated June 4, 11 am., from Vichy (Paris), concerning Henriette Berger and George Urban.

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

FROM: Vichy (Paris)

TO: Secretary of State

DATE: June 4, 1945

NO.: 804

Information of unknown reliability, but the contents of which the Department may wish to inquire into is as follows:

One Henriette Berger whose address is P. O. Box 240, Englewood, New Jersey, is said to be in communication with an ex-Russian employed by the Japanese Embassy in Vichy and a White Russian in Nice. It is believed that she has Russian Language correspondence in her possession. She is also in communication with agents of Germany and Japan.

From the same source, it was learned that one George Urban, a White Russian who is President of the Provisional Evangelique Russe in Paris, is being sent by the Germans to German occupied Ukraine to spread Nazism among the occupied population and to foment the Russian partisan group's activities in this territory. Urban is believed to have been active in Czechoslovakia and Norway prior to the occupation of these countries by the Germans. The informant believes that the Russian authorities should be informed.

TUCK

Birdsall 6-9-42
x War Dept.

Paul Birdsall

Colonel Donovan

June 6, 1942

The attached letter for your signature is self-explanatory. Mr. Baxter is aware of all circumstances which I discussed with him about a week ago, and I have his consent to proceed in the effort to secure appointment in the Military Intelligence Service for July 1, 1942. Will you kindly return to me the attached letter when you have signed it?

Attachment

[redacted]

June 6, 1942

Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner
Chief, Military Intelligence Service
Gaff Emplicum Building
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Kroner:

Mr. Paul Birdsall, who is Executive Assistant to the Director of the Research and Analysis Branch of my office has volunteered his services to the War Department for Military Intelligence duties. His action has my approval, and I hereby give consent to his appointment in the Army of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

Barnes, C.W. 10767

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

"CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION"
IN YOUR REPLY REFER TO
FILE
AND DATE OF THIS LETTER

April 6, 1943

Hon. William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

I am happy to reply to your letter of March 23, 1943, concerning Mr. Cecil W. Barnes.

The application for transfer which Mr. Barnes filed with the Commission has been photostated and briefed by one of the Examining Units. His qualifications have been brought to the attention of appointing officials, and we shall do everything we can to place him in a position of benefit to the war program.

Very sincerely yours,

Arthur S. Flemming
Commissioner

Barnes, C. W.

March 23, 1943

Mr. Arthur S. Flemming
Commissioner
United States Civil Service Commission
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Flemming:

The position of Chief, Budget and Finance Branch, for the Office of Strategic Services because of the nature of our operations, will hereafter be filled by an officer on detail from the Armed Services. Because of this fact the present incumbent, Mr. Cecil W. Barnes, CAF-13, $5600, will be available for transfer on or about April 1, 1943.

It is my understanding that Mr. Barnes would prefer, for family reasons, to work in the field and return to the Southwest or go to the Pacific Coast area if a vacancy exists for which he could be considered. He advises me that he has already filed an application with the War Transfer Unit of the Civil Service Commission.

During the period of his employment under my supervision, since August 14, 1941, he has held a responsible position, having organized and supervised all administrative services, including budget, fiscal, purchasing and supply, etc. I consider him a man of ability, intelligence, and loyalty to the American form of government and of good moral character.

I am glad to recommend Mr. Barnes for favorable consideration for employment in a position where his talents may be utilized and feel that he will serve in such a position with credit and distinction.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Concurrence:

cc: Colonel Donovan
Civilian Personnel Branch
Mr. C. W. Barnes

Burnett

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

March 25, 1943

FROM: C. W. Barnes

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

I am leaving Washington on annual leave March 28, 1943, enroute to the Southwest. I understand the present Budget and Finance Branch is to be reorganized and the position of Chief, Budget and Finance is to be abolished and the responsibilities assumed by other officers.

If, in the near future, an opportunity for service in connection with the war effort arises in another office or branch of the Office of Strategic Services where you feel that my background, training and experience would qualify me, I am ready and willing to assist in any way possible. I have in mind that a position such as you mentioned at Staff Meeting of liaison with OWI which might afford an opportunity for service to both groups, since I am generally familiar with the functions of both agencies.

During this war, every individual owes it to his country to do the job he can do the best, and I would, therefore, be willing to remain in or return to Washington in the event that the position I was to occupy was of more importance to the war effort than a field position I may take with private industry or another Government agency. I would prefer to be in uniform.

In the event you need me, I can be reached at 101 Lowry Street, Stillwater, Oklahoma.

MEMORANDUM

February 15, 1943

To: Colonel Donovan

From: William H. Vanderbilt

Subject: C. W. Barnes.

Mr. Barnes will continue to work on preparation of the 1944 budget, at the same time breaking in Woodring so that he will be in a position to handle it. Mr. Barnes will leave OSS sometime between March 15th and 30th.

Mr. Sears has in mind some changes in the Budget and Finance set-up which we believe will be an improvement and under the new set-up Lt. Woodring and other personnel now in Budget and Finance will be able to handle the work.

WHV

William H. Vanderbilt

CONFIDENTIAL

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Mr. C. W. Barnes

DATE June 6, 1942

TO: Col. William J. Donovan

SUBJECT:

In order that I may be of more service to you and to the Office of the Coordinator of Information, I would appreciate being kept currently informed of developments in our program which will influence our expenditures.

I would appreciate the attention of the Branch Directors and your special assistants being called by you to the importance of keeping the Budget and Finance Division currently informed of their requirements and anticipated needs. We are attempting to explain how their expenditures are distributed by means of a monthly report, but at times we find informal agreements or understandings have been made or reached without our knowledge which has made our work difficult.

We are anxious to serve and will cooperate in meeting problems when given the opportunity.

Executive Officer

Bernstein 6610

BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA

NEW YORK

May 26th 1942.

OFFICE OF
DIRECTOR-GENERAL

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have just arrived from England, and will spend some time here at the British Information Services.

There is now a very considerable demand in Great Britain for films about America, and I am looking forward to having an opportunity of discussing with you the possible co-operation between our departments, in making available American films which will meet this growing demand.

It is unlikely that I shall be able to proceed immediately to Washington, but I hope that when I do get down you will find it convenient to spare me some time.

Yours sincerely,

Sidney L. Bernstein.

Col. William J. Donovan,
Co-ordinator of Information,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

AW

Barbey
Woolley

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Commander Woolley

DATE May 25, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT:

I saw Captain Barbey on Saturday evening. He has just been appointed in charge of the Amphibious Section in the Navy Department on the staff of Admiral King.

He will retain Major Mason and is taking a Constructor and one or two other officers on his staff. One of his first duties will be the preparation of a programme of landing craft requirements. I suggested Lieutenant Commander Royale as an officer for his staff but he does not appreciate his value. Captain Barbey was Chief of Staff to Admiral "Train" at the January amphibious exercise.

He told me that the General of Marines was probably worried about the failures and, therefore, attacked the Navy very strongly at the discussion after the exercise. Captain Barbey said he does not agree with the General and finds him hard to get on with.

I pressed that the amphibious section should be composed of Army, Navy, Air and Marine Officers and he said he hoped to be able to have an Army liaison officer.

We discussed one or two other matters and I feel that he is entering his post with some wrong ideas; he appears to me to have an insufficiently open mind.

The setting up of the C.O. organization continues to be a process of 'trial and error'. Captain Barbey asked if I were free. I told him I was on other duty and that Captain Knox was now Combined Operations' Liaison Officer, but I would be glad to assist him in any way I could as a personal matter.

HGAW

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

W. L. BATT
DIRECTOR OF MATERIALS

May 6, 1942

Colonel Wm. J. Donovan
Administration Building
25th and E, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

A friend of mine, who is a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, sent me the two books which I am sending along to you with this note. I don't know whether they will be of any use to you or not, but thought perhaps you would like to have them.

Sincerely yours,

W L Batt

W. L. Batt

Batt, W. L. 6-9-1
x German lead...

May 9, 1942

Mr. W. L. Batt,
Director of Materials,
War Production Board,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Batt:

Many thanks for sending me the two books in German which were enclosed with your letter of May 6th. I am passing these along to our Research and Analysis Division where I am sure they will be received with great interest. If you wish me to return these to you, I should be glad if you would tell me, and in the meantime they will find a useful spot in our library.

Thank you again for sending these books to me.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Copies to Kimball
Wilson
Donovan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

June 3, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I append a few notes of an address given today in San Francisco by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai. Doubtless his regular presence in Washington has already made him accessible for such views as he holds on India but, as a speaker sometimes seemingly expands during a visit to the Pacific Coast, I thought perhaps the attached notes, though not very important, might have some value.

Sincerely yours,

David P. Barrows

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:HP
Encl.

Copy to Colonel Buxton

COPY

June 3, 1942

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Coordinator of Information
25th & E Streets, N. W.
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DPB:EF
Encl.

Copy to Colonel Buxton

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

June 3, 1942

To:

From: David P. Barrows

Subject: Address by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai at Commonwealth Club

Attended a special Commonwealth Club luncheon to hear Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai speak on "India and Invasion." Sir Girja is an agent for India at Washington, a position which seems to be semi-diplomatic. A dozen years ago he was a member of the Executive Council of the Governor General of India, and has represented India at important international conferences, including the round table conference following the report of Sir John Simon's commission. He said he was a native of Lucknow and spent four years at Oxford.

He seemed a sensible fellow, and optimistic with respect to India. He stated at the gathering that the entire future of India rested upon the success of the United Nations.

He praised the work of the Indian Army, which has been raised to a strength of a million and a quarter.

Stated that, without mentioning numbers, more Indian troops had fought in this war outside of India than the total of troops drawn from British Dominions.

He stated that Indian troops showed aptitude and enthusiasm for tank service and other forms of mechanized warfare.

In private conversation he also said that the Indians were keen on air warfare; that Indian air squadrons had been formed, and that one of the flyers who downed the German battleship Bismarck was an Indian pilot.

He considers that Japan intended, and still intends, to invade India or at least to accomplish the dominance of the Indian Ocean, though this project may have been checked by British strength at Trincomalee and the occupation of Diego Suarez.

He thinks the military importance to Japan of the Andaman Islands lies in their proximity to Ceylon and might have importance in an air or other attack upon Ceylon.

He seems to think that the northeast frontier of India is secured by the high and difficult mountains. The railway from Burma follows up the Brahmaputra Valley, but beyond the railhead the mountains become too high and difficult for land invasion. The same is true of the railroad that leaves the upper end of the Ganges Delta, and it is in the hill

districts in the northeast

His opinion on this matter need not be given too great weight, but in general he believes that the Japanese invasion of India will be an air and sea invasion, designed to occupy and control the coasts of India, isolate the peninsula, and dominate the Indian Ocean.

Asked whether the Burmese, if the Japanese are thrust out of Germany, would willingly submit to a resumption of British Government, he expressed the opinion that owing to their intellectual immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility there was no prospect for Burmese independence, and that while the nationalist movement has grown there it is incapable of effecting its objects by revolution.

Sir Girja is making his first visit to the west, and goes from San Francisco to the Southern California Institute of Technology, where he will deliver the Commencement address.

Calls attention to the fact that as long as Russia maintains the neutrality of Siberia, India is the only country through which communications can be had with China, which makes its present position in the war all important.

David P. Barrows

DPB:BP

COPY

June 3, 1942

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Coordinator of Information
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

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David P. Barrows

DPB:BP

April 30, 1942

Major John J. Sullivan
Public Relations Officer
Seattle Port of Embarkation
1319 South Alaskan Way
Seattle, Washington

My dear Major Sullivan:

Thank you for your letter. Major Blogg was assigned here at our request for special duty with our Service Unit. I am very glad to have your expressions about him, and it is encouraging to have this type of officer in our Unit.

If you do get this way, I hope you will come in for a talk.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

JMS:jm

Col. Goodfellow
Do this one
of your men?
JRM

Mr. Murphy:

Major Ainsworth Blogg is a member of the C. O. I. Service Unit.

E.A.Dockery

[illegible]

IN REPLY REFER TO:

HEADQUARTERS
SEATTLE PORT OF EMBARKATION
OFFICE OF THE PORT COMMANDER
1519 SOUTH ALASKAN WAY
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

April 24, 1942

Col. William J. Donovan
Coordinator, Bureau of Information
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel:

The undersigned is a former Assistant U. S. Attorney and a practicing lawyer of Seattle whom you met in the early days of the Legion, when he served as First National Vice-Commander being unanimously elected at St. Louis.

I am advised that Major Ainsworth Blogg, stationed at Ft. Lewis, was ordered to report to your section for duty. I have known Major Blogg for many years. He is one of the outstanding representative reserve officers of the Seattle Chapter of that association. He is a man of ability, reliability, energy and action and can be trusted to maintain the standards set by you and the section you represent in any assignment that you may see fit to give him. Having had the privilege of knowing you in the early days of the Legion, I have taken the liberty of writing to you so that you might know the calibre and character of my friend and brother officer, Major Ainsworth Blogg.

Should the opportunity present itself in the fortunes of war for me to ever be in Washington I shall take the privilege of dropping in and renewing our old acquaintanceship. With every expression of high personal regards, I remain

Very truly yours,

JOHN J. SULLIVAN
Major, M. I.
Public Relations Officer

[redacted]

COI
Form 50 COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

(Fold here)

To Mr. J. P. Murphy Date 4-10-42
Room Bldg.

For your information
Note and Return
File
Comments
Investigate and Report
See Me About This
Mail and Files Unit
Take this up with
For our Telephone Conversation
Prepare Reply
Signature

Remarks: Thanks — sorry I could not send him some signing [illegible]

(Fold here for return)

From C. W. Barnes Date
Room Bldg.

Even No. rolls

Expense is [illegible] 63

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

FISCAL SERVICE

WASHINGTON

BUREAU OF ACCOUNTS
DIVISION OF DISBURSEMENT

April 17, 1942

TB-5

Honorable William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Donovan:

Acknowledgment is made of the receipt of your communication of April 6, 1942 in which you state that you desire to delegate the authority to authorize certifying officers to Mr. Cecil W. Barnes, Chief, Budget and Finance Division.

You are advised that in accordance with Public Law 389, vouchers must be certified by the head of the department, establishment or agency concerned or by an officer or employee thereof duly authorized in writing by such head to certify such vouchers.

Therefore, authorization schedules delegating authority to certify vouchers are required to be signed by you as the head of your office. However, in your absence, authorization schedules may be signed by an officer duly empowered to serve in your absence as the Acting Coordinator of Information.

Very truly yours,

G. F. Allen
Chief Disbursing Officer

Barnes, Cecil W 1948
x Treasury

April 6, 1942

Mr. G. F. Allen
Chief Disbursing Officer
Division of Disbursement
Treasury Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Allen:

I would like to designate Mr. Cecil W. Barnes, Chief, Budget and Finance Division, to sign Schedules of Officers or Employees Authorized to Certify Vouchers for Payment to Disbursing Officers under the Executive Branch of the Government.

Will you please advise if this authority may be properly delegated, and if so, consider this letter as authority for Mr. Barnes to sign future schedules from the Coordinator of Information.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

CWBrolle

Barrows, Baxter

MEMORANDUM

June 5, 19.2

FROM: William J. Donovan

TO: Mr. Cecil Barnes
Mr. Opsata
Mr. David Williamson
Dr. Baxter

Please note that the address of General David Barrows, our representative in San Francisco, has been changed to

Central Tower Building
Room 1706
703 Market Street
San Francisco.

File

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

June 2, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I report that I returned yesterday, June 1st, from two weeks leave in Southern California and, owing to crowded conditions in the Montgomery Street quarters and the prospect of a removal of those quarters elsewhere, have moved to the Central Tower Building, 703 Market Street, Room 1706, San Francisco. The rental of this accommodation was accomplished by Mr. Linsley, the Senior Administrative Officer, through the usual Washington channels.

Sincerely yours,

David P. Barrows

DPB:HP

David Prescott Barrows

Copy to Col. Buxton

June 2, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I report that I returned yesterday, June 1st, from two weeks leave in Southern California and, [illegible] conditions in the Montgomery Street [illegible] the prospect of a removal of those [illegible] have moved to the Central Tower Building, [illegible] Street, Room 1706, San Francisco. [illegible] accommodation was accomplished by [illegible] Administrative Officer, through [illegible] channels.

Sincerely yours,

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:RP

Copy to Col. Burton

Reference - 3737a
x DeWitt

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Goodfellow March 19, 1942

From: J. R. Murphy

Colonel Donovan and Colonel Buxton have gone over the letter of General DeWitt, dated February 21, addressed to the General Headquarters, Field Forces, Army War College.

It appears that the letter has never been officially referred to this office and for that reason Colonel Donovan feels that he should not make a reply through channels. He also feels that since General DeWitt did not write to him about the matter he should not write directly to General DeWitt. He seems to think that the letter should go back through channels and suggests the attached be written by General Lee.

J. R. M.

Attachment
Murphy:Roy

SUGGESTED DRAFT

March 19, 1942

Re: Status of San Francisco Coordinator of Information

Reference is made to the letter of Lt. General J. L. DeWitt, dated February 21 on the above subject.

About a month ago, General David P. Barrows accepted an appointment as a special representative of the Coordinator of Information for the San Francisco area. That appointment does not carry any implication of the right to coordinate or otherwise interfere in any manner with the regular Intelligence services in the San Francisco area or in any other area.

The purpose of the appointment is to secure, on a voluntary basis, such information deriving from sources outside the United States as can be secured from particularly qualified government sources, or through studies by expert civilians in and about San Francisco. A copy of the executive order setting up the Office of Coordinator of Information is enclosed.

It is understood that General Barrows has been instructed to forward such information as he obtains, which [illegible] to the Coordinator of Information [illegible] immediately made available to the [illegible] departments interested.

General Barrows has been further instructed to communicate in the San Francisco area any information coming to his attention and considered of immediate interest to MID, ONI and, if it is desired, to the office of G-2, Fourth Army, and the office of G-2, Ninth Corps Area.

The above-described duties of General Barrows are intended to be supplementary and of a liaison character only. It is believed that such a special representative of General Barrows' qualifications can be useful in our national effort.

The Coordinator of Information consulted, on December 2, 1941, with the Chiefs of the Intelligence Sections in Washington, of the Army and Navy, and the Director of the FBI, prior to considering the matter of a special representative of the Coordinator on the Pacific Coast.

During the two weeks following December 7, 1941 Colonel C. [illegible] Liaison of the Coordinator's Office visited San Francisco and discussed the subject of a rep[illegible] with the San Francisco offices of ONI and MID and the office of G-2, Ninth Corps Area. It is understood that Colonel [illegible] talked with General

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

Room 1706, 703 Market Street

June 10, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I learn that President Robert Gordon Sproul, of the University of California, has approved the plan for an Army Language Center at Berkeley, to which I referred sometime ago, and has forwarded to Secretary of War Stimson the plan outlined by a committee of which Mr. A. E. Manell is secretary.

This is something, I think, that lies entirely between the University and the Army, but, as it falls within the scope of the interest which the COI is forwarding, I think it is proper to send you a copy of Manell's memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

David P. Barrows

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:BP
Copy to Colonel Buxton

Room 1706, 703 Market Street

June 10, 1942

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Sincerely yours,

DFB:HF
Copy to Colonel Buxton

David Prescott Barrows

To: The Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

From: A. E. Manell, International House, Berkeley, California

Subject: Plan for organization of a pool of foreign language personnel for service with expeditionary forces

Date: June 1, 1942

I. The Need

As our Expeditionary Task Forces are now engaged, and will operate increasingly, with or against people who speak languages and dialects ranging from Russian and French to Hindustani and Swahili, and countless others, one of our paramount needs will be for a large pool of soldier-specialists, trained in languages and intelligence functions, as a supplement to the Intelligence Section of the Army.

The Intelligence Section is aware, of course, of the job ahead, and is preparing to cope with it. It is obvious, however, that the size of the army we are building, and the scope of our involvement and responsibilities in this war, will necessitate expansion of our intelligence services, both in size and function, expressly adapted to the conduct of total war waged on a world scale.

In addition to its value to Intelligence, the pool should be important also as a clearing house to supply various branches of the Army in the field with foreign language personnel needed.

II. The Plan

The plan here proposed suggests an expeditious way to organize an Army unit or cadre to meet this need, and possesses three salient features:

(a) Candidates for this unit shall be selected, from within the Army, who already possess some knowledge of the language and a background of information on the geography, history, and ethnographic features of a given region, such as Siberia, Denmark, or Japan, as well as on the basis of character, experience, and intelligence.

(b) Such candidates shall then be assigned (upon completion of the basic military training period) to one of three or more ARMY TRAINING CENTERS FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE PERSONNEL to be established at strategically situated universities in the United States — there to be given intensive correlated instruction in the languages, ethnography, military geography, history and economics, and psychology of the people, of a given region, together with training in methods of intelligence and related technical skills. As the number of soldier-specialists needed is considerable, new groups would be assigned to Training Centers at regular intervals of from three to six months, depending upon the instruction period.

(c) There shall then be developed a large pool of qualified Army personnel, to be drawn upon as circumstances demand, and instantly accessible for assignment to expeditionary task forces as they are earmarked for given regions for service: in combat units, in military governments constituted in occupied

territories, and in fulfilling our immediate and possibly long-range responsibilities overseas in the post-war world.

III. Selection

Among the millions of men who will be enrolled in the Army there will be many who, either because of foreign birth, or previous study and travel abroad, will have varying degrees of knowledge of the land, people and government, as well as of the language, of one or more foreign countries.

Qualified men may be earmarked for service as foreign language personnel either at the time of induction, or later by applying for and being assigned to an advanced Training Center. Boards of review, either mobile or stationed at several posts through the country, could single out the most able candidates for assignment to such Training Centers. The soldier-specialist would then be trained for service in the region for which he is best suited. Thus for example, a soldier possessing a command of Russian and certain Siberian dialects, would be instructed in the military geography of Russia, with emphasis on Siberia; at the same time if he showed a marked aptitude for artillery, he would master the special vocabulary and some of the technical problems of that branch. Then should a given division be earmarked for service in Siberia, he would be promptly assigned to an artillery unit in that division.

A preliminary estimate suggests that a minimum of fifty such trained men be assigned to every division. Thus the total personnel of the entire unit or cadre may in time number twenty-five thousand men or more. The rank of such soldier-specialists shall be determined according to their individual qualifications, but it is assumed that all would receive special ratings (e.g., Staff Sergeant), or commissions, upon graduation from a Training Center.

IV. Comprehensive Estimate

Should official approval, in principle, be forthcoming on the part of the Secretary of War and the General Staff, it would be necessary for the War Department to ascertain:

(a) The approximate number of men needed for the suggested service, and the various categories of specialized duties involved. Thus, a possible AEF to Siberia or to French possessions in the Pacific, for example, would take into consideration personnel that could be employed effectively in working out some of the technical details of the plan of anticipated expedition, providing elementary language instruction aboard ship to troops of the task force, effecting arrangements during course of landing operations; reconnaissance and related duties in combat units, relations with population in theater of war; problems relating to military government, exercise of police power in occupied regions, and so on.

(b) The most satisfactory method of selecting qualified Army personnel to be assigned to Training Centers for a period of intensive instruction lasting three months or more.

(c) The type of comprehensive curriculum which would enable the soldier-specialist already possessing a basic knowledge of the language and main geographical features of a given region or country to improve and integrate his facilities for military purposes.

(d) The most involved in the establishment and operation of Training Centers.

V. Training Centers

In the event the plan is approved by the War Department, it is thought the objectives of this project could be attained most expeditiously and economically by setting up Army Training Centers at three or more American universities (e.g., University of California, Harvard University, Columbia University, University of Chicago), strategically located and already possessing the basic teaching staff and facilities necessary.

VI. Demonstration

In order to effect a demonstration, and to test the value of the plan, it is suggested that an experimental Army Training Center for Foreign Language Personnel be set up at the University of California, which is particularly well situated both as to personnel, location, and equipment to offer its services for this purpose.

(a) The University is able to offer instruction and research in the languages, geography, government, ethnography, history, and related disciplines, together with a wealth of collected materials, in a number of these fields: China, Dutch East Indies, Japan, Near East, Russia and Eastern Europe, Germany and Central Europe, Scandinavia, Italy, France and French Colonies, and Latin America. Neighboring colleges and universities could be drawn upon, if necessary, to supplement the present faculty in some fields.

(b) Moreover, the University is strategically located within a few miles of the Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. Thus, it may be feasible to assign officers stationed at the Presidio of San Francisco to give part-time instruction in the technical military aspects of the curriculum.

(c) In view of the decreasing University enrollment, there will be available the necessary equipment, including classrooms, laboratories, and housing accommodations.

To obtain optimum results, it is suggested that the men assigned to the Training Center live together in a separate house such as International House on the Campus of the University of California which can accommodate 450 persons, or similar dormitories that may be made available to the Army for this purpose. Thus such soldier-specialists, while living under military discipline, would at the same time profit from an academic environment and would derive thereby such additional advantages as personal association with colleagues in their fields, opportunities for language practice at table, the use of regional realia made adequately available in the building — all of which in sum would contribute toward a distinctive "esprit de corps."

VII. The Advantages

The advantages inherent in this plan are many:

(a) The primary advantage is that an officer ordered to lead an expeditionary task force could immediately draw upon the pool and attach to each division of his command the appropriate number and kind of foreign language personnel needed. The effective use of this unit will be, in the main, disciplined soldier-specialists who can fight, but who, moreover, will possess qualities of character and education that will expand the usefulness of those with whom they come in contact in line of duty in the field of operations.

(b) The sooner such a plan is activated the more certain we shall be of making the most intelligent and thoroughgoing use of language effectives in the Army. This seems the best way of insuring the availability of the right language personnel (both officers and men) in the right place at the right time. Otherwise it is possible that a man knowing Russian may be in a division sent to Africa, another acquainted with Arabic sent to Ireland, and so on, thereby causing some delay and lost motion if it is later necessary to reassign such men as language personnel in other parts of the world.

(c) If it were generally known that such an Army unit was being organized it would serve as an important stimulant to the morale of men already in the Army, and of those who will be inducted, and who are qualified in languages and related disciplines, as it would promise the most effective exercise of their special capacities in the service.

(d) It would attract the enlistment into the Army of a larger number of men gifted in languages, who are now otherwise engaged in civilian work or are seeking preferred status in the Navy, which is more flexible in offering commissions. It is evident that the Army, because it must carry the attack to the enemy on his own ground, and must bear the brunt of capturing, consolidating and administering territory, perhaps simultaneously in far-flung theaters of operations, has the most need for these men.

(e) In the event of invasion of the continent of Europe by our troops, and likewise as we retake ground in the Pacific area, this unit could assist in effective liaison with the underground armies of the subjugated nations, or with other forces which may be raised, and in promoting our objectives in reconquered areas.

(f) Finally, it may prove a decisive advantage to have available immediately on the conclusion of hostilities a pool of such men — capable, disciplined, hardened by the rigors of campaign, possessing first hand knowledge of conditions in countries to which they have been assigned, as well as a sure understanding of their languages and peoples. Whatever our most pressing responsibilities may then be in the conduct of our foreign relations, the services of such experienced personnel should add much to their effective solution.

III. Further Recommendations

The author of this memorandum has incorporated herein many suggestions arising out of recent consultations with: General David P. Barrows, Vice-President and Provost Monroe E. Deutsch, Professor Robert J. Kerner, Dean Joel H. Hildebrand, of the University of California; Dwight Davis, Director-General, and Lewis Meriam, Henry R. Fitzsimons, Colonel Edward E. Gibson, of the Staff of the Army Specialists Corps, Washington, D. C.; Mortimer Graves, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C.; Harold Leupold, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; Brigadier-General William C. Mee, Assistant Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.; Captain Charles A. H. Thomson, Psychological Warfare Service, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Albert H. Barrows, National Research Council, Washington, D. C.

If our plan briefly outlined above is basically sound and practicable, further consultation will be necessary. The writer would be pleased to cooperate with any military personnel assigned to take appropriate action.

Respectfully submitted,

A. H. Newell
Faculty Club, Berkeley, California
Revised: 6.1.43

COPY

Room 1706, 703 Market Street

June 10, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

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DPB:BP
Copy to Colonel Dixton

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(b) Such candidates shall then be assigned (upon completion of the basic military training period) to one of three or more ARMY TRAINING CENTERS FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE PERSONNEL to be established at strategically situated universities in the United States — there to be given intensive correlated instruction in the languages, ethnography, military geography, history and economics, and psychology of the peoples of a given region, together with training in methods of intelligence and related technical skills. As the number of soldier-specialists needed is considerable, new groups could be assigned to Training Centers at regular intervals of from three to six months, depending upon the instruction period.

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territories, and in fulfilling our immediate and possibly long-range responsibilities overseas in the post-war world.

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Among the millions of men who will be enrolled in the Army there will be many who, either because of foreign birth, or previous study and travel abroad, will have varying degrees of knowledge of the land, people and government, as well as of the language, of one or more foreign countries.

Qualified men may be earmarked for service as foreign language personnel either at the time of induction, or later by applying for and being assigned to an advanced Training Center. Boards of review, either mobile or stationed at several posts throughout the country, could single out the most able candidates for assignment to such Training Centers. The soldier-specialist would then be trained for service in the region for which he is best suited. Thus for example, a soldier possessing a command of Russian and certain Siberian dialects, would be instructed in the military geography of Russia, with emphasis on Siberia; at the same time if he showed a marked aptitude for artillery, he would master the special vocabulary and some of the technical problems of that branch. Then should a given division be earmarked for service in Siberia, he would be promptly assigned to an artillery unit in that division.

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(b) The most satisfactory method of selecting qualified Army personnel to be assigned to Training Centers for a period of intensive instruction lasting three months or more.

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In the event the plan is approved by the War Department, it is thought the objectives of this project could be attained most expeditiously and economically by setting up Air Training Centers at three or more American universities (e.g., University of California, Harvard University, Columbia University, University of Chicago), strategically located and already possessing the basic teaching staff and facilities necessary.

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In order to effect a demonstration, and to test the value of the plan, it is suggested that an experimental Army Training Center for Foreign Language Personnel be set up at the University of California, which is particularly well situated both as to personnel, location, and equipment to offer its services for this purpose.

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To obtain optimum results, it is suggested that the men assigned to the Training Center live together in a separate house such as International House on the Campus of the University of California which can accommodate 450 persons, or similar dormitories that may be made available to the Army for this purpose. Thus such soldier-specialists, while living under military discipline, would at the same time benefit from an academic environment and would derive thereby such additional advantages as personal association with colleagues in their fields, opportunities for language practice at table, the use of regional realia made adequately available in the building — all of which in sum would contribute toward a distinctive "esprit de corps."

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The advantages inherent in this plan are many:

(a) The primary advantage is that an officer ordered to lead an expeditionary task force would immediately draw upon the pool and attach to each division of his command the appropriate number and kind of foreign language personnel needed. The officers and men of this unit will be, in the main, disciplined soldier-specialists who can fight, but who, moreover, will possess qualities of character and education that will enhance the confidence of those with whom they come in contact in line of duty in the field of operations.

(b) The sooner such a plan is activated the more certain we shall be of making the most intelligent and thoroughgoing use of language effective in the Army. This seems the best way of insuring the availability of the right language personnel (both officers and men) in the right place at the right time. Otherwise it is possible that a man knowing Russian may be in a division sent to Africa, another acquainted with Arabic sent to Ireland, and so on, thereby causing some delay and lost motion if it is later necessary to reassign such men as language personnel in other parts of the world.

(c) If it were generally known that such an Army unit was being organized it would serve as an important stimulant to the morale of men already in the Army, and of those who will be inducted, and who are qualified in languages and related disciplines, as it would promise the most effective exercise of their special capacities in the service.

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(e) In the event of invasion of the continent of Europe by our troops, and likewise as we retake ground in the Pacific area, this unit could assist in effective liaison with the underground armies of the subjugated nations, or with other forces which may be raised, and in promoting our objectives in reconquered areas.

(f) Finally, it may prove a decisive advantage to have available immediately on the conclusion of hostilities a pool of such men — capable, disciplined, hardened by the rigors of campaign, possessing first hand knowledge of conditions in countries to which they have been assigned, as well as a sure understanding of their languages and peoples. Whatever our most pressing responsibilities may then be in the conduct of our foreign relations, the services of such experienced personnel should add much to their effective solution.

VIII. Further Examination

The author of this memorandum has incorporated herein many suggestions arising out of recent consultations with: General David P. Barrows, Vice-President and Provost Monroe E. Deutsch, Professor Robert J. Kerner, Dean Joel H. Hildebrand, of the University of California; Dwight Davis, Director-General, and Lewis Merian, Henry E. Seidemann, Colonel Edward S. Gibson, of the Staff of the Army Specialists Corps, Washington, D. C.; Mortimer Graves, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C.; Harold Lasswell, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; Brigadier-General William C. Rose, Assistant Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.; Captain Charles A. H. Thomson, Psychological Warfare Service, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Albert E. Burrows, National Research Council, Washington, D. C.

If the plan briefly outlined above is basically sound and practicable, further consultation will be necessary. The writer would be pleased to cooperate with any military personnel assigned to take appropriate action.

Respectfully submitted,

A. M. Sproul
Faculty Club, Berkeley, California
Revised: 6.1.42

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

PMG

June 3, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have been on leave without pay for the last two weeks in order to attend to personal affairs in Southern California, and returned on Monday, June 1st, to the office.

I acknowledge your letter of May 13th, and am much interested in your advice that COI will operate for the War Department General Staff a unit which will be called the Intelligence School, to which enlisted and drafted men speaking foreign languages will be assigned. This undertaking accords entirely with my own conception of the most important need of the Army, and I am very glad to know of the COI's participation in it.

However, I should like to advance the view that the number of such men required for the elements of our Army going overseas to foreign lands will be quite large. I would place the number of men essential to a division operating in the field at not less than 40 or 50. This would allow three for each combat battalion, enough perhaps to supply every reconnaissance, patrol, and every outpost undertaken by the battalion with a language man who is also trained in intelligence observation and collection of material, with a smaller element for duty at regimental and division headquarters. For an invading force that reached the aggregate of an army, say three corps, this would mean about 400 trained men.

The course of instruction as epitomized on page two of your letter would also seem good. There may be difficulty in securing a necessary number of officers to give the instruction in combat intelligence to such classes and I judge that a preliminary step would have to be to select and train a considerable number of young officers in combat intelligence who would form a part of the instructional staff of the enlisted men to be trained.

I trust I am not presuming in offering these observations. The matter interests me very much, and my interest originated from experience as Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 in the Philippines and on the American expedition to Siberia. For Siberian duty, and with the approval of the War Department, I selected fifty men from the American regiments in the Philippines who, by reason of foreign parentage, had a little linguistic capability, but the urgency with which the expedition was formed prevented giving these men any adequate preliminary training. However, they proved themselves useful throughout the Siberian intervention.

If I may be permitted to make a further observation, it would be that probably three such schools would be advisable, one in the eastern states, one in the middle section of the country, the 2nd and 3rd Armies, and one in the west, 4th Army. Mr. A. E. Manell, a former graduate student of mine in my seminar on "War in the Modern State" and a fine French scholar, with encouragement which I personally gave him, recently visited Washington and has pressed this idea upon the University of California. President Sproul appointed him a member of an academic committee to study the matter, of which he is secretary. The committee has just framed a report to President Sproul for possible presentation to the War and Navy Departments, copy of which I just received yesterday and will attach to this letter. Such a plan as this, of course, could not operate without the support and participation of the War Department and of the Fourth Army Commander. I have no knowledge as to whether or not it would be acceptable at these headquarters. However, I believe the University is staffed and equipped to make its contribution if this is desired.

The University of California also has committees at work creating new group majors for students in the junior and senior classes of the regular academic year, which majors will be built around colloquial preparation in various foreign languages, plus certain other studies, geographical, political, even anthropological and psychological, designed to make such graduates of the University proficient in this sort of work on their entrance into the Army.

I have made no mention of this matter to either General DeWitt or Admiral Greenslade, and would esteem your instructions as to whether or not I should do so at this time.

Sincerely yours,

David P. Barrows

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DPB:BF
Encl.

Copy to Colonel Buxton

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Respectfully submitted,

A. E. Manell
Faculty Club, Berkeley, California
Revised: 6.1.42

Confidential

COPY

To: The Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

From: A. E. Manell, International House, Berkeley, California

Subject: Plan for organization of a pool of foreign language personnel for service with expeditionary forces

Date: June 1, 1942

I. The Need

As our Expeditionary Task Forces are now engaged, and will operate increasingly, with or against people who speak languages and dialects ranging from Russian and French to Hindustani and Swahili, and countless others, one of our paramount needs will be for a large pool of soldier-specialists, trained in languages and intelligence functions, as a supplement to the Intelligence Section of the Army.

The Intelligence Section is aware, of course, of the job ahead, and is preparing to cope with it. It is obvious, however, that the size of the army we are building, and the scope of our involvement and responsibilities in this war, will necessitate expansion of our intelligence services, both in size and function, expressly adapted to the conduct of total war waged on a world scale.

In addition to its value to Intelligence, the pool should be important also as a clearing house to supply various branches of the Army in the field with foreign language personnel needed.

II. The Plan

The plan here proposed suggests an expeditious way to organize an Army unit or cadre to meet this need, and possesses three salient features:

(a) Candidates for this cadre shall be selected, from within the Army, who already possess some knowledge of the language and a background of information on the geography, history, and ethnographic features of a given region, such as Siberia, Denmark, or Japan, as well as on the basis of character, experience, and intelligence.

(b) Such candidates shall then be assigned (upon completion of the basic military training period) to one of three or more ARMY TRAINING CENTERS FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE PERSONNEL to be established at strategically situated universities in the United States - there to be given intensive correlated instruction in the languages, ethnography, military geography, history and economics, and psychology of the people of a given region, together with training in methods of intelligence and related technical skills. As the number of soldier-specialists needed is considerable, new groups could be assigned to Training Centers at regular intervals of from three to six months, depending upon the instruction period.

(c) There shall thus be developed a large pool of qualified Army personnel, to be drawn upon as circumstances demand, and instantly accessible for assignment to expeditionary task forces as they are earmarked for given regions for service in combat units, in military governments constituted in occupied territories, and

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(c) If it were generally known that such an [illegible] cadre was being organized it would serve as an important stimulant to the morale of men already in the Army, and of those who will be inducted, and who are qualified in languages and related disciplines, as it would promise the most effective exercise of their special capacities in the service.

(d) It would attract the enlistment into the Army of a larger number of men gifted in languages, who are now otherwise engaged in civilian work or are seeking preferred status in the Navy, which is more flexible in offering commissions. It is evident that the Army, because it must carry the attack to the enemy on his own ground, and must bear the brunt of capturing, consolidating and administering territory, perhaps simultaneously in far-flung theaters of operations, has the most need for these men.

(e) In the event of invasion of the continent of Europe by our troops, and likewise as we retake ground in the Pacific area, this cadre could assist in effective liaison with the underground armies of the subjugated nations, or with other forces which may be raised, and in promoting our objectives in reconquered areas.

(f) Finally, it may prove a decisive advantage to have available immediately on the conclusion of hostilities a pool of such men - capable, disciplined, hardened by the rigors of campaign, possessing first hand knowledge of conditions in countries to which they have been assigned, as well as a sure understanding of their languages and peoples. Whatever our most pressing responsibilities may then be in the conduct of our foreign relations, the services of such experienced personnel should add much to their effective solution.

VIII. Further Examination

The author of this memorandum has incorporated herein many suggestions arising out of recent consultations with General David P. Barrows, Vice-President and Provost Monroe E. Deutsch, Professor Robert J. Kerner, Dean Joel H. Hildebrand, of the University of California; Dwight Davis, Director-General, and Lewis Merriam, Henry B. Seidemann, Colonel Edward S. Gibson, of the Staff of the Army Specialists Corps, Washington, D. C.; Mortimer Graves, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C.; Harold Leasnell, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; Brigadier-General William C. Rose, Assistant Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., and Dr. Albert L. Barrows, Emerson, Psychological Warfare Service, Washington, D. C.

If the plan briefly outlined above is basically sound and practicable, further examination will be necessary. The writer would be pleased to cooperate with any military personnel assigned to take appropriate action.

Respectfully submitted,

A. R. Hasell
Faculty Club, Berkeley, California
Revised: 6.1.42

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

May 18,1942

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Colonel Wm.J.Donovan

FROM: G.Edward Buxton

Concerning General Barrows' letter to you of May 15th asking for instructions as to the transmission of a plan for setting up language schools for the instruction of officers and interpreters in the University of California, I would suggest that you instruct Barrows to have the plan submitted to you so that you can present it either to the Joint Chiefs or to the Secretaries of War and Navy.

I think this would be better than to have it taken up through General DeWitt because these schools would be national in scope and not simply a matter for the Fourth Army.

May 13, 1942

General David Barrc
333 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California

Dear General Barrows:

Thank you for your letter of May 8th, in which you suggest training in languages and combat intelligence for Task Forces.

The Military Intelligence Service of the War Department General Staff is conducting a school at Savage, Minnesota, to teach the Japanese language. This school was formerly in or near San Francisco and was moved away from the West Coast because that is now a theatre of operations.

The C.O.I. will operate for the War Department General Staff a unit which will be called the Intelligence School. All the soldiers now in the

army and all drafted men who speak any foreign language fluently are reported to this organization. We, therefore, have a pool of language experts ready for training.

At present the courses of instruction includes map making, map reading, combat intelligence, interpretation of aerial photographs, examination of prisoners (German, Japanese and Italian) examination of documents (German, Japanese and Italian) and the instruction of interpreters for military and civilian personnel of the countries in which the fig[illegible] is liable to take place. We expect to also hold a pool of trained men who can be attached to Task Forces according to the languages which will be encountered.

I believe, therefore, that this school, together with the Japanese Language School, covers all the suggestions in your letter and in addition I think the University of California cannot be used.

for the same reason that the Japanese language school was moved out of California.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Secret

Dear General Barrows:

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I believe, therefore, that this school, together with the Japanese Language School, covers all the suggestions in your letter and in addition, I think the University of California school cannot be used, for the same reason that the Japanese language school was moved from California ~~to Minnesota.~~

~~Yours very truly,~~ Sincerely

out by

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

May 8, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

In the past week I have had conversations with both MID and ONI about what I regard as an Army need for a pool of men trained in the languages of the countries and peoples whom we are under pledge to free of enemy invasion.

When our American expedition was sent into Siberia, having been in Siberia for the preceding six months on the mission of making a military estimate of the situation there, I was designated by the War Department as Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 of the expedition. Believing that neither our troops nor our staff could function intelligently without interpreters and language men, I secured approval from the War Department to select fifty such men from American troops in Manila. These men, by reason of their foreign immigrant parentage, spoke Russian and some other languages. They served a useful purpose, being detailed to accompany each detachment in the field. However, it was clear that if these men could have had more education and been given a period of systematic training to refresh their language knowledge and basic combat intelligence, etc., they would have been many times more valuable than they were, hastily picked out and put immediately into the field of operations.

We are now faced with the extraordinary situation noted above and, in the Far East, where Army operations must eventually take place if we are to win, the Army will need large numbers of men prepared on language and combat intelligence lines in at least four dialectical fields - Russian and Northern Chinese, Malay in the south, and I would add to Malay, Dutch. I believe that the University of California, where the administration and faculty are very eager to organize special instruction of value to our forces, might be able to organize colloquial language classes in all of these subjects, if the Army could detail men from the draft replacement centers after they had had their basic instruction. I judge that San Francisco or, more locally, the University of California, would be a suitable center for such instruction for the whole area of the Fourth Army or the Ninth Army Corps.

I have not discussed the matter with General DeWitt or his representative, but will enclose with this letter a memorandum prepared for the con-

sideration of the President and administration of the University. Again, this is only a tentative study but I submit it for instructions from you as to whether I should proceed further. Accompanying it is a memorandum from a rather gifted young man and former student of mine, Mr. A. E. Manelli, with whom I had conversations a good many weeks ago and who made a trip east during which he saw Mr. Dwight Davis, General Rose, and others about this very matter. These two documents can properly be considered together.

Sincerely yours,

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:BP
Encls.

Copy

MEMORANDUM May 6, 1942

To: The President of the University of California
From: David P. Barrows

Colloquial language instruction for Army and Navy details in languages of the Far East likely to be of vital importance to our forces in the event of Far Eastern operations and military administration.

1. There are two areas of the Far East in which joint Army and Navy operations may be anticipated. One is northeastern Asia, the eastern Russian provinces of Siberia, including Manchuria, Mongolia, and North China. Here the fundamental languages spoken are (a) Russian, and (b) northern Chinese dialect.

2. The second area is southeastern Asia and the East Indies, embracing the whole of the Netherlands Indies, including the Melanesian Islands of New Guinea and on each side of New Guinea, and British Malaya which includes the Malay peninsula, Sarawak, Labuan, British North Borneo, and several small islands. Within this language area also may be included the Sulu archipelago and the southern coast of Mindanao. In this area the two important languages, besides English, are Dutch and standard or literary Malay which is used by both white men and innumerable native peoples throughout the entire area.

3. The idea then would be that there should be a large pool of young men possessing both a college education and a certain language aptitude who could be assembled for brief courses in understanding and speaking these four languages. It is conceived that such men would be, first, drafted enlisted men drawn from the Army replacement camps who have completed their initial basic instruction. Such men would be detailed to these schools with little extra expense except commutation of rations, and on the satisfactory completion of the language course might be assured of a sergeant's or staff sergeant's rating. They would then be assigned to combat units going over the Pacific or, if the great their services are not immediately needed, retained in the school of instruction to make further progress with the language or languages.

4. It is conceived that soldiers possessing this simple language attainment might be invaluable in obtaining combat intelligence and on detail as interpreters at the headquarters of battalions, regiments, and divisions. These schools of instruction need not be restricted to enlisted men, but might include young officers of proper education and aptitude although it is judged that the officer personnel, in the Army at least,

may become a problem of such increasing difficulty that line officers could not be spared. In any case, the office of interpreter is a duty for a non-commissioned officer rather than an officer.

5. It is believed it would also be highly advantageous if, in addition to colloquial language training embracing most hours of the academic day, instruction could also be given these men in basic combat intelligence and in the military geography of the places in which they were designed to operate, and also in the character and culture of the native peoples. In Malaysia this should include a limited amount of information with respect to the tenets, prejudices, and fanaticisms of Islam.

6. In addition to these young men of draft age, who should be an essential element in the combat units, the necessity, in case of the success of American arms in driving the Japanese invaders out of this territory, for setting up military administration under the armed forces employed makes it recommendable that a more mature type of man, particularly a man who had service in the First World War but who may be today beyond the age of the draft or the age at which he would preferred for line duty, could likewise be prepared by such language courses and more ample instruction in the native culture and organization and in the colonial administration of the countries concerned, as well as in the general principles of military law and administration. The war against the Japanese is likely to be so determined and persistent as to make it highly undesirable to detail officers from the staff or line for duty under military government. Probably in no case could it be done while actual combat persists, without detriment to the effective fighting value of our armed forces. The United States Army obviously appreciates the necessity of training officers in the character and administrative services of military government, as witness the school to be established at Charlottesville, Virginia for this purpose. However, it is submitted that in addition to this basic and necessary addition to an officer's knowledge, language equipment appropriate to the country in which he may have duty under administrative government is of great importance.

7. Having had a little preliminary consultation with responsible officers in this state of both the Army and the Navy, and having received their endorsement of this plan, in principle at least, I seek the privilege of laying it before the President of the University of California for his consideration as to whether this University might not properly make an offer of the necessary hospitality and instruction to undertake this task on a broad experimental basis. The University, through its own teaching staff, is equipped to teach Chinese and Russian, and by engaging some additional support through the use of volunteers or men engaged as department assistants, could, it is believed, offer colloquial instruction in all four of these languages. The length of such instruction in order to give a minimum qualification would have to be a matter of some experiment, but might tentatively be set at a minimum of three months.

8. It is further suggested, though no consultation has been had upon such a matter, that soldiers detailed for this duty might, for purposes of command and discipline, be placed under the senior military and senior naval officers on duty with the University. It is believed that

the services of the University California Press would be adequate to print the necessary lessons in conducting this instruction.

9. It is recommended that this report be studied within the University in such manner as the President may direct, and if a plan can be evolved that promises success it is recommended that it be submitted to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

David P. Barrows

COPY

Preliminary Memorandum re Organization of Army Language Corps

I. The Need

As our basic strategy in the conduct of the war, clearly set forth by the Commander-in-Chief and repeatedly emphasized by military and government spokesmen, envisages the use of American Expeditionary Forces in far-flung theatres of operation, its most effective execution involves the need of an Army Language Corps, as an important arm of the Military Intelligence Service in the field.

A Language Corps, composed of men in the Army, selected systematically and carefully on the basis of their present mastery of languages, and trained in methods of military intelligence, would ensure a ready pool of soldier specialists, subdivided according to the main land and language areas of the world, and to be drawn upon as and when circumstances and military strategy dictate, in overcoming the enemy wherever and whenever we can hit him hardest.

Thus a commanding officer charged with the responsibility of conducting a mission in any land theatre of operations abroad would be enabled instantly to attach to his expeditionary force a body of soldier specialists, having a thorough knowledge of the languages and of the military and economic geography of the field of operations, equipped with skills essential in all phases of reconnaissance, and possessed of training and character that will command the confidence of the population within the area.

Our own experience, and the experience of the enemy in Europe and Asia, have demonstrated the peculiar need for and the extraordinary usefulness of a Language Corps in total war waged on a global scale.

II. How to Meet the Need

The draft, together with voluntary enlistments, is bringing into the Army thousands of men, who either because of foreign birth, or by virtue of previous intensive study and travel abroad, possess an oral and written mastery of one or more foreign languages. Many have used such language skills as a tool in the advanced study of history, geography, economics, political science, and other disciplines toward advanced university degrees, or for professional purposes. While a number of such qualified individuals are eventually assigned to Military Intelligence Work, the absence of a clearly defined, systematic and comprehensive plan for a Language Corps often results in the assignment of such men to tasks, and to units operating in areas, where the best use cannot be made of their particular language skills.

Thus the lack of a precise formulated plan sometimes results in the assignment of a man knowing Hindustani to a force stationed in England, and of others knowing Russian to Africa. Should the need suddenly emerge for a force to be dispatched swiftly to Siberia and India, it would of course involve much lost motion to track down the competent linguists needed, and perhaps to reassign them to a language task in another part of the world.

Accordingly, it is suggested that a Language Corps be organized, based on an integrated and overall plan, to meet such future contingencies as may now be envisioned.

Qualified men may be earmarked for a branch of the Language Corps either at the time of induction, or later by applying for and being assigned to the Corps. A Board of Review, representing each of the main world language groups, stationed at several points throughout this country, shall pass on all applications. Successful applicants shall then be assigned to one of several special Army Intelligence schools, when the basic three months training period is completed, there to be trained by Military Intelligence officers for a period of perhaps three months in methods of intelligence, and in a review of the military geography and such other subjects as may be considered necessary, in preparing the soldier specialist for effective service in the theatre of operations for which he is best suited. Thus for example, a soldier possessing a command of Russian and perhaps certain Siberian dialects, would be trained in the military geography of Russia, with especial emphasis on Siberia; likewise if he showed special aptitude for artillery, he would master the special vocabulary and particular problems of that branch. Then the moment a given Division were earmarked for service in Siberia, he would be promptly assigned to an artillery unit in that Division.

A preliminary estimate suggests that a minimum of fifty Language Corps effectives be assigned to every Division. Thus the total personnel of the Language Corps may in time number twenty-five thousand men or more. The rank of such soldier specialists shall be determined according to their individual qualifications, but it is assumed that many would be eligible for commissions.

III. The Advantages

The primary advantage has been stated: an officer ordered to lead an expeditionary force in any theatre can immediately attach to each Division of his command a minimum of fifty men from the Language Corps pool; the officers and men of the Language Corps will be disciplined soldiers who can fight, but who, moreover, can be employed flexibly in reconnaissance, interpreting, scouting, counter espionage, and in relations with the population in the theatre of war, as circumstance demands.

In addition, it is thought that the formal public announcement of the organization of the Army Language Corps would serve:

(a) as an important stimulant to the morale of men already in the Army, and of those who will be inducted, and who are especially qualified in languages, as it would promise the most effective exercise of their talents during the war.

(b) to attract the prompt enlistment into the Army of a larger number of men gifted in languages, who because of the somewhat more flexible system employed by the Navy in issuing commissions to qualified civilians, do not wait to be drafted. It seems evident that the Army, because it must carry the attack to the enemy on his own ground, and must bear the brunt of capturing and consolidating territory, perhaps simultaneously in far flung theatres of operations, has the most considerable need for a Language Corps;

(c) as one more weapon in the "war of nerves," for it would be an additional notice to the totalitarian enemy that the final day of reckoning is nearer at hand;

(d) as an additional source of comfort, aid and encouragement, when relayed by shortwave, to the peoples of the subjugated democracies in Europe and Asia, and to their underground armies, in the fore-knowledge that plans for their final delivery are being prepared with thoroughness.

In the event of invasion of the continent of Europe by our troops, possibly in concert with other United Nations' forces, and likewise as we recapture ground in the Pacific theatre, the Language Corps could be utilized as an effective liaison with underground armies of the subjugated nations, or with other forces that may be raised, and in promoting our objectives in reconquered areas.

Finally the Language Corps could be employed effectively in helping to resolve some of the problems immediately attendant on demobilization at the conclusion of hostilities.

IV. Further Study

If the plan briefly outlined above is basically sound and practicable, further research and study, taking into account detailed analyses of the various problems raised, of the facts and figures involved, of the cost in time and money, of the experience of the German, Japanese, British, Russian armies in similar enterprises, should be undertaken.

The writer of this memorandum is prepared to present further memoranda if so requested.

Submitted by:
A. E. Manell
International House
Berkeley, California
4.14.42

COPY

May 8, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
23th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

In the past week I have had conversations with both MID and ONI about what I regard as an Army need for a pool of men trained in the languages of the countries and peoples whom we are under pledge to free of enemy invasion.

When our American expedition was sent into Siberia, having been in Siberia for the preceding six months on the mission of making a military estimate of the situation there I was designated by the War Department as Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 of the expedition. Believing that neither our troops nor our staff could function intelligently without interpreters and language men, I secured approval from the War Department to select fifty such men from American troops in Manila. These men, by reason of their foreign immigrant parentage, spoke Russian and some other languages. They served a useful purpose, being detailed to accompany each detachment in the field. However, it was clear that if these men could have had more education and then given a period of systematic training to refresh their language knowledge and basic combat intelligence, etc., they would have been many times more valuable than they were, hastily picked out and put immediately into the field of operations.

We are now faced with the extraordinary situation noted above and, in the Far East, where Army operations must eventually take place if we are to win, the Army will need large numbers of men prepared on language and combat intelligence lines in at least four dialectical fields - Russian and Northern Chinese, Malay in the south, and I would add to Malay, Dutch. I believe that the University of California, where the administration and faculty are very eager to organize special instruction of value to our forces, might be able to organize colloquial language classes in all of these subjects, if the Army could detail men from the draft replacement centers after they had had their basic instruction. I judge that San Francisco or, more locally, the University of California, would be a suitable center for such instruction for the whole area of the Fourth Army or the Ninth Army Corps.

I have not discussed the matter with General DeWitt or his representative, but will enclose with this letter a memorandum prepared for the con-

sideration of the President and administration of the University. Again, this is only a tentative study but I submit it for instructions from you as to whether I should proceed further. Accompanying it is a memorandum from a rather gifted young man and former student of mine, Mr. A. E. Wanell, with whom I had conversations a good many weeks ago and who made a trip east during which he saw Mr. Dwight Davis, General Rose, and others about this very matter. These two documents can properly be considered together.

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David Prescott Barrows

DPB:MP
Encls.

MEMORANDUM May 6, 1942

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3. The idea then would be that there should be a large pool of young men possessing both a college education and a certain language aptitude who could be assembled for brief courses in understanding and speaking these four languages. It is conceived that such men would be, first, drafted enlisted men drawn from the Army replacement camps who have completed their initial basic training. Such men would be detailed to these schools with little added expense except consumption of rations, and on the satisfactory completion of the language course might be assured of a sergeant's or staff sergeant's rating. They could then be assigned to combat units going over the Pacific or, in the event their services are not immediately needed, retained in the school of instruction to make further progress with the language or languages.

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may become a problem of such increasing difficulty that line officers could not be spared. In any case, the office of interpreter is a duty for a non-commissioned officer rather than an officer.

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the services of the University California Press would be adequate to print the necessary lessons in conducting this instruction.

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David P. Barrows

COPY

Preliminary Memorandum re Organization of Army Language Corps

I. The Need

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The writer of this memorandum is prepared to present further memoranda if so requested.

Submitted by:
A. E. [illegible]
International House
Berkeley, California
4.14.42

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

pe not rel.

May 11,1942

MEMORANDUM:

To: Colonel Wm.J.Donovan

From: Colonel G.Edward Buxton

I received a copy of General Barrows' letter of May 8th to you concerning a "pool of men trained in the languages of the countries and peoples whom we are under pledge to free of enemy invasion".

It seems to me that his recommendation to the President of the University of California is sound.

It occurred to me that you might want to have David Bruce or Preston Goodfellow take the subject up with G-2. Perhaps you wish to say something to General Smith about it in case they want to assign the activity to your Agency.

If a school were set up in the University of California under our auspices I think General Barrows would make a very good man to organize and administer the school, although there might be a better suggestion.

GEB FS

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GEB PS

Colonel Buxton

COPY

May 8, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

In the past week I have had conversations with both MID and CWI about what I regard as an Army need for a pool of men trained in the languages of the countries and peoples when we are under pledge to free of enemy invasion.

When our American expedition was sent into Siberia, having been in Siberia for the preceding six months on the mission of making a military estimate of the situation there I was designated by the War Department as Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 of the expedition. Believing that neither our troops nor our staff could function intelligently without interpreters and language men, I secured approval from the War Department to select fifty such men from American troops in Manila. These men, by reason of their foreign immigrant parentage, spoke Russian and some other languages. They served a useful purpose, being detailed to accompany each detachment in the field. However, it was clear that if these men could have had more education and been given a period of systematic training to refresh their language knowledge and basic combat intelligence, etc., they would have been many times more valuable than they were, hastily picked out and put immediately into the field of operations.

We are now faced with the extraordinary situation noted above and, in the Far East, where Army operations must eventually take place if we are to win, the Army will need large numbers of men prepared on language and combat intelligence lines in at least four dialectical fields - Russian and Northern Chinese, Malay in the south, and I would add to Malay, Dutch. I believe that the University of California, where the administration and faculty are very eager to organize special instruction of value to our forces, might be able to organize colloquial language classes in all of these subjects, if the Army could detail men from the draft replacement centers after they had had their basic instruction. I judge that San Francisco or, more locally, the University of California, would be a suitable center for such instruction for the whole area of the Fourth Army or the Ninth Army Corps.

I have not discussed the matter with General DeWitt or his representative, but will enclose with this letter a memorandum prepared for the con-

sideration of the President and administration of the University. Again, this is only a tentative study but I submit it for instructions from you as to whether I should proceed further. Accompanying it is a memorandum from a rather gifted young man and former student of mine, Mr. A. E. Menoll, with whom I had conversations a good many weeks ago and who made a trip east during which he saw Mr. Dwight Davis, General Rose, and others about this very matter. These two documents can properly be considered together.

Sincerely yours,

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:EP
Encls.

May 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: The President of the University of California
From: David P. Barrows

Colloquial language instruction for Army and Navy details in languages of the Far East likely to be of vital importance to our forces in the event of Far Eastern operations and military administration.

1. There are two areas of the Far East in which joint Army and Navy operations may be anticipated. One is northeastern Asia, the eastern Russian provinces of Siberia, including Manchuria, Mongolia, and North China. Here the fundamental languages spoken are (a) Russian, and (b) northern Chinese dialect.

2. The second area is southeastern Asia and the East Indies, embracing the whole of the Netherlands Indies, including the Melanesian Islands of New Guinea and on each side of New Guinea, and British Malaya which includes the Malay peninsula, Sarawak, Labuan, British North Borneo, and several small islands. Within this language area also may be included the Sulu archipelago and the southern coast of Mindanao. In this area the two important languages, besides English, are Dutch and standard or literary Malay which is used by both white men and innumerable native peoples throughout the entire area.

3. The idea that would be that there should be a large pool of young men possessing both a college education and a certain language aptitude who could be assembled for brief courses in understanding and speaking these four languages. It is conceived that such men would be, first, drafted enlisted men drawn from the Army replacement camps who have completed their initial basic instruction. Such men could be detailed to these schools with little added expense except commutation of rations, and on the satisfactory completion of the language course might be assured of a sergeant's or staff sergeant's rating. They would then be assigned to combat units going over the Pacific or, in the event their services are not immediately needed, retained in the school of instruction to make further progress with the language or languages.

4. It is conceived that soldiers possessing this simple language aptitude might be invaluable in obtaining combat intelligence and on detach as interpreters at the headquarters of battalions, regiments, and divisions. Young officers of proper education and aptitude might furnish young officers of proper education and aptitude and, but might furnish young officers of proper education and aptitude although it is believed that the officer personnel, in the Army at least,

may become a problem of such increasing difficulty that line officers could not be spared. In any case, the office of interpreter is a duty for a non-commissioned officer rather than an officer.

5. It is believed it would also be highly advantageous if, in addition to colloquial language training embracing most hours of the academic day, instruction could also be given these men in basic combat intelligence and in the military geography of the places in which they were designed to operate, and also in the character and culture of the native peoples. In Malaysia this should include a limited amount of information with respect to the tenets, prejudices, and fanaticisms of Islam.

6. In addition to these young men of draft age, who should be an essential element in the combat units, the necessity, in case of the success of American arms in driving the Japanese invaders out of this territory, for setting up military administration under the armed forces employed makes it recommendable that a more mature type of man, particularly a man who had service in the first World War but who may be today beyond the age of the draft or the age at which he would preferred for line duty, could likewise be prepared by such language courses and more ample instruction in the native culture and organization and in the colonial administration of the countries concerned, as well as in the general principles of military law and administration. The war against the Japanese is likely to be so determined and persistent as to make it highly undesirable to detail officers from the staff or line for duty under military government. Probably in no case could it be done while actual combat persists, without detriment to the effective fighting value of our armed forces. The United States Army obviously appreciates the necessity of training officers in the character and administrative services of military government, as witness the school to be established at Charlottesville, Virginia for this purpose. However, it is submitted that in addition to this basic and necessary addition to an officer's knowledge, language equipment appropriate to the country in which he may have duty under administrative government is of great importance.

7. Having had a little preliminary consultation with responsible officers in this state of both the Army and the Navy, and having received their endorsement of this plan, in principle at least, I seek the privilege of laying it before the President of the University of California for his consideration as to whether this University might not properly make an offer of the necessary hospitality and instruction to undertake this task on a broad experimental basis. The University, through its own teaching staff, is equipped to teach Chinese and Russian, and by engaging some additional support through the use of volunteers or men engaged as department assistants, could, it is believed, offer colloquial instruction in all four of those languages. The length of such instruction in order to give a minimum qualification would have to be a matter of some experiment, but might tentatively be set at a minimum of three months.

8. It is further suggested, though no consultation has been had upon such a matter, that soldiers detailed for this duty might, for purposes of command and discipline, be placed under the senior military and senior naval officers on duty with the University. It is believed that

the services of the University California Press would be adequate to print the necessary lessons in conducting this instruction.

9. It is recommended that this proposal be studied within the University in such manner as the President may direct, and if a plan can be evolved that promises success it be recommended that it be submitted to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

David P. Barrows

COPY

Preliminary Memorandum re Organization of Army Language Corps

I. The Need

As our basic strategy in the conduct of the war, clearly set forth by the Commander-in-Chief and repeatedly emphasized by military and government spokesmen, envisages the use of American Expeditionary Forces in far-flung theatres of operation, its most effective execution involves the need of an Army Language Corps, as an important arm of the Military Intelligence Service in the field.

A Language Corps, composed of men in the Army, selected systematically and carefully on the basis of their present mastery of languages, and trained in methods of military intelligence, would ensure a ready pool of soldier specialists, subdivided according to the main land and language areas of the world, and to be drawn upon as and when circumstances and military strategy dictate, in overcoming the enemy wherever and whenever we can hit him hardest.

Thus a commanding officer charged with the responsibility of conducting a mission in any land theatre of operations abroad would be enabled instantly to attach to his expeditionary force a body of soldier specialists, having a thorough knowledge of the languages and of the military and economic geography of the field of operations, equipped with skills essential in all phases of reconnaissance, and possessed of training and character that will command the confidence of the population within the area.

Our own experience, and the experience of the enemy in Europe and Asia, have demonstrated the peculiar need for and the extraordinary usefulness of a Language Corps in total war waged on a global scale.

II. How to Meet the Need

The draft, together with voluntary enlistments, is bringing into the Army thousands of men, who either because of foreign birth, or by virtue of previous intensive study and travel abroad, possess an oral and written mastery of one or more foreign languages. Many have used such language skills as a tool in the advanced study of history, geography, economics, political science, and other disciplines toward advanced university degrees, or for professional purposes. While a number of such qualified individuals are eventually assigned to Military Intelligence Work, the absence of a clearly defined, systematic and comprehensive plan for a Language Corps often results in the assignment of such men to tasks, and to units operating in areas, where the best use cannot be made of their particular language skills.

Thus the lack of a precise formulated plan sometimes results in the assignment of a man knowing Hindustani to a force stationed in England, and of others knowing Russian to Africa. Should the need suddenly emerge for a force to be dispatched swiftly to Siberia and India, it would of course involve much lost motion to track down the competent linguists needed, and perhaps to reassign them to a language task in another part of the world.

Accordingly, it is suggested that a Language Corps be organized, based on an integrated and overall plan, to meet such future contingencies as may now be envisioned.

Qualified men may be earmarked for a branch of the Language Corps either at the time of induction, or later by applying for and being assigned to the Corps. A Board of Review, representing each of the main world language groups, stationed at several points throughout this country, shall pass on all applications. Successful applicants shall then be assigned to one of several special Army Intelligence schools, when the basic three months training period is completed, there to be trained by Military Intelligence officers for a period of perhaps three months in methods of intelligence, and in a review of the military geography and such other subjects as may be considered necessary, in preparing the soldier specialist for effective service in the theatre of operations for which he is best suited. Thus for example, a soldier possessing a command of Russian and perhaps certain Siberian dialects, would be trained in the military geography of Russia, with especial emphasis on Siberia; likewise if he showed special aptitude for artillery, he would master the special vocabulary and particular problems of that branch. Then the moment a given Division were earmarked for service in Siberia, he would be promptly assigned to an artillery unit in that Division.

A preliminary estimate suggests that a minimum of fifty Language Corps effectives be assigned to every Division. Thus the total personnel of the Language Corps may in time number twenty-five thousand men or more. The rank of such soldier specialists shall be determined according to their individual qualifications, but it is assumed that many would be eligible for commissions.

III. The Advantages

The primary advantage has been stated: an officer ordered to lead an expeditionary force in any theatre can immediately attach to each Division of his command a minimum of fifty men from the Language Corps pool; the officers and men of the Language Corps will be disciplined soldiers who can fight, but who, moreover, can be employed flexibly in reconnaissance, interpreting, scouting, counter espionage, and in relations with the population in the theatre of war, as circumstance demands.

In addition, it is thought that the formal public announcement of the organization of the Army Language Corps would serve:

(a) as an important stimulant to the morale of men already in the Army, and of those who will be inducted, and who are especially qualified in languages, as it would promise the most effective exercise of their talents during the war.

(b) to attract the prompt enlistment into the Army of a larger number of men gifted in languages, who because of the somewhat more flexible system employed by the Navy in issuing commissions to qualified civilians, do not wait to be drafted. It seems evident that the Army, because it must carry the attack to the enemy on his own ground, and must bear the burden of capturing and consolidating territory, perhaps simultaneously in far flung theatres of operations, has the most considerable need for a Language Corps;

(c) as one more weapon in the "war of nerves," for it would be an additional notice to the totalitarian enemy that the final day of reckoning is nearer at hand;

(d) as an additional source of comfort, aid and encouragement, when relayed by shortwave, to the peoples of the subjugated democracies in Europe and Asia, and to their underground armies, in the fore-knowledge that plans for their final delivery are being prepared with thoroughness.

In the event of invasion of the continent of Europe by our troops, possibly in concert with other United Nations' forces, and likewise as we recapture ground in the Pacific theatre, the Language Corps could be utilized as an effective liaison with underground armies of the subjugated nations, or with other forces that may be raised, and in promoting our objectives in reconquered areas.

Finally the Language Corps could be employed effectively in helping to resolve some of the problems immediately attendant on demobilization at the conclusion of hostilities.

IV. Further Study

If the plan briefly outlined above is basically sound and practicable, further research and study, taking into account detailed analyses of the various problems raised, of the facts and figures involved, of the cost in time and money, of the experience of the German, Japanese, British, Russian armies in similar enterprises, should be undertaken.

The writer of this memorandum is prepared to present further memoranda if so requested.

Submitted by:
A. E. Manelli
International House
Berkeley, California
4.14.42

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. J. R. Murphy April 22, 1942

From: C. F. Remer C.F.R.

Subject: California College in China (College of Chinese Studies)

Dr. Barrow's letter of March 25, 1942, is returned herewith.

I am happy to know that Dr. William R. Pettus' institution is in operation. You will remember that the Coordinator of Information played some part in bringing this about.

I shall be glad to see the statement, when it reaches your office, to which Dr. Barrows refers in his closing paragraph.

attachment

Barrows
Pettus
Interpreters

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

March 25, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
25th & "E" Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

The College of Chinese Studies in Peiping, under President William B. Pettus, for many years has been giving training in the Chinese language and Chinese culture, and has had as students a great many missionaries of various denominations as well as some officers of our Army and others desiring an intensive and practical instruction. Having to leave Peiping and its well-established collection of buildings and academic facilities there, the College has moved for the present to the University of California. The University affords it hospitality and shelter for its library and classes, and President Pettus has arranged for the financial support of the faculty, both American and Chinese, to carry on these studies here during the present war. The plan as in operation seems to be starting well. A meeting was held last week of the Board of Directors of "California in China" which is a corporation under the laws of California for the support of the Peiping institution, and the President of the University of California has appointed a special committee, headed by Professor Budberg, a very able scholar in the language and literature of China, to cooperate. A part of the library of the Peiping school was gotten out of China before the Japanese interfered with the institution there, and, added to the rather extensive and rich library on Oriental languages in the possession of the University, gives, I judge, a very adequate basis for instruction and investigation of any type.

Had a talk this morning with President Pettus in which he brought forward his idea that his school, located now at Berkeley, could perform a service in training officers of the United States Army in China. He tells me that General Stilwell was at one time a language student at his school, and that he has written him for advice as to his own need for language officers and hopes shortly to have the benefit of General Stilwell's recommendations.

At the same time I raised with Pettus the question of whether important service could not be rendered by his institution in training American-born Chinese young men to act as interpreters and as intelligence agents, particularly in combat intelligence, and in this way build up a reserve of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men who might be of first rate aid to forces which it is conceivable we may put into China. In the A.E.F. Siberia it fell to me to provide as far as practicable soldier interpreters who could speak Russian and other languages, and I found that one such trained man per battalion was by no means too much, in fact, it

was a bare minimum. Dr. Pettus says that young Chinese in this state who speak Cantonese as the language of their parents and early home associations can make much more rapid progress with Mandarin than students without this early introduction to a difficult Chinese dialect. There must be a large number of Chinese within and beyond military age in this state who might be qualified as a valuable interpreter corps.

In the mobilization of the 91st Division at Fort Lewis in 1917 there were a considerable number of Chinese American-born citizens. Some of them showed distinct aptitude and I never heard any complaint that they did not do their duty well. These particular men who had this experience twenty-five years ago may now be beyond the draft age in this world war, but many of them might be available for this special duty if they were given a preliminary training. There are other young Chinese, American-born, in the Fourth Army and Western Defense Command, but I have no information as to their numbers.

If the expedient of drawing on these two classes for a considerable number of student interpreters is judged by General Marshall and the War Department to be a good thing to do, Pettus assures me that he could organize such a group immediately and that in a relatively short time they could be expected to possess the necessary language equipment. It would also be possible, in my opinion, to give them such training as would make them effective intelligence agents in battalions operating in American forces in China if this contingency occurs.

I have asked Pettus to put his plan and a statement of his facilities in the form of a memorandum which I will submit to you within a few days. This letter of advice is preliminary to a more exact report.

Sincerely yours,

David P. Barrows

DPB:P

David Prescott Barrows

For Colonel Donovan

COPY

University of California
Berkeley, California
March 17, 1942

To-
Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell
American Embassy
Chungking, China (Via Africa Clipper)

Dear Joe:

The news given us by newspapers and radio, of your going to China and your work there, has greatly encouraged me. I am glad too to know that Frank Roberts, and others qualified in Chinese, are out there with you, as well as in Bill Mayer's office. I saw Isabel yesterday, and she told me of news from Bill.

I am much concerned, however, about the failure, to the present time, by both Army and Navy and the Marines as well, to put any of the officers or men in preparation here so that they can be qualified in a knowledge of Chinese for service over there.

It is altogether good and constructive that the Navy has a considerable group studying Japanese at Berkeley and another at Cambridge. The Army has also a group studying Japanese, but so far none are studying Chinese, and much of the future of this war and of the world depends upon the completeness of the cooperation between China and America.

The efforts we have made to secure funds and staff for our cooperation with the University of California, have succeeded. Foundations, Mission Boards and individuals have given us the funds needed. It has been endorsed by the Secretary of State, Colonel Donovan, the President of the United States, and many others. I have gathered a faculty of excellent Chinese from North China, as well as several Americans who have spent thirty years or more in North China. We have our teaching material here.

I wrote a note to Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt. He had a Colonel on his staff telephone me. I talked with the Colonel who could see the importance of Japanese, but saw no need for the study of Chinese. I have written several times to the War Department, and they express interest and ask questions, but so far there has been no action.

A brief note from you to General George C. Marshall, or to the Secretary of War, stating the need for training, would bring results I am sure. Frank Roberts is familiar with some of the plans, but left before we secured the funds necessary to carry out our program. I am sure you will know how to shape a radiogram that will bring results.

I have just learned that Alison has an exhibit in the California State Library at Sacramento this month. Sarah and I will plan to drive out and see it.

If you are anywhere near Changsha I hope you will see our boy, Hinton. He has had great opportunities there, and enjoyed them hugely. Do you need such a medical officer as Hinton on your staff?

Always with best wishes,

Cordially yours,

(Signed) W. H. Forster

Top ↑

Barrows 5123

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

DATE: April 8, 1942

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. James Murphy through Mr. David K. E. Bruce DKEB

FROM: J. R. Hayden

SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. David P. Barrows, March 31.

I believe that this letter refers to the same matter concerning which Dr. Pettus wrote to Colonel Donovan about ten days ago. At that time I gave Colonel Donovan orally certain information about Dr. Pettus' school and I believe that the action which Dr. Pettus requested was taken.

Attachment

[Exposure 1 - 62 - RHB 63]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

March 31, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & "E" Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I explained a few days ago the project discussed with Dr. William B. Pettus for the training of officers and American-born Chinese soldiers as interpreters and intelligence men at the College of Chinese Studies now temporarily located in Berkeley.

Dr. Pettus has furnished me with a copy of his letter to General Stilwell, who is an old friend and who formerly studied in the School at Peiping. In my position at present, I think that this proposal from Dr. Pettus and his correspondence with General Stilwell should be given to General Marshall through you.

Sincerely yours,

David F. Barrows

David Fredett Barrows

DFB:P
Encl.

Copy to Colonel Baxton

CONFIDENTIAL

For Colonel Donovan

COPY

University of California
Berkeley, California
March 17, 1942

To-
Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell
American Embassy
Chungking, China (Via Africa Clipper)

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If you are anywhere near Changsha I hope you will see our boy, Winston. He has had great opportunities there, and enjoyed them hugely. Do you need such a medical officer as Winston on your staff?

Always with best wishes,

Cordially

(Signed) W. B. Pettus

CONFIDENTIAL

Bell...

File

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

March 18, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & "E" Streets
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have a much younger colleague at the University of California in the Department of Political Science, Eric C. Bellquist, who has been asked by one of our agencies to prepare short biographical sketches and character estimates of the influential people of Sweden. I have asked him for the privilege of making copies of these sketches to send to you, and he is willing that I should do this. He has the best acquaintanceship with Sweden of any American whom I know, and a very unusual acquaintanceship with the leading personalities of that country, either there or here. The fact is, during his periods of study in Sweden in recent years, they quite admitted him into their political and diplomatic confidence. He is a man of unusual ability. He was educated at the University of California and I have known him intimately for a good many years, have been his teacher, and speak from an informed knowledge of his character and abilities.

I am enclosing a note about him in case your office should want information on Sweden or upon Norway, Denmark, and Finland, countries with which he has some personal acquaintance. At the same time, I am sending the names of several other Americans who have been in Sweden and have studied that country. This information was supplied me by Bellquist himself.

Bellquist was in Sweden when the Russian attack on Finland occurred. He prepared and sent to me at that time an unusually clear and objective estimate of the defensive capacity of the Finns. The Finnish war with Russia was justified and realized everything he said. Though this is past information, it may have interest to you and I shall have a copy of it made. At the time of its reception, nearly three years ago now, I sent a copy of it to the War Department.

While I know almost nothing about this, I believe that the Scandinavian situation, with Sweden as a center, ought to be closely followed. I understand we have excellent Foreign Office people there, and doubtless this is being done, but we may see a showdown there this summer in a new field of warfare. Meanwhile, I believe your office should be supplied with the best estimates of Swedish leadership that we can get, and I know that Mr. Bellquist can contribute to this.

Sincerely yours,

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:P
Encls.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

March 16, 1942

From: David Prescott Barrows

Subject:

Eric C. Bellquist, Assistant Professor, University of California. The son of Swedish born parents of very fine middle class quality. Father now dead. Born in this country, lived in Murphysboro, Tennessee, before family established itself in the San Joaquin Valley in California. Largely by his own efforts he made his way through the University of California and through the graduate years. Ph.D. degree from the University of California. Academic record, including his appointment to various traveling fellowships, etc., indicated on attached sheet. On same sheet is a list of his writings, both in English and in Swedish. His life in Sweden established seemingly firm and highly advantageous friendships with leading Swedish personalities. Swedish Foreign Service in this country holds him in esteem and confidence. Is not only an excellent college teacher, but the ablest young thinker in the political science field that I know or have known. In spite of his junior grade, has acted as Chairman of the Department of Political Science. In my opinion, he would be an invaluable man to any office in the United States having relations with the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, or desiring reliable and scientific information upon them. I would put him number one in this country among authorities on Sweden.

Other names (and these are gentlemen who are well recommended to me but whom I do not know personally) follow:

Roy V. Peel - Political scientist. Formerly at New York University; now Director of the Institute of Politics at the University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana. Has spent two years in Sweden and knows the language thoroughly; is an authority on Scandinavian local government. Is also well acquainted with economic affairs in the northern countries.

Arthur Wald - Spent 1939 and 1940 in Sweden. Long a student of the cultural institutions of this country. Teaches the Swedish language at Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois, and is also thoroughly familiar with the German and Spanish languages.

Bart Schaaf - Now teaching at Richmond Technical Institute, (branch of William & Mary College) at Richmond, Virginia. Is a young man, with a fair command of the Swedish language. Took his doctorate at the University of Michigan two years ago, his dissertation being a work on Swedish political parties. This has not been published. Is thoroughly familiar with the Swedish party system, particularly the social democratic group.

Albin Andersson - Now in California. A Fellow of the American Scandinavian Foundation in 1938 and 1939. The son of a Swedish minister of the gospel in California; now a foreman in a local shipbuilding company while, at the same time,

completing the work for his doctorate. Has been secretary of the local chapter of the American Scandinavian Foundation. Is well acquainted with Scandinavian groups and group leaders throughout this country. His dissertation for his doctorate, which will be completed within a few weeks, treats the life of Oxenstierna, the eminent Swedish statesman, adviser of Gustavus Adolphus.

Anderson has a younger brother who is now in Sweden and is doing the broadcasting for N.B.C. from that country.

DPB:P

VITA - ERIC CYRIL BELLQUIST

EDUCATION

Elementary: Christiana, Tennessee
High School: Ripon, California, was graduated in three years, 1923.
College and University: Modesto Junior College, Modesto, California, 1923-25; A.B., University of California, 1927; M.A., 1928; and Ph.D., 1932. Studied abroad, 1930-31, University of Uppsala, Sweden. Also some research and observation in Denmark, Germany, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland. Further research in the Scandinavian countries and Finland, 1939-40.

ATTAINMENTS

Carrie M. Jones Scholar, 1925-26
Swedish-American Scholar, 1926-27
Teaching Fellow, 1927-28
Teaching Assistant in American Government, 1929-30
Appointed Amy Bowles Johnson Traveling Fellow in Political Science, American-Scandinavian Foundation Traveling Fellow, and Carnegie Fellow in International Law, 1930.
University Fellow in Political Science, 1931-32.
Social Science Research Council post-doctoral fellow, 1939-40.

EMPLOYMENT AND EXPERIENCE

Newspaper work, Stockton and Modesto, California, 1922-25.
Reader, Department of Political Science, University of California, 1926-27, 1929-30, and Inter and Summer Sessions, 1927-31.
Teaching Fellow, Department of Political Science, 1927-28.
Senior Teaching Fellow, Department of Political Science, 1928-29.
Teaching Assistant in American Government, Department of Political Science, 1929-30.
Research work for the Commonwealth Club, Summer, 1930.
Study abroad, as above, 1930-31.
Instructor in Political Science, Los Angeles Junior College, 1932-36.
Member of Carnegie Summer Session, Teaching of International Law, 1935.
Instructor in Political Science, University of California, 1936-39. Also Lecturer in Journalistic Studies, University of California, February 21 - May 31, 1939.
Social Science Research Council Fellow, 1939-40.
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, 1939-
Lecturer, Orientations Course, U. S. Army, 1942.

It might be added that during Professor Bellquist's year of study, research, and travel in the Scandinavian countries, 1939-40, he made extensive observations in the political field, with special attention to propaganda and public opinion in these countries. After his return from his European trip, he was decorated by King Gustaf of Sweden in recognition of his interest in and service to the Swedish Government and people.

PUBLICATIONS

Treatises

Some Aspects of the Recent Foreign Policy of Sweden, University of California Press, 1929.

The New Deal in Operation, Los Angeles Junior College, 1933.

PUBLICATIONS (Cont.)

Articles

"The Heinrich Augustin, A Consideration of the Attitude of Sweden on the Territoriality of Bays," 24 American Journal of International Law (1930), 776-783.
"Sveriges Insatser til Varldspolitikens Stabilisering efter Kriget," 34 Statsvetenskaplig Tidskirft (1931), 31-54 (Swedish Contributions to Post War Stability, published in the Swedish Political Science Review.)
"The First Northern Political Science and Public Law Congress," 25 American Political Science Review (1931).
"Possible Effects of Danish Disarmament," 19 American-Scandinavian Review (1931).
"The Swedish Historical Association," 4 Swedish-American Historical Bulletin (1931).
"The Greenland Question," 93 Advocate of Peace (1931).
"Statsvetenskapens Stallning i Forenta Staterna," 34 Statsvetenskaplig Tidskirft (1931), 397-428. (The Status of Political Science in the United States, published in the Swedish Political Science Review).
"Finland's Treaties for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes," 26 American Journal of International Law (1932), 70-86.
"Political Unrest in Iceland," 34 University of California Chronicle (1932), 153-165.
"Inter-Scandinavian Cooperation," 168 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (1933), 183-194.
"The Social Sciences Today," 4 Junior College Journal (1934)
"The Five Hundredth Anniversary of the Swedish Riksdag," 29 American Political Science Review (1935), 857-65.
"Washington, Lincoln, and the Democracy of Today," Los Angeles School Journal, May, 1936.
"Training for Democracy," Los Angeles Junior College News, December, 1936.
"Washington and Democracy," National Republic, December, 1936.
"Lincoln and Democracy," National Republic, February, 1937.
"Democracy," 38 California Monthly (1937), February, 25-26, 39-40.
"Freedom through Democracy," Emana-El, March, 1937.
"Public Opinion and Propaganda," 40 California Monthly (1938) January, 9-11, 37-39; February 22-24, 44-46.
"Presidential Elections in Finland," 4 Baltic and Scandinavian Countries (1938) 186-197.
"Scandinavia in the World Crisis," 2 Pacific Coast Scandinavian, No. 6 (June, 1938).
"Constitutional Monarchy in Sweden," 4 Baltic and Scandinavian Countries (1938) 297-300.
"Transfer Students in Political Science," 9 Junior College Journal No. 6 (March, 1939), 313-316.
"Public Opinion and Propaganda with Special Reference to Public and International Affairs," Proceedings of the Institute of World Affairs, Vol. XVI (1939), 106-112, 286-89.
"Eyes on Russia," California Monthly, November, 1939, pp. 6-7.
"Finlandia," California Monthly, December, 1939, pp. 6-7; 29-32.
"Name-Calling in Foreign Affairs," The Galley, Vol. XII, August, 1939, No. 3, pp. 2; 7-10; 14-15.
"Politik och Politiker i U.S.A. En oversikt infor hostens presidentval" ("The Political Situation in the United States: An Appraisal of Policies and Politicians as a Background for the Coming Presidential Election"), Svensk Tidskirft, Vol. XXVII, 1940. pp. 39-60.
"Amerikansk Neutralitetslagstiftning," ("American Neutrality Legislation, 1935-39"), Mellanfolkligt Samarbete, Vol. X, 1940, pp. 47-57.
"Baltic Twilight," California Monthly, June, 1940, pp. 20; 48.
"Om Presidentvalen i Nordamerikas Forenta Stater" (" On the Presidency of the United States"), Statsvetenskaplig Tidskirft, Vol. 43, 1940, pp. 112-34.

PUBLICATIONS (Cont.)

Articles (Cont.)

"Education and Intelligent Patriotism: The Formation of Adult Opinions and Attitudes," Proceedings Conference on Education and the National Emergency, October 14, 15, 1940, pp. 134-146.
"Presidential Title," Dictionary of American History, Vol. IV, 1940, pp. 334-5.
"On the Position of Our Democracy in the Present Crisis," (Seventh lecture of the Los Angeles City College William Henry Snyder Lectureship, March 27, 1941) Los Angeles City College Bulletin, Vol. XII, 1941, No. 2, pp. 1-52.
"Freedom of the Press in Sweden," The American Swedish Monthly, Vol. XXXV, July, 1941, No. 7, pp. 7-8; 26.
"High Rank of Sweden's Newspapers," The American Swedish Monthly, Vol. XXXV, August, 1941, No. 8, pp. 5-6.
"Maintaining Morale in Sweden, A Study of the Swedish State Information Agency," 5 Public Opinion Quarterly, No. 3, October, 1941.
"Emergency Regulations and the Press in Sweden," 18 Journalism Quarterly, No. 4, December, 1941.

March 12, 1942

The Honorable Francis Biddle
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Francis:

This is in reply to your letter of February 20, 1942, in which you asked to be advised of the administrative action taken on the two cases pending in this office under Public Law No. 135, 77th Congress.

As a result of the report concerning Mrs. Elizabeth W. Beitz, an applicant for a position, we are no longer considering her for employment and have so notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been requested to clarify several statements contained in its report on Donald H. Cooper, an employee in our Central Current Information Division. We have also requested the Civil Service Commission to review the case in the light of its favorable report of January 7, 1942. You will be immediately informed of the disposition of this case when replies have been received from these two sources.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

JBOpenka/mrb

Beitz -
Cooper
FBI
Holden

March 18, 1942

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

As a result of your report concerning Mrs. Elizabeth W. Beitz, an applicant for a position in this organization, we are no longer considering her for employment.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

JJOpmbm/eab

Copy to Kimball

Beaumaine, Raoul

x Visa
1 file

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 7. 1942

In reply refer to
VD 811.111 Bernard-Beaumaine, Raoul

My dear Colonel Donovan:

With reference to your interest in the visa cases of Raoul B. Beaumaine and his wife, Barbara, I take pleasure in informing you that, after careful consideration of the documents submitted, the Department has given advisory approval to the American Officer at Montreal, Quebec, Canada for the issuance of immigration visas.

Notification of this action has been transmitted by mail.

Very truly yours,

Eliot B. Coulter

Eliot B. Coulter
Acting Chief, Visa Division

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Bonner [illegible] Kirkpatrick
4/7/50

[illegible]
[illegible] State

April 2 1942

Mr. Avra Warren
Visa Division
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Warren:

Re: JACQUES BEAUMAIRE

The above subject, who is now in Montreal, can render valuable service to our interests. I therefore ask that special consideration be given to his case and that he be granted an immigration visa so that he may return to this country from Montreal at an early date. I assure you that I shall appreciate your favorable action in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan March 9, 1942

From: David Prescott Barrows

Subject: Argument for the Offensive

Participated last night in a discussion of this topic at "California Council Table", conducted weekly by Mr. Stuart Ward. Present were General Paul B. Malone, General Sweeney, Captain Mayo, U.S.N., Commander Beardsley, Mr. Norman Thomas, and myself. Discussion followed the normal line of historic review in support of offensive action as the only way in which wars have been won in our history or any other. But as to whether we are so far realizing the doctrine of offensive strategy in this war, opinion was divided. At least, my own opinion was widely separated from that of the others.

My old friends, Generals Malone and Sweeney, for whose soldierly experience and qualities I have the highest respect, both warned that we must guard against public pressure to do anything precipitate and untimely; that we are not prepared and must not assume the offensive until we are prepared; that we had made very splendid progress up to date and must not jeopardize this progress by untimely action and defeat. In my view this was sheer complacency, the thing we are adjured at the present moment to guard against as a people.

The popular pressure that drove McDowell into defeat at Bull Run through the fact that he was not ready was referred to as an example to be kept in mind. Neither side was ready at Bull Run. It was not decided because one side was better prepared than the other, but by appearance on the battlefield of Stonewall Jackson and the Valley Brigade. It was a pure tactical victory, achieved at the very moment when it looked like a Union success. I suggested that if we were looking for examples out of the early period of our Civil War we could find another of even more significance. This illustration was George B. McClellan. McClellan is today recognized as having been a very able man; a superb organizer; a commander who won and retained the confidence and enthusiasm of his troops; not a bad strategist; able to plan a well-conceived military movement like the peninsula campaign. There was nothing wrong with McClellan except that he was George B. McClellan. He could never satisfy himself that his forces were sufficiently ready; never would appreciate or admit that he had great superiority of numbers. His estimates of the opponent were uniformly highly exaggerated. Only reluctantly could he bring himself to take the risks of combat and even where it succeeded, as at South Mountain and Antietam, he could not follow up success.

Now our great immediate danger is that at some point along the line we are McClellan-ized and, as I view our situation, the fault does not lie in any lack of heroism or readiness to take fighting chances in our common soldiers, in our sailors, in our flying pilots, or in our marines. The McClellan-izing is higher up. The situation of our participation in the war at the present moment is so bad and such a marked failure that it is a duty and not an impertinence, certainly not a disloyalty, to present the question as to where the hesitation and unwarranted

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

March 9, 1942

From: David Prescott Barrows

Subject: Argument for the Offensive - page 2

prudence arise. Since the outbreak of the war, about 95 days ago, we have suffered a terrible injury at Pearl Harbor, we have lost Wake, Guam, Manila, Zamboanga; the British have lost Hongkong, Malaya, Singapore, Rangoon; and the Dutch have now lost everything in their vast Indian Empire except whatever last stand they can make at Surabaya and Bandoeng. We are not entitled to be complacent about this disaster. We have suffered a smashing defeat and if we choose to call this phase of our war the battle of the East Indies, this battle has been won by the Japanese. There may be another battle there eventually in which we may participate in retrieving this disaster, but it will not be this battle. Neither will it be of a military character like this battle that we, among others, have lost. It will be a battle involving far more time, much greater loss of blood, much greater destruction of planes and sinking of ships and expenditure of materiel. Now, why be complacent?

Under any system by which men carry out large enterprises, this is a responsibility which must be admitted by those at the top; and I mean by this the British Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, and the American President, Mr. Roosevelt. Both are men with striking gifts, men who, in this war, have evoked impressive loyalties but, to be candid, it must be said of them that they, or their combination, have so far terribly failed. Whether the mistakes arose out of their conferences, out of bad judgment, injudicious division of their tasks, or a joint failure to properly estimate the military strength and speed of Japan, no one can at the moment say, and perhaps this is not the time to inquire.

There are doubtless several courses open to the British and American peoples in view of this Far Eastern defeat. One of them seems to be advocated by Colonel Kiernan in his little book, DEFENSE WILL NOT WIN. It is the abandonment by Great Britain and the United States of the Far Eastern field to Japan, and the concentration of war effort on aggressive action against Germany through attack upon Italy. Kiernan is not only a good soldier but he is a good deal of a scholar, and we are all ready to agree with the title of his book, that the defense will not win this war any more than it has ever won any war. At the same time, it is possible to take the sharpest issue with him on both of his proposals: the relinquishment, at least for this stage of the war, of the Far East, and the practicability of initiating an offensive against Germany through a country that, however unimpressive her military qualities, is nevertheless an enemy country and not a friendly country whose help would be gained by such intervention.

The American people at this moment are being charged with apathy and complacency. I do not think this is true of the people. They do not, so far as I can see, betray fear or nervousness; they do not lack courage or readiness to sacrifice. If they

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan March 9, 1942

From: David Prescott Barrows

Subject: Argument for the Offensive - page 3

seem quiet and unmoved, the best explanation that I can find for it is that in their great concern over the disaster of the last three months they do not find anything which in their private capacity they can do. All fields of usual private endeavor which give a release to the pent-up fervor of a nation at war have been completely taken over by Governmental agencies. These agencies are naturally jealous against intrusion into their fields of duty. They do not want the private citizens encroaching upon their activities. This leaves practically nothing for the civilian volunteer except, as has recently been remarked, to pay taxes and offer no complaint.

I believe that today, the 96th day of our participation in this present war, was also the 96th day of war in 1898 with Spain, and the very day upon which Spain capitulated and sought for peace. There is an amazing, almost inexplicable contrast between that war with Spain and our present war. The war with Spain has been generally belittled by American writers. There have been some recent foolish books on the subject which misrepresent it completely. Never was our nation less prepared for war than in 1898 as far as organized forces were concerned, except that we had a small but good battle fleet. Yet, of all the wars we have ever fought, our war with Spain was a short war, 101 days in length, and the most completely successful. It was the one war which from the very start was conducted upon an unhesitating and unremitting doctrine of the offensive. It opened with Dewey's penetration of Manila Bay and the complete destruction of the Spanish naval power and the capture of the naval station at Cavite. Having no naval base whatever in the Far East, Dewey did what only a resolute and aggressive commander could do, he took the risk of Corregidor and Manila Harbor and wrested a base for his fleet from the enemy. He immediately followed this action by recommending a continuance of the operation by the dispatch of troops that would capture the city of Manila. Somehow or other, within that 100 days eight expeditions, mostly of hastily organized regiments of volunteers, left San Francisco harbor for Manila. They were crowded on old ships with less than a tonnage of space to a man. But they all made the voyage. They arrived in fighting condition and were able as a final act of war to capture the city of Manila. In those 100 days and in spite of recognized ineffectiveness of administration, the American Army was raised from 25,000 to 250,000 entirely by volunteers, and less through action of the Federal Government than action of the State governments throughout the land. Two corps of this Army were dispatched in opposite directions a distance of 11,000 miles from one another, and both accomplished their missions. By the Navy there was an immediate blockade of the Island of Cuba and the eventual destruction of every ship of Cervera's squadron. The Fifth Corps made a landing on a difficult shore of Cuba, fought the battles of Las Guasimas, San Juan, and El Canay, and forced the surrender of Linares' army of greater strength than the invading Fifth

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan — March 9, 1942

From: David Prescott Barrows

Subject: Argument for the Offensive - page 4

Corps. This was immediately followed by the invasion of Puerto Rico and this island had been practically captured when Spain surrendered.

It is the offensive taken immediately and relentlessly pursued that distinguishes this war beyond any that this country ever waged. Apparently, the Spanish government and nation had expected to localize the war on the Island of Cuba and protract it until malaria and yellow fever would wear our forces down. That this would occur was also the judgment of European critics, military and civilian. All such expectations were defeated by the offensive quality of the American nation and its forces. Spain was struck in both the Far East and the West and the final threat which brought her to her knees was the announced dispatch of Commodore Watson's raiding naval force to the coast of Spain herself. Not only was this the only short war this country ever waged, but it was the least expensive as the most continuously aggressive.

Whatever can be said as to the different conditions obtaining in this war from that against Spain in 1898, there nevertheless remains that the sharpest and most impelling contrast lies in the complete difference between the two in the first 100 days. One can only speculate as to what causes underlie this difference, and suggestions must be offered with diffidence. But undoubtedly a wrong conception of this war has been inculcated in the American mind and it has been done by official authority. An early mistake was the assurance that we could win the war not by combat but by subsidy. This idea still prevails. After having been stood upon by the Government for many, many months, it cannot be immediately overcome. But it must be utterly rejected, and its unreality admitted.

Secondly, there has entered into the American mind, as a result of a good many years now of advocacy and trial, the ideal of long-distance, long-time planning. War certainly, if it is to be undertaken, deserves long-distance, long-time planning, but this must take place in peace, not after war begins; because once war is engaged in there is no time whatever. Extemporization, hazards, desperate chance, and success in the face of what seem like invincible odds are the only things that will win in a war for which adequate preparation has not been made.

These hard expedients are the only prospect for the American people today. We have seen allies, the British, the Dutch, the Filipinos, overwhelmed by Japan while apparently we took time to perfect our arrangements before giving the relatively slight help that might have prevented their disaster. A long-time planning for the present war is likely to see every other ally or associate against the enemy powers likewise destroyed before we will be judged fit to enter aggressively. This is not idle forecast. Already the outlines of a peace of accommodation, in which this country would have to surrender every boast and every forecast, are

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

March 9, 1942

From: David Prescott Barrows

Subject: Argument for the Offensive - page 5

beginning to take shape in the murk and fog of this war. If the American people is to be roused to a spirit of aggression there must cease all official forecast of a year or two of disaster and a probable readiness for conflict in 1943. There must be removed, if possible, from the American mind, the conception of a deferred naval war until we have a two-ocean navy. The finish of this war will not wait on such distant achievements. The only way to have an offensive war is to start the offensive. We must assume there has been delay over this and that the counsels of prudence, if not of timidity, have prevailed over those of audacity. Give audacity and imprudence a trial and see what the result will be, both as regards the always hazardous fortunes of war and the aroused resolution of the American people.

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:P

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

Boston, Massachusetts

February 23, 1942

YOUR FILE REFERENCE

IN REPLY REFER TO M-1

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Coordination and Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Bill:

When Harold Coolidge returned from Washington recently and told me that he was to receive an appointment in your agency of the Federal government because of his past experiences as an explorer in the Far East and in Africa, I must admit I felt like sitting right down and writing you one of those "you can't do this to me" letters.

It did n't take me long, however, to realize that my first reaction was not of selfishness but of sadness in having to let him go. During the time he has served under me in organizing the G-2 Section and in setting up the Military Intelligence Service of our State Guard, I have become not only very fond of him but proud of the fact that he turned out to be a good soldier upon whom I knew I could depend under any emergency. I guess that's the best thing one can say about anyone.

I have told him that in my opinion no greater opportunity will ever be offered to him or no honor he will ever receive will be greater than the chance he now has to serve under the best soldier in America. I assure you he appreciates it.

This note is just to say "Hello" to you and to tell you how proud all of your friends up here in Boston are of the job you are doing out in the front line again. You would n't be satisfied unless you were right up there tangling with the enemy. Harold's going down to join you has given me this excuse.

Keep your eye on the kid, Bill - he's got what it takes - and when it's all over, you will agree with me that he was one of the most loyal, conscientious and devoted fellows who ever served under your command. That's a lot, I know, but like yourself, I think I can tell a "competitor" when I see one.

If you take the field again, will you please conscript Gaspar and me. We will take anything from corporal up. Those corporal stripes will get us off K.P., and that's the only thing we want to duck, or perhaps will admit we cannot do well.

Yours always,

Bill

WILLIAM J. BLAKE
Manager

Clare 4432

February 27, 1942

Mr. William J. Blake, Manager
Veterans' Administration
Boston, Massachusetts

Dear Bill:

Thank you very much for your nice letter. Coolidge has already started some very good things for us and I know that he will measure up to all you say.

I would like to see you and Gaspar one of these days soon.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

March 5, 1942.

Dr. David P. Barrows,
333 West Montgomery St.,
San Francisco, California.

Dear Dr. Barrows:

Thank you for your memorandum on the Japanese in California. I shall be greatly interested in reading it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan.

For Perry
Incoming retained by Col. Donovan.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

March 3, 1942

File

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and "E" Streets, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I enclose a memorandum on the Japanese in California and, in accordance with your instruction, am sending an extra copy to you and a copy to Colonel Buxton.

The proclamation of Commanding General Fourth Army and Western Defense Command, defining military area #1 from which all Japanese and other Axis aliens are to be excluded, etc., has been issued this morning and will appear in mid-day papers.

The organization designed to be of service to the Government and to those affected by this proclamation may be counted upon, I am sure, to assist solely in carrying out this order with as little hardship and loss as possible and will view itself largely as a body prepared to counsel helpfully those affected.

Very sincerely yours,

David P. Barrows

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:P
Encls.

Barrows
California
Japanese

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

To: March 2, 1942

From: General David P. Barrows

Subject: Japanese in California

Have had informing conversations with Mr. H. C. Van Pelt and with Mr. Robert B. Hawley, of the F.B.I. The latter was sent to this coast by reason of his acquaintance with the Japanese language, etc. He is the son of Mr. Harry F. Hawley, present Consul General at Marseilles and long in the Embassy and Consular Service in Japan. Mr. Robert Hawley and his brothers were educated in part in the Japanese schools of Nagoya.

1. There have been no overt actions by Japanese in California as yet, but there is a considerably held belief that such actions have been delayed because a wide, organized conspiracy among Japanese is waiting for the opportune moment, probably raids upon this coast by the Japanese naval and air power.

However, the F.B.I. officers here tell me that they have found no evidence as yet of any such organization or conspiracy, and I think the soundest view is that if actual or potential leaders who are pro-Japanese can be taken into custody there will be quite insufficient leadership to organize anything of this kind. The great body of Japanese are of a relatively humble station and would probably lack the resolution and the intelligence to originate a popular act of sedition.

2. Of the 93,000 people who are Japanese or of Japanese parentage in California, about 30,000 are first generation, or Ishei, and legally are enemy aliens, while over 60,000 are native born and constitutionally are United States citizens if they have not forfeited the privilege. To deny them the rights of citizens I judge would require court proceedings showing that they had, for example, served in the Japanese Army or taken an oath of allegiance to the Japanese Emperor. There is no certain information as to how far actions of this kind may have gone with them. But there are about 10,000 who are described as Kibei, that is, young Japanese, both men and women, born here of Japanese parents, who, over a period of a good many years, were sent back to Japan to complete their education. Their parents' motives may have been two: First, a desire to have their children educated in the Japanese language and culture; and, second, the relatively greater economy of educating them in Japan rather than in California.

Investigators here draw a considerable distinction between Japanese who as children were sent to Japan for education before 1931 or thereabouts, and those sent subsequently. Those educated in Japan, of whom many completed the upper middle schools, equivalent of our secondary instruction, imbibed liberal ideas and even near-Communist ideas, and perhaps even still represent a Leftist attitude in the group in this state. Those who were sent as children to Japan after 1931 and particularly those who returned to this country between 1935 and 1941 are much more thoroughly imbued with the present "totalitarian" or pro-Axis attitude of the present Japanese regime. They are largely pro-Japanese in their

feeling, even as to the present war, and, in some cases, they are ready to avow it. The Kibei are the most maladjusted of all Japanese in California. Their Japanese education separates them from American educated Japanese, they feel superior by reason of their Japanese training, and yet, speaking English less well and being less adjusted to American life, they do not succeed so well as American educated Japanese. Most of them are engaged in the rather humble occupation of crop picking or small agriculture, although a few of them have found employment in banks and Japanese houses where their better knowledge of Japanese recommends them. Among the 10,000 Kibei in this state there is a considerable proportion of women, although it probably does not amount to half of the number. Many of the Kibei have been drafted into the United States Army where at least their initial service was satisfactory and promising. The life seems to have gratified them, and they are said to have appreciated its democratic character and the equality of opportunity held out to them. Whether this condition has remained so fortunate since December 8th is doubtful and merits investigation.

In conversation with Mr. Van Pelt as to the actions and policy of the F.B.I., he stated that up to the present (February 28th) no evidence had been secured that would amount to probable felonious action and that no Nisei or native-born Japanese men or women had been taken into custody. About 383 Ishei, or Japanese born in Japan, had been arrested through the discovery that they held forbidden arms or materials in their possession or had been communicating with the enemy. The statement was made that the regulations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation do not permit the arrest of a Japanese who is an American citizen without evidence of probable guilt. Such limitations do not affect the activities of the F.B.I. as regards the aliens, and if evidence of wrong action is found they can be turned over to the immigration authorities without legal adjudication.

3. Influence and attitude of Buddhist churches. Unfortunately, there seems to be no accurate information as to the number of Buddhist churches and Buddhist priests in California although all having responsibility for the Japanese situation appear to distinguish between the reliability of Buddhists and the reliability of those who belong to the Christian churches. Many of the Kibei belong to clubs, possibly pro-Japanese, which seem to meet in the buildings of Buddhist worship.

There is in this state, has been for some time, a Japanese-American Citizens League. Its leaders and prominent members are University graduates and members of the State Bar. This is true of the President, Mr. Kido, and of Mr. "Mike" Masaoka. Their announced purpose has been to protect Japanese who are citizens in their rights, and to protect Nisei in their property and other rights, and they doubtless feel that they are subject to discrimination in business, occupation, and acquisition of property. While I have considerable acquaintance with Japanese who have graduated from the University, I have no acquaintance with this League. There is informed opinion that the leaders are personally ambitious and disposed to seek personal gain out of their leadership.

4. State of public opinion. Down to recent years when our relations with Japan were steadily approaching a crisis and war, there was very little

pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment in California. The legislation which had suspended their entrance seemed to quickly and entirely alter American feeling. An exactly comparable change of feeling occurred in connection with the Chinese who, as long as they were coming in great numbers and before the Chinese exclusion acts, were regarded as very unwelcome and were treated with hoodlumism. Following the arrest or curtailment of Chinese entry, the Chinese became great favorites in their localities, and there are still a considerable number of aged Chinese in old communities of the state who are the objects almost of sentimental affection and who are looked out for and supported in their senility. It has long been my judgment that the anti-Oriental attitude in the state sprang from apprehension lest these people come in such numbers as to effect a transformation in our society, and the Californians did not intend that this state should become another Malaya, and San Francisco another Singapore.

However this may be, in recent years there is a large and highly respectable element in the state who have respected the Japanese, found much to commend in their industry and their law-abiding habits, and have felt genuine interest particularly in the future of the American-born Japanese. Whether the general feeling that the Japanese exclusion and California land legislation have relieved the state of all danger of California's (or agricultural portions of it) becoming a Japanese colony has been founded in too much optimism I cannot say. There are doubtless those who view the Japanese as improper and unwarranted rivals, who envy them the businesses which they have acquired and who feel that they would themselves be advantaged by the banishment of the Japanese or the appropriation of their property. However, the element that takes a broad view and desires to be fair to the Japanese is large and very representative.

A plea sent out last summer by newspapers and others, to treat the Japanese with fairness as the diplomatic situation between Japan and the United States steadily worsened, and to leave necessary action entirely in official hands, met with a very large response in the press and in letters, and there was practically no negative voice. Having issued this appeal or suggestion, the responsible committee felt its work was done. However, the present circumstances have again called this group together, and they have reorganized under the title "Committee on National Security and Fair Play." The undersigned presided over the meeting of about twenty people here in San Francisco on February 20th but, following the decision to revise and reorganize the work, stated that he felt continued chairmanship of the group was incompatible with other work and responsibilities, whereupon the group made what is regarded as an admirable choice of chairman in Mr. Henry F. Grady, former Assistant Secretary of State and now president of American President Lines. The committee is expected to issue a statement to the public within a day or two and I understand that the statement already has been submitted to officers of the F.B.I. and to the Commanding General Fourth Army and Western Defense Force. Attached to this letter is a list of officers and sponsors.

At the above-mentioned meeting there was unanimous expression of purpose to cooperate fully with all official action to safeguard the state. But at the same time the desire was expressed to lend all possible assistance by counsel, encouragement, and other aid to Japanese, especially American-born Japanese, in whatever shifting of residence and occupation may lie before them.

Views as to the actual dangers which the Japanese population present differ very widely. There is a conservative opinion which holds that the danger is slight and that the popular clamor is largely due to hysteria or envy of the Japanese in certain economic positions. On the other hand, there is the campaign of the Mayor of Los Angeles, who is a respectable and highly regarded man, based upon the proposition that there is no safety for the Coast unless all Japanese, whether foreign or native-born, are removed to the interior.

The decision of the Commanding General Fourth Army and Western Defense Force has not been published, though it is expected shortly. The General furnished the Governor of the State and the Director of the F.B.I. with a preliminary sketch exhibiting a line passing north to south through the state along the course of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and including the city of Fresno and all of Southern California west of the Sierra Madres, which the Army must regard as a theatre of operations and from which all elements of doubtful patriotism should be evacuated.

Whatever the Commanding General's decision may be, I think it will receive practically unanimous support and that the concentration of this authority in the Commanding General is welcome and has reassured the citizens of the state as a continuing distribution and fragmentation of authority had previously disturbed them.

David P. Barrows

DPB:P
1 encl.

Committee on National Security and Fair Play

Chairman: Dr. Henry F. Grady, 311 California St., San Francisco - DOuglas 6000

Vice-Chairmen:

General David P. Barrows, South Hall, Berkeley - AShberry 6000
Frederick J. Koster, 100 Bush St., San Francisco - SUtter 2260
Alfred J. Lundberg, 2129 Grove St., Oakland - HIghgate 4127
Joseph S. Thompson, 5815 Third St., San Francisco - ATwater 0810
Provost Monroe E. Deutsch, Administration Bldg., Telegraph Ave., Berkeley - AShberry 6000
Dean J. Hugh Jackson, Stanford University - Palo Alto 9411
Pres. Aurelia Henry Reinhardt, Mills College, Oakland - TRinidad 2700
Pres. Robert Gordon Sproul, Administration Bldg., Telegraph Ave., Berkeley- AShberry 6000
Pres. Ray Lyman Wilbur, Stanford University - Palo Alto 9411
Mayor Frank S. Gaines, City Hall, Berkeley - BErkeley 9207
Dr. Richard R. Perkins, YMCA, 220 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco - TUxedo 0460
James K. Fisk, American Legion, Veterans Memorial, San Francisco - HEmlock 2400
George G. Kidwell, Dept. Industrial Relations, 515 Van Ness Ave., San Francisco - UNderhill 8700
George Wilson, C.I.O., 593 Market St., San Francisco - EXbrook 1809
Mrs. Wallace M. Alexander, Los Aromas, Orinda, Calif. - ORinda 8421
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, 3675 Clay St., San Francisco - WAlnut 6641
Mrs. Robert McWilliams, 901 California St., San Francisco - BOuglas 6189
Mrs. Agnes Morley Cleaveland, 2532 Cedar St., Berkeley - AShberry 1383
Mrs. Duncan S. Robinson, 2334 Durant Ave., Berkeley - AShberry 3679
Rt. Rev. Karl Morgan Block, 1055 Taylor St., San Francisco - GRayston 0644
Prof. Arthur Cushman McGiffert, 1798 Scenic Ave., Berkeley - AShberry 0529
Rabbi Irving F. Reichert, Arguello Blvd. & Lake St., San Francisco - BAyview 4030
Chester H. Rowell, Chronicle Bldg., 5th & Mission Sts., San Francisco - DOuglas 1414
Dr. Benjamin W. Black, Highland Hospital, 2701 - 14th Ave., Oakland - MErritt 5525
Dr. Chauncey D. Leake (81 Lagux St.) S. F. - U.C. Hospital, Parnassus & 3rd - MOntrose 3600
John S. Curran, Anglo-California Bank, 1 California St., San Francisco - DOuglas 8100
Ralph T. Fisher, American Trust Co., 14th & Broadway, Oakland - TEmplebar 8000
C. C. Young, Mason McDuffie Co., 2101 Shattuck Ave., Berkeley - BErkeley 0200
Gerald H. Magar, Central Bank Bldg., Oakland - GLencourt 7207
Maurice E. Harrison (Subject to confirmation), 111 Sutter St., San Francisco - SUtter 0666

Secretary of Committee: Galen M. Fisher, 11 El Mesa, Orinda - Orinda 3951

Room 311
260 California Street
San Francisco, Calif.
Telephone YUkon 1570
February 28, 1942

Released for March 3, 1942

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FAIR PLAY

Dr. Henry F. Grady, Chairman

Vice-Chairmen

General David P. Barrows
Joseph S. Thompson
Pres. Aurelia Henry Reinhardt
Mayor Frank S. Gaines
George Wilson
Mrs. Robert McWilliams
Rt. Rev. Karl Morgan Block
Dr. Chester H. Rowell
John S. Curran
Gerald H. Hagar

Frederick J. Koster
Provost Monroe E. Deutsch
Pres. Robert G. Sproul
Dr. Richard R. Perkins
Mrs. Wallace Alexander
Mrs. Agnes M. Cleaveland
Pres. Arthur C. McGiffert
Dr. Benjamin W. Black
Ralph T. Fisher
Maurice E. Harrison

Alfred J. Lundberg
Dean J. Hugh Jackson
Pres. Ray Lyman Wilbur
George G. Kidwell
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin
Mrs. Duncan S. Robinson
Rabbi Irving F. Reichert
Dr. Chauncey D. Leake
Hon. C. C. Young
Galen M. Fisher

The President's Proclamation and the California Situation

As a group of citizens concerned first and foremost with winning the war, we welcome the President's proclamation of February 20th, placing all residents in vital military areas under the control of the Secretary of War and the military commanders. We believe that the extreme gravity of the situation justifies this drastic step. And as Californians, no less than as American citizens, we accept it as a wise solution of the vexed problem of handling enemy aliens and dangerous citizens.

Freedom of speech is still unimpaired, and we are glad to know that national Government authorities, including the military, desire constructive, non-partisan criticisms and suggestions. In that spirit, we venture to offer a few suggestions to them and to our fellow-citizens.

Let the actual care of evacuated persons be committed as heretofore to civilian governmental agencies experienced in matters of social welfare.

Let the removal of aliens and citizens be kept at the minimum consistent with military necessity and national security. The uprooting of alien Japanese and Italian farmers living outside vital military areas obviously would reduce production of the food essential to winning the war, and the indiscriminate removal of citizens of alien parentage might convert predominantly loyal or harmless citizens into desperate fifth-columnists.

The problem of providing permanent homes for the evacuated persons cannot be solved by Government agencies without the cooperation of local officials and private citizens. Thus far, the nine thousand evacuees are reported, for the most part, to have found only temporary homes. In some communities, the entry of Japanese refugees has been resented to the point that long resident Japanese have been warned not to harbor them.

There appear to be only three methods of caring for the evacuees: either allow them to settle where they can work freely and produce; or set up supervised work projects; or support them in whole or in part at public expense. If they are

to find places to settle down and become self-supporting, then some interior communities in California itself or in other states must allow them to settle. This may seem to certain communities like demanding a heavy sacrifice, but without various kinds of sacrifice we cannot hope to win the war. If we mean it when we glibly agree to bear any necessary hardship, then perhaps communities as well as individuals will have to accept this as one of the inescapable sacrifices.

The integrity of our nation and all the liberties guaranteed by it are at stake. It is a national fight, and only the Government should call the signals. In the spirit of the President's proclamation, it behooves us all - public officials and private citizens alike - to set up no impediments in the way of the military and other Federal authorities, and to place ourselves at their command.

Engaged as we are in a life and death struggle to preserve our hard-won democratic heritage, we should be traitors if we flouted democratic principles of justice and humanity in our treatment of either aliens or citizens, even under the stress of war. We therefore appeal to our official representatives, municipal, county, State, and National, and to our fellow-citizens of whatever origin, to maintain order under law and the respect for persons summed up in the words "fair play".

. . . . . .

NOTE: The Committee on National Security and Fair Play is the direct successor of the Northern California Committee on Fair Play for Citizens and Aliens of Japanese Ancestry, but it embraces the wider scope implied in its title. Its primary purpose is to support the Government and the armed forces in preserving national security and winning the war, and at the same time, to foster fair play, especially toward law-abiding and innocent aliens and citizens of alien parentage. The Committee will cooperate with other organizations devoted to similar purposes, such as the Committee on Discrimination, of "Citizens for Victory". Persons in sympathy with the Committee on National Security and Fair Play are invited to enroll as Associates.

Galen M. Fisher, Secretary
of the Committee

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

333 MONTGOMERY STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

March 11, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th & "E" Streets
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I much esteem your two notes of March 5th. I am enclosing with this letter further brief note on my estimate of Japanese intentions in the north and what I am trying to get in the way of intelligence in that quarter, and also sending a brief memorandum which may be needless in view of the reports on the decision taken by the Army Commander with respect to the Japanese.

I am advised that conference was held yesterday with General DeWitt's representative, Colonel McGill, on his decision as to what is necessary in connection with the Japanese citizens and aliens on this coast. The conference was granted to a group of good citizens including Provost Deutsch of the University of California; Dr. Chester Rowell; Mr. Harry Lundberg, Chairman of the State Chamber of Commerce; Mr. Ralph Fisher, Secretary of the Committee on National Security and Fair Play; Mr. Maurice Harrison and Mr. Jesse Steinhart, both representative lawyers of San Francisco. General DeWitt himself could not meet the committee as he was engaged in long distance conference with the War Department. His decisions, as reported to me, are:

1. A complete evacuation of all Japanese citizens and aliens from the coastal area as fixed by him in previous proclamations. The only exceptions will be certain Japanese citizens, I believe, who are Federally employed and indispensable to the conduct of war related enterprises such as translators and broadcasters.

2. As regards German and Italian aliens and those of German and Italian descent, a quite different policy is announced. The citizens, I believe, are not to be disturbed; aliens, including refugees if properly attested for behavior and loyalty, will be licensed to remain.

3. I think that any citizen efforts to assist the element of Japanese origin such as has previously been considered, like advisory boards by whom evidence of loyalty might be secured and recommendations for leniency considered, will, in view of this decision, be fruitless and needless. I am advised, however, that there will be place for such committees in the other states or areas to which the Japanese are moved. This can hardly be organized, however, on this coast or at least within the area affected.

4. As I have already reported, I believe that public opinion in this

state will support the Commanding General's decision. Quite naturally, this public opinion becomes more intense and more comprehensive as the Japanese military success rises to unanticipated heights and as the basic savagery of Japanese character is disclosed as in such a statement as that of Mr. Eden in Parliament in regard to atrocities in Hongkong. However, I think the prospects of promotion of confidence and understanding between American-born Japanese citizens and citizens of other races which seemed a possibility sometime ago, and a possibility that might be built around the service of young Japanese citizens inducted into our Army, should be regarded as improbable. I am not advised as to whether the policy of the War Department is hereafter to accept Japanese volunteers for the Army or to induct into the Army young Japanese citizens, though under the present circumstances I can hardly see how such legal citizens can be of further use or advantage in our armed forces.

5. I am not advised as to how this policy as regards a group of native-born citizens (which is based frankly on their racial origin, and which differs from policy with respect to groups that are also of enemy origin) is to be considered under our constitutional law, nor how the Supreme Court would regard a case under this decision based upon the Fourteenth Amendment. The recommendation of our constitutional law and its interpretation is at the present time obviously in a process of change and some of its one-time fundamental guarantees may no longer be sustained by the Supreme Court and will be abandoned during and after this conflict.

I think public opinion in this state, as I have already reported, welcomed and is reassured by the committing of full and entire responsibility to the Commanding General Fourth Army and Western Defense, and that it will accept this decision.

Sincerely yours,



David Prescott Barrows

DPB:P
Encls.

SX32

COLONEL WM. J. DONOVAN, COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHNDC

"A SITUATION HAS ARISEN IN THIS STATE WHICH HAS POSSIBILITIES OF GRAVE CONSEQUENCES TO THE PUBLIC WELL BEING, THE STATUS OF ENEMY ALIENS AND CITIZENS OF ALIEN PARENTAGE, AND TO OUR ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND TO REPUTATION. THIS SITUATION ARISES FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF JAPANESE SUCCESS IN THE FAR EAST, REPORTS OF JAPANESE FIFTH COLUMN ACTION IN HAWAII, AND OF SUSPICION OF SIMILAR PREPARATION HERE, BY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE PROBABILITY OF ENEMY RAIDS UPON THIS COAST AND OF ACTUAL DANGER FROM WITHIN AND FROM WITHOUT.

"OUR PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BETWEEN EXTREMES OF VIEW; ONE VIEW CONSIDERS MOST OF THIS EXCITEMENT TO BE UNINFORMED HYSTERIA. ON THE OTHER SIDE A SEMI-PANIC ATTITUDE COMES FROM THOSE WHO INSIST THAT THERE IS NO SAFETY EXCEPT IN THE EXPULSION OF RACES AND CLASSES, INCLUDING NATIVE-BORN CITIZENS, FROM THE STATE OR FROM A LARGE PART OF THE STATE.

"MY REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONCENTRATION OF AUTHORITY IN THE COMMANDING GENERAL, FOURTH ARMY IS THAT IT WILL BE FAVORABLY RECEIVED AND THAT THERE WILL BE UNITED SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL AND OF MEASURES WHICH HE MAY TAKE. THERE ARE, NEVERTHELESS, ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION LARGER THAN MERE MILITARY SAFETY WHICH WILL HAVE FUTURE CONSEQUENCES THAT MAY BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. CONNECTED WITH PRESENT DISTURBANCE OF THE PUBLIC MIND AND ITS SENSE OF DANGER THERE IS THE FACT THAT THE STATE GUARD, ORIGINALLY ORGANIZED AS A VOLUNTEER EFFORT UNDER THE GOVERNOR'S AUTHORIZATION TO REPLACE THE NATIONAL GUARD, HAS BEEN VERY BADLY SHATTERED BY ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND THE STATE LEGISLATURE AND BY THE FINAL ENACTMENT OF AN EMERGENCY STATUTE WHICH IS NOT REGARDED AS SOUND OR HELPFUL. COMMITTEE BEING FORMED UNDER MAJOR GENERAL MALONE, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED) TO SUPPORT AN INITIATIVE MEASURE SETTING ASIDE THE STATUTE.

"ASSUMING THAT COLONEL DONOVAN IS ALREADY FURNISHED WITH INFORMATION UPON ALL THESE MATTERS, WOULD WISH HIS INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHETHER MY OWN REPORTS UPON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE OF ASSISTANCE. HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT INTIMATELY ASSOCIATED WITH AND AM INFORMED AS TO THE ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN THIS PROBLEM.

"WOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS."

PAYNE PRESCOTT BARROWS - SIX, MILBANK 2/21/42

AND TO REPUTATION. [illegible] EFFECT OF JAPANESE SUCCESS IN [illegible] FAR EAST, REPORTS OF JAPANESE FIFTH COLUMN ACTION IN HAWAII, AND OF SUSPICION OF SIMILAR PREPARATION HERE, BY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE PROBABILITY OF ENEMY RAIDS UPON THIS COAST AND OF ACTUAL DANGER FROM WITHIN AND FROM WITHOUT.

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"WOULD APPRECIATE INSTRUCTIONS."

DAVID PRESCOTT BARROWS - SX. M1120APWT 2/21/42..

Copy of message transmitted to Colonel Donovan by teletype
from Office of Coordinator of Information, 333 Montgomery St., San Francisco
February 21, 1942

A situation has arisen in this state which has possibilities of grave consequences to the public well being, the status of enemy aliens and citizens of alien parentage, and to our economic resources and to our reputation. This situation arises from the psychological effect of Japanese success in the Far East, reports of Japanese fifth column action in Hawaii, and of suspicion of similar preparation here, by official statements of the probability of enemy raids upon this coast and of actual danger from within and from without. Our people are divided between extremes of view; one view considers most of this excitement to be uninformed hysteria. On the other side a semi-panic attitude comes from those who insist that there is no safety except in the expulsion of races and classes, including native born citizens, from the state or from a large part of the state.

My reaction to the President's concentration of authority in the Commanding General Fourth Army is that it will be favorably received and that there will be united support of the Commanding General and of measures which he may take.

There are, nevertheless, aspects of the question larger than mere military safety which will have future consequences that may be of great importance. Connected with present disturbance of the public mind and its sense of danger there is the fact that the State Guard originally organized as a volunteer effort under the Governor's authorization to replace the National Guard, has been very badly shattered by antagonism between the Governor and the State Legislature and final enactment of an emergency statute which is not regarded as sound or helpful. Committee being formed under Major General Malone, U.S. Army Retired, to support an initiative measure setting aside the statute. Assuming that Colonel Donovan is already furnished with information upon all these matters, would wish his instructions as to whether my own reports upon this subject will be of assistance. Have been somewhat intimately associated with and am informed as to the elements involved in this problem. Would appreciate instructions.

(Signed) David Prescott Barrows

Barrows 4736

March 16, 1942

The Honorable Francis Biddle
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

Dear Francis:

In reply to your letter of March 9, these are the facts:

1. No one has been designated as (your quote) "Coordinator of Intelligence and Information on the West Coast".

2. Some weeks ago we did designate, as one of our representatives on the West Coast, General David P. Barrows, a distinguished and respected citizen of San Francisco.

3. The whole question of the selection of representatives on the West Coast was discussed with General Miles, Admiral Wilkinson, and Mr. Hoover, by Colonel Buxton and myself at lunch on the 2nd of December, 1941. Colonel Buxton went immediately to the West Coast for the purpose of selecting a representative. While there, he told the Army and the Navy officials, and also Mr. Fisher, the FBI representative, that

Barrows was under consideration.

4. Colonel Buxton, upon his return from the West Coast, discussed the matter with Colonel T. B. Bissell, General Lee's assistant.

5. Admiral Wilkinson sent a message to San Francisco informing his people of the designation.

6. No attempt of any kind has been made to have any representative of ours there invested with authority over the other services, or to coordinate their activities, interfere with them, or impinge upon their prerogatives. Our written instructions to General Barrows, as to all others, concerning your Department relate only to the duty of turning over to your office any information concerning subversive activities which might come to his attention. This is a duty incumbent upon him not only as our representative but as a private citizen.

7. There has never been any misunderstanding regarding General Barrows on the part of either ONI or MID in San Francisco, and there is no reason for any misunderstanding on the part of your Department.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

~~Vol 5 #700~~

Mr Pieper
Capt McCullough
Gen DeWitt
Col Ross

Telephone
Gen Miles
Adm Wilkins
Burton
Col D

Burton to Gen J

Col. Bissell
G-2

Exposure is 125 [illegible]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

[redacted]

NEW YORK

21 East 40th Street

March 12,1942

Colonel Wm.J.Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

After going through the file in this office of correspondence with General Barrows I find that we have nowhere used any phraseology concerning his appointment except that of a "representative on the West Coast". I do find, however, that in General Barrows' letter of February 2nd addressed to me, (of which you have the original) he refers to the suggestion that he would "act as the West Coast coordinator for the Coordinator of Information". My answer of February 6th says that Colonel Donovan is very pleased "that you are willing to represent him on the Coast". I now think that I should have challenged his phrase more specifically. I did not, of course, assume that the General was coining a title for his office.

At this point I decided to telephone my friend, Captain Dick McCullough, head of ONI in San Francisco, and talk with him - off the record. I asked the Captain to tell me frankly whether or not the General had gotten off on the wrong foot and if he had assumed any prerogatives or authority or had stated that he was there to coordinate the other Services. Captain McCullough stated that on the contrary General Barrows' attitude had been, if anything, over cautious; that far from assuming any authority or setting himself up as a coordinator he had approached Captain McCullough with expressions of uncertainity as to just what he would be able to do that would be useful to our Organization. Captain McCullough says that he is willing to be quoted as saying that General Barrows is wholly acceptable to the Navy and in Captain McCullough's opinion will be useful over a period of time.

Captain McCullough says that the General has prestige in the community and is universally respected.

Furthermore, Captain McCullough ten days ago received a message from Admiral Wilkinson stating

that General Barrows had been appointed in San Francisco as Colonel Donovan's representative but added in the message that the General had not been given any authority over the other intelligence services in San Francisco. You must have given this information to Admiral Wilkinson and, consequently, Mr.Biddle could not have checked with Admiral Wilkinson before writing you that the heads of Washington Services were not informed.

Captain McCullough says that Admiral Greenslade asked him what General Barrows' authority was. Captain McCullough replied to Admiral Greenslade that he had no authority over the other Services but that his only function was to be useful when possible. Admiral Greenslade expressed his approval.

I then called Colonel Ahrends, head of MID in San Francisco, to whom I felt sufficiently close to have a similar talk. Colonel Ahrends was not in so I talked with Colonel Harris who is also, as you know, close to our Organization. I asked Colonel Harris if General Barrows had called at his office or if he had heard any adverse comment concerning him. Colonel Harris said that the General had not called on them, nor had they heard any adverse comment, nor had they discussed General Barrows with anyone. He said that any time the General came to see them they would give him a very cordial reception and they would be perfectly willing to let him have anything they had; that they knew who he was and of his high standing in the community.

This it seems to me disposes of the only two Federal Services in San Francisco concerned with the subject of foreign information. You will remember that our written instructions to General Barrows concerning the FBI related only to the duty of turning over to that office any information concerning subversive activities which might come to the General's attention. This is a duty not only encumbent upon the Government Agencies but upon private citizens as well.

I should think you might say to Mr. Biddle that certainly there has been no misunderstanding regarding General Barrows on the part of either ONI or MID in San Francisco; that ONI in San Francisco received

Colonel Wm.J.Donovan March 12, 1942

a statement from Admiral Wilkinson ten days ago; that General Miles, Admiral Wilkinson and Mr.Hoover were invited to lunch to be informed of your proposal to establish one or more representatives on the Coast - and that on December 2nd, 1941. That General Barrows has never been given any instructions which assumed the slightest authority over other Services or impinged in any way on their prerogatives; that we have checked with the offices of ONI and MID in San Francisco and have been assured that the General has never given himself the title of Coordinator to either of the heads of those two branches; and we are surprised to learn that there has been any misunderstanding on the part of the office of FBI in San Francisco. Also, that you would be glad, ~~whenever he might want to do so~~ when mutually convenient, to tell him something of our general objectives and the nature of our work.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

GEB FS

G.Edward Buxton

Top ↑

Pieper is an alarmist and always on the defensive. Is now in a row with the Mayor of Los Angeles and took 45 minutes yesterday trying to defend himself.

General Barrows said he would be glad to receive any information McCullough felt at liberty to give him and that his only quandry was that he was an Army officer and a soldier and felt a little embarrassed about getting information. He did not know just how he stood there. Coordinator of Intelligence activities would be the last thing he would want to .

There would probably be some objection to Barrows sitting in at the meetings - probably Pieper - but McCullough said he would be willing to lay the groundwork of such an idea.

McCullough is going to write Col. Buxton a letter re cable messages with an idea of getting after the FCC. Greenslade reported this situation to Washington over two weeks ago but no action has been taken.

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

March 9, 1942

Dear Bill:

I have been advised that you have appointed General David P. Barrows as "Coordinator of Intelligence and Information on the West Coast." I am further advised that the Directors of Military and Naval Intelligence have not been informed of the purpose or reason for General Barrow's designation to this post.

The intelligence services have been carrying on a carefully coordinated program built upon a complete exchange of pertinent information and the carrying out of mutual undertakings in carefully defined fields of responsibility. Close personal liaison is constantly maintained. Therefore, there would appear to be no reason for the designation of a Coordinator.

I would appreciate if you would let me know your purpose in designating General Barrows and your intentions and program with reference to this "Coordination". I am somewhat surprised that this appointment was made without prior discussion with the regularly constituted intelligence services.

Sincerely yours,

Francis Biddle

Honorable William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Personal

August 26,1942

Major General David P.Barrows
Central Tower Bldg
703 Market Street, Room 1706
San Francisco, California

My dear General Barrows:

Colonel Buxton, who has now returned, has shown me your letter of August 17.

I do not want our Governmental relationship to terminate without expressing my very grateful appreciation of the services you have rendered this Agency.

I feel that you have made a definite contribution to our general intelligence work and have, in addition, stimulated our thinking on numerous occasions. Please accept my sincere thanks for your loyal efforts.

I appreciated very much your offer to permit us to address an occasional inquiry should the occasion arise to use your very sound knowledge of the situation in the Philippines or in Siberian areas.

With best wishes and personal regards,

Very sincerely yours

William J.Donovan
Director

Barrows 2737
x Buxton

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

[redacted]

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
ROOM 1706, - 703 MARKET STREET

August 17, 1942

Colonel G. Edward Buxton
Office of Strategic Services
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Buxton:

I have not previously acknowledged your letter with respect to the closing up of this office and concluding my official connection with the Office of Strategic Services, as when you wrote you advised you were about to depart for Europe and probably would not be back until the middle of this month. I now write directly to you in the expectation that you have returned or are about to return.

Your statement of your understanding with respect to my work this summer is in entire correspondence with my own understanding of it. I started in on a full time basis in June with the expectation that I would be free until about the first of October, but I agree with you that it is becoming increasingly difficult to make this office a worthwhile center for military intelligence. In fact, the sources of up-to-date information on the Pacific here in San Francisco seem to me to be drying up.

In the past week I have been seeking information from our excellent Dutch allies here in the city, including members of a group of aviators who arrived here some days ago, twelve of them. These gentlemen know the Netherlands Indies very well, but do not possess any independent information, as far as I can learn, subsequent to the fall of Java. In fact, Lieutenant Commander Wytema, the senior naval officer stationed here, tells me that his best source of information was our former Consul General in Batavia, Mr. Walter Foote, who, after spending some time in Washington, has returned to Australia as a consultant to General MacArthur. From other sources, Chinese, Korean, Russian, American, I have learned very little of value recently.

Accordingly, toward the end of July I took up the matter of closing down with Major Bruce, suggesting that we finish on the last day of this month and, with his approval, I advised the management of this property of the termination of the lease at that time, and gave also a month's notice to Miss Barbara Parker, who, I hope, can be placed by that time in a situation where her valuable training and ability can be fully used.

Mr. Kibler, of the Office of War Information, will take over all the office furniture originally supplied by that office, which has been inventoried and which was not transferred to the Office of Strategic Services. The files and records of the office are being consolidated and will be kept in my hands pending any instructions, although the originals of everything of consequence have been sent on. At the end of the month I shall send a final report on the operations of this office.

It pleases me to have you suggest that on returning to my position at the University you will feel free to call upon me for any unofficial service that I can render, and at any time and in any way I shall be most happy to respond with any help that I can give.

I very much esteem this connection which I have had with the work of Colonel Donovan and yourself. It has been most agreeable. I wish it could have been more productive for the purposes of your organization.

With best wishes and with the hope of meeting you again, either here or in the east, I am

Faithfully yours,

David P. Barrows

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:BP
Copy to Colonel Donovan

Barrows 3737
x Bryton
file

July 17,1942

Major General David P.Barrows
Central Tower Bldg
703 Market Street, Room 1706
San Francisco, California

Dear General Barrows:

I want to let you know that I am going abroad next Tuesday night and will be away some three or four weeks.

Please continue to send the copy of the material addressed to Colonel Donovan which you have been sending to Watts Hill, (who is also going away) to Major David Bruce, same address. The third copy might, I think, go to our Research and Analysis Branch addressed to Dr.William Langer.

In the pressure of our recent reorganization I have not had an opportunity to let you know something of the changes which have taken place and the modifications of our activities which have followed the Military Order transferring us to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As you know, the Foreign Information Service, both radio and publications, has become part of OWI.

I think I should tell you that in our new environment the need for offices in this country is considerably lessened and the occasional opportunity for interviewing returning travelers has, of course, diminished because of the war itself.

I recall that you told me when I was in San Francisco that your preference would be to finish out the Summer months with us, giving us such time as you had available on a part time basis, and then return to full time activity at the University for your final year.

Major General David P.Barrows July 17,1942

This would seem to harmonize with our somewhat modified activities and would be agreeable to us if you feel as you did when I last talked with you.

Let me say that it has been a great pleasure to have had this association with you and that we appreciate tremendously the receipt of reports and memoranda as well as the guidance you have given our representatives during their visits to San Francisco.

Let me say further that if we are to discontinue our San Francisco office we shall all feel it is still possible to direct a query to a valued friend should the emergency arise, whether you are formally associated with us or not.

I am writing this letter at this time because I do not expect to be back in Washington until after the middle of August at the earliest and possibly a week later.

If this letter covers your general understanding of the situation it might be desirable to let Major Bruce have some date prior to the opening of College on which the official relationship might terminate. We will rely upon you to make arrangements with the building authorities in which your office is located to see that they have whatever notice is necessary.

With warm personal regards and the sincere hope that we will continue to be occasionally in touch, I am

Cordially yours,

G.Edward Buxton

copy for Colonel Wm.J.Donovan
Copy to: Major Bruce
Mr. John Williams
Dr. Langer

DATE 4/23/42

Colonel Donovan

from G. Edward Buxton

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

COPY

MEMORANDUM

To: General David F. Barrows April 22, 1942

From: G. Edward Buxton

I have your letter of April 16 concerning your proposed plans for yourself and Miss Parker. This arrangement will, I feel sure, meet with Colonel Donovan's approval and you may consider this letter as your authorization to work on a full-time basis at the rate of $6,500 a year for the five months beginning May 1.

I also note that you do not feel you should engage yourself definitely beyond the 15th of next October because of your commitments to the University during a time when so many of the faculty are away on war work.

I also note that you are proposing to give the top compensation to Miss Parker. I must leave this wholly to your judgment. While with you I had a very favorable opinion of Miss Parker's abilities, both for research work as well as her confidential secretarial duties.

I am turning this letter over to Major David Bruce whose branch is taking care of the confidential details of your service. In any matters in which Major Bruce makes any requests or suggestions, I would like you to please regard them as if they come from Colonel Donovan or from me.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

G. Edward Buxton

cc - Col. Donovan ✓
Major Bruce

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

April 16, 1942

C O P Y

Colonel G. Edward Buxton
c/o Coordinator of Information
21 East 40th Street
New York City

Dear Colonel Buxton:

I learned with regret of the reason for your hasty return to New York. I hope that Colonel Donovan is not in danger and that his improvement will be rapid. I have decided for personal reasons that I shall not go east the first of next month for the meeting of the Carnegie Trustees. Had I done so, I would have visited Washington and familiarized myself with the organization, but I have too many interests that are important that will keep me here.

I should like to renew our discussion of the question of whether I am to continue work after the first of May. The Political Science Department, of which I am chairman and for which I am responsible, will lose two of its most effective teachers presumably for war duty (one of these is Bellquist who has not only your attractive offer but another), and there may be other losses, and in loyalty to the University and to my last year of responsibility for the Department I feel that I should not engage myself definitely beyond the 15th of next October when the fall semester will open. I am free, however, to give five months of full time work to the office of the Coordinator of Information beginning the first of May, if it is perfectly clear to you, as it is not quite clear yet in my own mind, that the services I render through the San Francisco office are fully worth the cost to the Coordinator of Information. I shall have to take your judgment as to this, however, and do my best with the understanding that at any time in the summer if it is advisable to eliminate my position I will cheerfully retire.

However, in accepting this work for five months beginning May 1, I must advise that I need about a fortnight off, largely for personal business in Southern California, and I should like to have an understanding that I would be free to take the two weeks May 16-May 31st on a vacation without pay, returning to the San Francisco office on the

first of June.

This summer position and the period of my vacation involves the secretary, Miss Barbara Parker. Miss Parker has, in my judgment, fully demonstrated her competence and value. If I continue after May 1 I purpose to somewhat improve her compensation to the rate of $2,000 per annum. I have already taken this up with Mr. Kibler, who has initiated the necessary steps. Mr. Kibler also advises that in my absence in May on other business, Miss Parker's help will be appreciated in his office if she is willing to help there while I am gone.

This, I think, is the whole statement of the case, and I would appreciate your decision upon it at your convenience.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) DAVID PRESCOTT BARROWS

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
333 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California

March 13, 1942

Colonel G. Edward Buxton
Office of Coordinator of Information
21 East 40th Street
New York City

Dear Colonel Buxton:

I much appreciate your telephoning me yesterday, and it is an encouragement to know that you appreciate that to do this task satisfactorily out here one must sort of grow into the position and, with considerable understanding of human nature, must tactfully dissolve psychological obstacles which always exist where jurisdiction is overlapped by several agencies.

I can assure you at once that I have had nothing but courteous reception by Army, Navy, F.B.I., and so on, and I have at no time exaggerated my position. I have said very little about it and it is not generally known and, of course, has had no publicity, but where I have had to explain what I am doing here, rather than create a mystery I have simply said that temporarily I am undertaking to do some work for the Coordinator of Information. However, I have reason to believe that there has been some apprehension lest I might be pushed, or push myself, into a position of coordinator of the work of agencies here accumulating military intelligence. Let me assure you I have not thought of this myself, have no stirrings of the spirit toward such a role, and I think I have done nothing to incite such a concern.

On the other hand, I find myself in a very different situation from what I was in when in March 1918 I was despatched on a special military task of making an estimate of the situation in Siberia. The ignorance of our Army about Siberia was just about complete, we had no maps of that vast area better than an International Harvester Company sales map, and most impressions held abroad of the military and political situation there in the spring of 1917 were erroneous and harmful. Consequently, almost anything that I could learn or observe and report upon was welcome and novel. I had two very skillful and courageous men with me, one an American engineer with ten years experience and one Russian engineer who was a Siberian, and the means to employ as many other agents as desired. Now, this situation here is wholly and utterly different and I do not intend to imagine that it is another cherry pie for an intelligence officer, as Siberia was in 1918. The consequence is that I do not see very clearly what I can do that will not be a duplication of better effort and that will not be futile and unnecessary. For example, here are two illustrations, both in my mind at this moment.

If our warfare swings westward to embrace Kamchatka, as I have indicated in previous memoranda I thought it might, do we need information-topographic, demographic, administrative, and so on-about this singular body of land? With the assistance of a very competent Russian graduate student who has already been called into our Army, I have assembled a half a dozen works on Kamchatka with the idea of securing some basic material about the interior of this peninsula (I assume that the coast and its harbors and lagoons are well known to our naval people), and of digesting information that I would certainly want myself if I were going to conduct any kind of operation in Kamchatka. To do this job in any sort of way will require a week's time and a few dollars spent for making translations from the Russian. The question in my mind is, will it pay to do it? So, this morning I went around to see Captain McCullough, who is a very understanding and broad-minded friend, and asked him whether he thought such a thing was necessary. He was inclined to think that the Naval Intelligence at Washington had done this job through officers who are better qualified for such research than I can hope to be, and that it had been adequately done- in which case, of course, I do not want to spend time and money creating a dim reflection of the light they have thrown upon this important land.

The second matter is embodied in the enclosed copy of a letter which I wrote recently to General Van Deman. I enclose also a copy of Van Deman's reply. To get the Army judgment as to the value of such a report, I have talked this morning with Colonel Weckerling, G-2 Fourth Army, who is about to relieve Colonel Harrington, who has recently relieved Colonel Stroh, and I am encouraged to proceed. The information I secure will be basic, general information, not comprehensive but possibly complementary to what our Government already has. As I get this together I will send it on to Colonel Donovan and you can supply it to Army and Navy if you find they have need of it and want it-this in accordance with Colonel Donovan's instructions governing the disposal of my information. I think there is no objection to my saying that Colonel Weckerling advised me that while the Army had had observers and agents in Baja California there was no permanent check kept upon that area nor perhaps upon the effectiveness of General Cardenas' surveillance.

In accordance with your direction last night, I will use the telephone whenever necessary, but as there is no particular urgency about this I am sending this report by mail.

With very best wishes and appreciation of your interest in my succeeding in this task, I am

Faithfully yours,

David Prescott Barrows

COPY

File

Room 1706, 703 Market Street
June 16, 1942

Mr. W. L. Rehm
2500 Q Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rehm:

I acknowledge with appreciation your note of June 9th with the check covering twelve days of service at per diem for the month of May.

I have been continuously at work in this office since June 1st, but due to obligations arising out of my University connection I have lost two half days which in any case should be deducted from my compensation if it is now on a monthly basis. However, inasmuch as I am going to be subject to certain necessary interruptions for a half day or a day throughout the summer, I raise the question whether it would not be a fairer arrangement, and slightly more economical for the office of the Coordinator of Information, if I continue on a per diem basis. Personally, I would feel freer to take a day off when I am obliged to do so to attend to University or personal matters that will require some attention.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

David [illegible]

DPB:BW
Copy to Colonel Buxton

COPY

June 2, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I report that I returned yesterday, June 1st, from two weeks leave in Southern California and, owing to crowded conditions in the Montgomery Street quarters and the prospect of a removal of those quarters elsewhere, have moved to the Central Tower Building, 703 Market Street, Room 1706, San Francisco. The rental of this accommodation was accomplished by Mr. Linsley, the Senior Administrative Officer, through the usual Washington channels.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ David Prescott Barrows

DPB:BP
Copy to Col. Buxton

COPY

June 2, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I report that I returned yesterday, June 1st, from two weeks leave in Southern California and, owing to crowded conditions in the Montgomery Street quarters and the prospect of a removal of those quarters elsewhere, have moved to the Central Tower Building, 703 Market Street, Room 1706, San Francisco. The rental of this accommodation was accomplished by Mr. Linsley, the Senior Administrative Officer, through the usual Washington channels.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ David Prescott Barrows

DPB:BP
Copy to Col. Buxton

May 1, 1942

Mr. Reynolds Benson
26 East 93rd Street
New York, New York

My dear Mr. Benson:

In the absence of Colonel Donovan and at his request, an investigation has been made into the subject of your recent memorandum.

It is the feeling here that if copper deposits of greater value than are now known to exist were discovered, it would be only after prospecting expeditions which would take a long time. In addition, it would require many months, if not years, to bring into the area the mining, refining, and transportation facilities necessary for commercial operations.

We are advised that at the present time it would be unwise to enter upon the large and expensive undertaking which would be required to verify the presence of copper ore deposits and to develop them if they should actually be in existence.

Sincerely,

J. R. Murphy

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: J. H. Hayden

DATE

TO: Col. [illegible] Ian J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Memorandum from [illegible] the possible presence of [illegible] in North China.

1. Mr. Benson was sent to [illegible] with him, I am [illegible] to the [illegible] Section, which has prepared the attached memorandum which contains answers to [illegible] raised by Mr. Benson.

2. The memorandum from Dr. Roberts [illegible] the conclusion that at the present time it would be unwise to embark upon the large and expensive undertaking which would be required to verify the presence of the copper ore deposits in question, and to develop them if they should actually be in existence. It is therefore recommended that Mr. Benson's memorandum and Dr. Roberts comments upon it be filed for reference should this question arise in the future, and that Mr. Benson be informed in substance of Dr. Roberts's findings.

Attachments

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. J. [illegible] Luyuen April [illegible], [illegible]

From: J. P. Kemer C.F.R.

Subject: Memorandum to Colonel Donovan from Reynolds Benson.

The following statement has been prepared in the Far Eastern Section on the basis of Mr. Reynolds Benson's memorandum to Colonel Donovan:

Copper is found in almost every province of China but in only a few cases is the ore of more than local value. The deposits are small, inaccessible in many cases, and the ores rarely have a high metal content. The chief commercial workings are in Szechuan and Yunnan and small amounts are also mined in Hupeh, Shansi, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Kansu, Hunan and Yukien.

The Japanese make no mention of copper in their plans for North China and there is no indication that Russia has interested herself in North China copper.

If copper deposits of greater value than are now known to exist were discovered, it would only be after prospecting expeditions which would take some time. In addition, it would require many months, if not years, to bring into the area the mining, refining and transportation facilities necessary for commercial operations. The closeness to present and possible future fighting fronts would add to the difficulties of such a venture. Adequate personnel would have to be brought in as well.

The present fighting front runs from the elbow of the Yellow River north to Mongolia, passing through Paotow, Suiyuan. The line is fluid and at present little but guerrilla activity is taking place. Since all of the nations involved are in need of copper, it is unlikely that copper workings could be established without a military struggle for control of the area.

Transportation facilities consist almost entirely of roads and trails. From Ninghsia to Paotow there is a

road which the Chinese control as far north as Tuyuan, with the section from Tuyuan north to Paotow in Japanese hands. Another highway in eastern Suiyuan is controlled by the Japanese. Numerous trails and caravan routes criss-cross the area and trucks can negotiate some of these. A northern road operates from Tatung to Kweisui, in Suiyuan, and then west to Hami in Sinkiang. Road connections, in fact, make possible travel from Suiyuan to Manchuria, Occupied or Free China, Mongolia, or the Soviet Union.

In addition, the Japanese operate a main railroad line from Kalgan to Tatung and then to Kweisui and Paotow in Suiyuan. From Paotow a new branch line runs due north to Pailingmiao.

There is no known contact between Chinese and Russian troops on the southern borders of Outer Mongolia. Probably there are numerous Russian troops in areas adjacent to Japanese occupied zones.

attachment

26 - [illegible]

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D.C.

Memorandum.

I have knowledge, which so far as I am aware I alone possess, of the location of certain surface minerals in North China, the presence of which indicates the probability of underlying copper ore deposits.

Should a mining prospect result in locating ore in quantity, the information can well be of incalculable value to a Nation allied with the United States.

If the above premise is deemed to be worthy of investigation, I submit the following recommendations as to information to be obtained to immediately determine the practicality of further proceedure;

1. Has any copper-bearing ore body been developed in this region by: (a) China; (b) Japan: (c) Russia?

If so, what is its approximate location?

2. Is China and/or Russia (in the Far East) in need of copper for munitions or other manufacturing purposes?

3. Has China or Russia (or both) the facilities and personnel, combined with Foreign aid, to set up mining operations, install smelters and manufacturing plants to produce war or other materials in sufficient time and quantity as to be useful?

Note: Smelters should of course be located near enough to the ore body to make the whole proceedure practical. This presupposes reasonable proximity of fuel particularly.

4. What is the location of the present Chinese-Japanese front in Suiyuan Province?

5. What is the state of stability of same?

6. Is Russia's army contiguous to the Chinese north, or left, flank? (a) If so, what is the approximate line of location of the contact? (b) If not, what is the location and width of the zone between them?

7. What transportation facilities (a) rail, (b) motor truck routs, are functioning in this sector?

Investigation of the above questions should determine what proceedure to pursue next. If action is indicated, I am ready and at your service.

Respectfully submitted,

Reynolds Denson.

Block 2219

January 15, 1942

Mr. Ralph Block,
Vice President
Screen Writers' Guild
1655 North Cherokee Avenue
Hollywood, California

Dear Mr. Block:

It was good of you to write, on behalf of the writers in the Screen Writers' Guild, offering assistance to this office.

While we can see no immediate use of such assistance, it is not unlikely that we may wish to avail ourselves of your offer in the near future. When that time comes I shall communicate directly with you.

In the meantime, please extend to your associates my appreciation of their cooperative offer.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information.

Forward

Telephone GLadstone 4181

Hollywood Center Building
1856 NORTH CHEROKEE AVENUE
HOLLYWOOD, CALIFORNIA

Mr. Richards

SCREEN WRITERS' GUILD, INC.

AFFILIATED WITH THE AUTHORS' LEAGUE OF AMERICA, INC.

DEC 24 1941

December 22, 1941

Colonel Wm. J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Office of Emergency Management
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Senator Pepper has advised me by telegram that he has forwarded to you my telegram explaining briefly the desire of writers in the Screen Writers' Guild to render aid to the war effort.

The Screen Writers' Guild has more than a thousand members. Of these, some four hundred are employed in the motion picture studios but there is a certain rotation of employment so that not the same four hundred are employed at all times.

A great many of these writers are newspaper writers, playwrights, novelists and short story writers and are trained professional people. The Screen Writers' Guild has already instituted a questionnaire, copy of which I am enclosing, and the returned questionnaires are being analyzed and tabulated to give the Guild Defense Committee, of which I am Chairman, full information as to the talents and abilities available in the Guild for defense work.

Some of these individuals are already working in association with local Civilian Defense which we have set up, and some others are being used through the studios by the Motion Picture Coordinating Committee, whose lines we do not wish to cross in any way. This still leaves a large pool of writing talent free to be used in National Defense channels.

Colonel Wm. J. Donovan
Dec. 22, 1941 - Page #2

I am intending to be in Washington some time around January 2, at which time it is my hope to be able to find out more precisely how we may be of service in connection with all the branches of National Defense.

The writers whom I will represent are able to write expository pamphlets for labor, agriculture, housewives, and other internal defense channels, as well as propaganda for foreign consumption if this were deemed advisable. Probably a great many other uses of this available talent will develop as time goes on.

Remembering something of Washington in war time, I would prefer to have some idea of the right persons and offices to discuss this matter with before my arrival. The Executive Board of the Guild and myself will be deeply grateful for any assistance and advice you may be able to give.

I can be reached most directly at 707 N. Alpine Drive, Beverly Hills, California, telephone Crestview 11314.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph Block

RALPH BLOCK,
Vice-President

RB:rr
encl.
uc/9

Declassified

Block 225

December 24, 1941

My dear Senator Pepper:

Many thanks for your letter about Block. I shall certainly get in touch with him and I should think that Archie MacLeish would also want to look into this.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

The Honorable Claude Pepper
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Block. 2229

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

December 20, 1941

Col. Wm. F. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Executive Offices of the President,
Washington, D. C.

DEC 22 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan:

There is enclosed a telegram that reached me recently from Mr. Ralph Block, 707 N. Alpine Drive, Beverly Hills, California, an [illegible]nce this telegram Mr. Block has talked to me personally.

It is evident that he represents a pool of talent that is independent of the moving picture industry itself, and that they are anxious to place themselves and their respective talents at the service of the appropriate agency.

It occurs to me that in this pool of talent there might be some that you could utilize advantageously. I have suggested to Mr. Block that he communicate directly with you.

This is brought to your attention in an effort to be helpful.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Carter Glass

CP:ms

Top ↑

WESTERN UNION

(04)

1201

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full rate Telegram or Cable-gram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter
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J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

WA364 47=HOLLYWOOD CALIF 18 1109A

SENATOR CLAUDE PEPPER=

'94 DEC 18 PM 3 45

=SCREEN WRITERS GUILD SENDING ME TO WASHINGTON TO ARRANGE LIAISON BETWEEN NOVELISTS, DRAMATISTS, JOURNALISTS, ETC. GUILD MEMBERS WHO CAN BE GREAT VALUE TO WAR, NAVAL AND CIVILIAN DEPARTMENTS. NEED INFORMATION BEFORE LEAVING. PLEASE TELEPHONE ME YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE TODAY BEVERLYHILLS CRESTVIEW 11314. HAVE ARRANGED FOR CALL HERE=

=RALPH BLOCK.

11314.

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE.

[Even No. rolls]

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3]

Bolitz BZ

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: William L. Langer **DATE** March 31, 1942

TO: Mr. Murphy

SUBJECT: Documents belonging to Therese Bonney.

In reply to your memorandum of March 23 concerning missing papers which belonged to Therese Bonney, we have searched the files of this office exhaustively and have asked Mr. Gooch and Mr. Dorn about them. I am quite certain that they were returned to the Colonel's office intact.

I am returning herewith her letter of March 18, and your letter to the Bureau of Customs dated March 13.

William L. Langer
Director of Research

Attachments

117 East 30th Street,
New York City.
March 24,1942.

Colonel W.Donovan,
Co-Ordinator of Information,
24th and E Street,
Washington,D.C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

On March 18th I advised you as you requested of the receipt of some of the material which I had brought from Europe and of the loss of other. I am writing to tell you that I am in receipt of a letter from the Assistant Collector of Customs reading as follows:

" Due to an inadvertence, the enclosed exhibits, listed below, were not returned with the three packages recently delivered to you, which were temporarily detained at the time of your arrival on the San Thome.

This office regrets any inconvenience which may have been due to failure to deliver this material to you with your other possessions."

There are still several pages of notes and digests missing, the secret report concerning the Alsace Lorraine expulsions and a clipping re: Dr.Carrel.

In the material I expect from London, if it is ever received, parts of the Alsace Lorraine expulsions report is duplicated. I have a copy of the Carrel Clipping. The notes are then the most important.

It is evident that greater precautions should be taken in handling papers taken from incoming passengers as any such could have unique information.

~~Sincerely,~~

Thérèse Bonney.

117 East 30th Street
New York City
March 18, 1942

Colonel W. Donovan,
Co-Ordinator of Information,
24th and E Street,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I was to advise you as soon as I had taken delivery of the material which I brought back with me from Europe. ~~through~~ Your secretary and I had assumed it would take three days. There was a full week's delay in transferring the negatives and contents of my two brief cases back to New York from Washington .... a total of three weeks, plus the six weeks devoted to the struggle of getting from London to Lisbon to New York.

The English and more French material, the latter taken to England at the request of Sir Noel Charles, though announced, has not yet arrived.

When I finally took delivery of the material brought with me, I found my notes and digests, all missing. I immediately reported this to the Customs authorities here, Mr. Fishman and to Mr. Herbert Gaston, Assistant secretary of the Treasury, Washington. On further checking of the material, I found other items missing: a secret report concerning the Alsace Lorraine expulsions, an exposé of the German plan for the colonization of France, clipping concerning Dr. Carrel. The notes represented a year's work and were digests of facts concerning such questions as : Jews, English and Americans in Occupied France, Collaborators, Collaboration, Food, Vichy, German penetration, etc. About eighty-per-cent of the material was unknown in this country and it was decidedly not to the interest of the enemy that it be known here.

Sixty per cent of the material can, I hope, be reassembled. Forty per cent, unfortunately, was taken from papers, notes etc. destroyed in Lisbon in order to keep within baggage restrictions for Clipper travel.

I assumed the material in question would not be appropriated by the government without advising me and going through customary requisition procedure.

Mr. Gaston advised me Monday last that none had been withheld by the government. The Customs here in New York have made an investigation and have found no trace of it in the various departments through which it unnecessarily

passed. The Department of Justice is now making an investigation.

For me this is a very serious loss. To have undertaken a trip, such as I did, have run the risks, endured, and have succeeded in the task of bringing all back safely and then lose the results of my labours at my own front door is rather difficult to bear, especially when it could have been so easily avoided.

I am still convinced as I was when I left England that much of this material could be of great and real value to the OFF and COI. However after nearly three months lost in getting from London to New York and in clearing my material through Customs, (December fifteenth to March sixth) I find I have to burn row-in and edit my negatives and material in order to fulfill immediate editorial commitments.

I shall, nevertheless, be anxious and willing to collaborate with the COI in any way that might be found possible.

I have already asked Commander Vanderbilt to advise you of some of these facts.

Sincerely,

Therese Bonney

Therese Bonney

March 13, 1942

Mr. Russell
Bureau of Customs
Winder Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Russell:

In accordance with our telephone conversation today, I am sending some papers which were among those belonging to Miss Theresa Bonney.

I understand the bulk of her papers were returned to her.

1. Die Woche, Jan. 14, 1942
2. Miscellaneous German newspaper and magazine clippings
3. La France Allemande, by Jacques Lorraine
4. Correspondence re collaboration

Sincerely,

J. R. Murphy
William J. Donovan

March 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. LANGER.

The attached is a letter from Therese Bonney. You will remember that we obtained her papers from the Customs Bureau, without her knowledge, and that they were read and returned. She later notified the Customs Bureau that some of the documents were missing. I found some of them and returned them through the Customs Bureau, as per copy of my letter of March 13th attached.

Belongs in FBI
Rodda
Kaufman
Lewis

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

~~270 MADISON AVENUE~~

NEW YORK

21 East 40th Street

March 12, 1942

To: Mr. James R. Murphy

From: William H. Vanderbilt

Subject: MISS THERESA BONNEY

Miss Bonney has called me several times on the phone, and came in to see me yesterday. She recited all her difficulties about her papers, documents, etc. She told me that they were finally returned to her but that some material was missing from the three packages which she brought with her.

The missing material is all descriptive of opinions and activities of the Nazis which could be used for anti-Nazi propaganda. All the missing documents came from her brief case, and they include the following:

A digest of twenty to thirty pages about collaboration, collaborationist's views, etc.

A book "France-Allemagne" by Jacques Lorraine.

Copy of Dr. Carrell interview.

Secret report on Alsace explusion.

Miss Bonney has been unable to trace these through the Customs, and feels that it is suspicious that everything that disappeared could be used against the Nazis.

Miss Bonney has much additional material, some from France and some from England, arriving through Cook & Son. She is anxious to take steps to protect this material from loss. Miss Bonney says the FBI is interested in the missing documents , and they will be glad to start an investigation as to what has become of them.

She is willing to go over her documents, papers, etc. with anyone in our organization, have them photostated, etc.

WHV AM

W.H.V.

Bonney 4/19
x Miscellaneous documents
x Vanderbilt file

att to 1 c.

Received on February 28, 1942, from Mr. Shirley Stephens, Chief, Enforcement, of the Bureau of Customs, three packages Nos. 1, 2, and 3, containing film, photographs and other tangible communications detained from Miss Therese Bonney by the collector of customs at New York, N. Y., for examination pursuant to the provisions of section 3(a) of the Trading with the enemy Act.

Burton
Liaison
FBI
Foreign Nat

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

MAR 18 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
South Building
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In confirmation of arrangements which Special Agent G. C. Burton of this Bureau made with Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole of your office on March 3, 1942, I desire to advise that Mr. Burton has been designated by this Bureau to be the liaison man between the FBI and the Foreign Nationalities branch of your office. On the occasion of Mr. Burton's conference with Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole, these gentlemen outlined in detail the work of this new branch, and offered to this Bureau, through Mr. Burton, the privilege of calling upon them for information in their possession which would be of interest to this Bureau.

I feel that much information of value can be exchanged between the Foreign Nationalities branch and this Bureau, and I hope you will feel free to call upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation for any information which will be of value in this work.

Sincerely yours,

Hoover

Poole

Top ↑

Borgese
Gramercy Park Hotel
NY

Chicago : 1224 East 57th St.
(Midway 2258)

[illegible] of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is [illegible] of f.6.3

1.

A Columbus plan was submitted to a few experts and statesmen early in 1941. It was founded on the notion that the earth is round. It proposed initiative against Japan, occupation of Indochina, junction with the Chinese armies, double-pronged pressure toward Russia and toward the Middle and Near East. The Atlantic, with the Mediterranean, was considered as a defensive front, always on the alert and ready for offensive thrusts when the moment should come.

That plan belongs now to the past.

2.

With the situation changed after the intervention of Russia and the reverses in the Pacific, the tenet that "defense will not win the war" has become popular, and the request for new fronts has risen to a clamor.

But the suggestion of Australia, or India, as springboards for an early offensive, is too inadequate to be discussed at length. The proposal of an African assault via Dakar is comparatively pointless if its point is directed to North Africa alone. Colonel Donovan's idea of invading Italy would have been excellent two and a half years ago. Other plans insisting on an early invasion of Western Europe do not take into full account the present preparedness of Germany.

3.

[illegible] permanent immediately after Pearl Harbor. Soon afterward (January 1942) an article in Free World detailed

on apparently serious information the German plan for an invasion of the United States via the Northern Pacific. In more recent times there has been much public discussion on Alaska both as a crucial sector of defense and - with or without the support of Russian bases in the central area of Eastern Siberia - as a prospective base for an attack on Japan.

What, however, is generally meant by the latter suggestion is a "grand air attack" on Tokyo and the island empire.

The airplane as a factor of victory was first academically belittled as it is now superstitiously magnified. It is not so sure that air attacks alone, grand as they may be, would knock out Japan.

It is questionable, on the other hand, whether the enormous expanse of Alaska (and the same should be said of Western Canada) can be successfully defended in the long run against invasion, unless we parry the blow by making of that territory a base for a full offensive, thus forcing Japan to concentrate on defensive positions in Asia.

Closest to a comprehensive view came an editorial in the Nation of March 7. It still envisioned, however, two separate wars - one in the Pacific and the other in Europe - while this war is one, and its proposals of cooperation between America and Russia remained still needful of further precision.

4.

The move from Detroit, suggested in the Columbus plan, was

be castled north, toward and beyond the lands of Marco Polo.

An A.E.F. should join the Russian forces in Eastern Siberia. A double-pronged action would develop toward the West and toward the South. The purpose of the westward action would be to bring help to the Russian front in Europe, with the invasion of Germany as its final goal. The final goal of the southward action after a junction with the Chinese armies, would be Thailand and Singapore, with the Japanese armies enveloped from the rear and squeezed toward the sea.

The hour for attacks on Western Europe via the Atlantic would strike after a certain amount of positive success in the battles of Asia. It might strike earlier in case of German revolution or collapse, unpredictable today; or in the case (not clearly predictable either) that a more promising sector, like Spain and especially Portugal, could be chosen instead of Nazi-occupied France, or the coast of the North Sea, or Norway.

Clearly enough, a [illegible] March through Asia is no jaunt. The layman himself realizes some of the terrific difficulties.

The other plans, however, that have been proposed to the public mind, do not look more comfortable. The purpose, heroic though it is, of "carrying the fight from year to year", is no plan. Production may be on our side, or on the side of the enemy, or on both. Time is rather against us.

It is not indifferent whether we win the war in a reasonable time or in an indefinite future. A long war of attrition may well exhaust our energy. It may also exhaust most of the values of the

civilization we are fighting for.

The roads of Asia are proposed as possibly leading to a victory timely enough to make sense for our generation.

6.

Foremost or preliminary among the difficulties is the conveyance of a large expeditionary force from this continent to Siberia.

Three routes - as long as the ratio of the naval forces is unfavorable to us - are proposed by the maps: 1) the stepping stones of the Aleutian islands; 2) the Behring Strait; 3) the Arctic Ocean.

Ideally convenient would be to use the Aleutian islands and the Behring Strait as fences or taints, while the Arctic Ocean, presumably out of reach for Japanese navy, would provide the main artery of communication. The ideal, however, might look fanciful.

We know for certain that communications along the Arctic Ocean have been immensely improved in the last few years, after the so called "North-Eastern Route" was definitely opened by Schmidt in 1932 and 1933. The situation there is by no means the same as in the days of Nordenskiold. But in what proportions and under what conditions the Arctic route could be used for a large scale operation, is a matter beyond the knowledge of the layman.

The same is true of navigable rivers in Siberia, from the Yenisei to the Angara, and from the Lena to the Amur, and of whatever other ways on land or water may be open to an A.E.F. on its arrival either from the Northern Pacific or from the Arctic Ocean. The only common knowledge is that Russia has dedicated tireless energy to the improvement of the whole system of communications in Siberia. Otherwise, the

maps are reticent or contradictory, and even the state of completion of railroads projected long since has been kept hidden from the public. Experts in the General Staff's perhaps have the information at their disposal. It is for them to judge whether and how a military mass can reach from Vertchoyansk or other bridgeheads the Transiberian Railroad and the navigable system which is being expanded across Lake Baikal toward Mongolia and the borders of China. It is for them to appraise the ways of communication across Alaska or to decide what an access, if any, can be provided from inner or outer Siberia and through the Amur valley to the Tatar Strait and Northern Sakhalin, bordering on Japan proper.

But it has been said that where there is still a will there is a way. Imaginative conceptions, to be sure, entail stupendous risks. It is only unimaginative and automatic thinking, with the earth as flat as the mind, that is exempt from dangers - except the danger, or certainty, of consumptive defeat and slow doom.

7.

Encumbered by technical difficulties, the layman can measure the ideological or emotional obstacles. They are bigger.

It seems credible that the Russians are not particularly fond of seeing the armies of the Western democracies - which they mistrust - on their own soil.

It seems certain that the Western democracies are not particularly eager of joining sporty hands with Russian Communism - which they condemn.

maps are reticent or contradictory, and even the state of completion of railroads projected long since has been kept hidden from the public. Experts in the General Staff's perhaps have the information at their disposal. It is for them to judge whether and how a military mass can reach from Vertchoyansk or other bridgeheads the Transiberian Railroad and the navigable system which is being expanded across Lake Baikal toward Mongolia and the borders of China. It is for them to appraise the ways of communication across Alaska or to decide what an access, if any, can be provided from inner or outer Siberia and through the Amur valley to the Tatar Strait and Northern Sakhalin, bordering on Japan proper.

But it has been said that where there is a will there is a way. Imaginative conceptions, to be sure, entail stupendous risks. It is only unimaginative and automatic thinking, with the earth as flat as the steppe, that is exempt from dangers - except the danger, or certainty, of consumptive defeat and slow doom.

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It seems credible that the Russians are not particularly fond of seeing the armies of the Western democracies - which they mistrust - on their own soil.

It seems certain that the Western democracies are not particularly eager of joining speedy hands with Russian Communism - which they condemn.

Events
X Liaison
1 F.B.I.
1 For Pat Rec.

March 20, 1942

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Thank you for your letter of March 18. I know that Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole are pleased with the arrangements which you have made for cooperation in their work. I feel that the exchange of information will be of mutual value and we appreciate this opportunity of cooperation.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Supply: Foy
Copy to Mr. Poole 3/20
Copy to " " Ltr of 3/18.

This mutual disaffection is explanatory of the blinkers beyond which neither party wants to recognize the sector or sectors of the war where full cooperation is possible. Ideology and strategy are the two faces of the same fact.

But the truth, again, is dawning on many minds that if America, Russia, and China do not hang together, they may hang separately.

Even supposing that victory in a global war could be won by discordant efforts, the outlook after winning the war would be, once again, the well-known way of losing the peace. A conflict of East and West looms large already beyond the horizon, cloudy enough, of our days.

Nothing could be more effective in averting this danger than plenary cooperation and comradeship on the battlefields.

This war - together with the peace it unfolds - will be finally won, as most others were, by the infantrions, i.e. by the passion of the common man inspired by the genius, military and moral, of the leaders.

It is legitimate to hope that experts and leaders may consider this plan, to adopt or reject it as their knowledge and insight [illegible]

March 24, 1962

G.A. Borgese

G.A. Borgese

(University of Chicago)

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

THE NEW "REPUBLIC"*

BY I. A. RICHARDS

NO BOOK except the Bible has had so much influence upon us as "The Republic." In a very real sense we are its creatures. "That book," said the Yankee farmer to Emerson, who had lent him it, "has a great number of my ideas." Socrates's words at the end of Book IX have come true; we are citizens of the state he founded. "The greatest of the Greek inventions," said Werner Jaeger recently, "was man himself." He means Western man of course. The Chinese had Confucius and Mencius to do for them what Plato did for us—give them forever their picture of their true selves. We come short of it endlessly, of course, but it is of Plato's guardian mind that we come short.

Yet we may never have read a word of Plato. It is still true. Most of our serious thoughts have been echoes of his. Every successful student of Plato comes to feel that later literature is a whispering gallery. Plato's thought—miraculously mated with Christianity in the third century—still lights the eyes of every enthusiastic new discoverer of Truth. If this surprises you, read Emerson's "Representative Men," should reading Plato himself seem too much.

Reading Plato himself is a big undertaking. Even among those who are coaxed and coached through it few successful readers will be found. A successful reader is one who knows more *about himself* and *about the good* after his reading. It is easy to learn *about* Plato, harder to learn about these things *from* him. This is partly because we had already learned so much from him before we opened his pages. But partly it is due to the superb pedagogy in "The Republic." There never was a book of such scope so well designed for its pupils. It acted perfectly on the scholar disciples it was written for. But though we are disciples—witting or unwitting—we are not those scholars. The very spaciousness of the book, the broad introductory sketches, the anticipatory hints, the figurative indications, the minor parallels, the cunningly arranged correspondencies and contrasts, the gambits and the recapitulations, the returns to deeper levels through passages hewn already only for this purpose—all that art entirely misses its effect on us at a first reading. How many, for example, have thrown "The Republic" down toward the end of the first book, unaware that a main ingredient of their dissatisfaction is something Plato intended them to feel. The arguments *are* bad. Thrasymachus gives up too easily. But Socrates knows this better than we do. We are meant to feel, "This sort of thing will never do!" Unfortunately, "this sort of thing" in this guise is so unfamiliar to us that we miss the point and blame Plato when we should be blaming sunday combative tricks in argument we ourselves use, in other guises, every day.

Again, as Plato develops the great parallel between society and the mind—which has shaped so many societies and so many minds—how many notice that Socrates says, "We shall never reach the truth this way"? This is a parallel, a figure of speech which is perpetually necessary, not an argument. The modern sociologist is apt to take his own arguments so seriously that he overlooks Plato's analysis of method and his hints that in "these things" even a Glaucon—surely the best audience that any man could ever hope for—must be content with parallels. On these and many other fundamental points the temptation to write yet further commentaries is irresistible. I have indulged it by putting what I have to say about "dialectic," and much else that is central here, into my How to Read a Page, which is published with this and is in its latter parts just some more of those "footnotes to Plato" of which, as Whitehead said, "Western philosophy consists."

"The Republic," as it stands in the English versions of the best scholars, is ineffective today for the very reasons which have made it effective in Plato's Greek. The main lines of its thought become lost among the qualifications and preparations and the polite and (to the Greek) persuasive indirections.

The very familiarity, too, of some of the ideas prevents us from seeing their everlasting novelty. They are like our hands and feet; only now and then do we realize them and how much they do for us. Of all media which could guard us from this awakening shock, a translator's English which attempts to follow the Greek meticulously in minor detail and social tone is the most absorbent. Plato's style deployed endless exquisite devices for meeting attitudes and expectations in his readers which sprang from their milieu. These attitudes and expectations never arise in us; we have our own. A dummy discourse in English does not meet them, however well it is trained to ape the alien delicacies of the Greek. Nor does it help us in taking what Plato said to heart. Versions in nineteenth-century idiom did help the nineteenth century to realize itself. Today they have the uncanny effect of making Plato seem mid-Victorian. We hardly know which of two remote worlds we are exploring.

This is unfair both to Plato and to Jowett. But its causes lie deeper than even the perennial moral strife between intellectual generations. It is the effort to get *all* of Plato's meaning into our English—just that meaning and nothing less—which befogs the translator's prose. It is a wholly admirable effort and ambition, from the point of view of scholarship in Greek. To try to say it in English is one of

*This essay from the introduction to a new version of "The Republic" of Plato, founded on Basic English. Adult has been prepared by I. A. Richards and will be published on April 9 by W. W. Norton and Company.

Amateur Strategists

BY G. A. BORGESE

IT WAS impressive to hear again the rebuke of Consul Lucius Aemilius to the amateur strategists of his time—168 B.C.—as reported by Livy and quoted extensively by Mr. Roosevelt at his press conference of March 17.

There are, however, other stories. One is in Herodotus, I, 84. It refers to events of 546 B.C. when Croesus and the Lydian empire fell to Cyrus.

> Now this is how Sardis was taken. When Croesus had been besieged for fourteen days, Cyrus sent horsemen about in his army to promise rewards to him who should first mount the wall. . . . A certain Mardian called Hyroeades essayed to mount by a part of the citadel where no guard had been set; for here the height on which the citadel stood was sheer and hardly to be assaulted, and none feared that it could be taken by an attack made here. . . . So then it chanced that, on the day before, this Mardian, Hyroeades, had seen one of the Lydians descend by this part of the citadel after a helmet that had fallen down, and fetch it; he took note of this and considered it, and now he himself climbed up, and other Persians after him. Many ascended, and thus was Sardis taken. [Translation by A. D. Godley.]

Another story refers to events of 773 A.D. It is reported by medieval historians such as Anastasius, Frodoard, Agnellus Ravennatis, and the Chronicler of Moissiac.

> Charlemagne, having dismissed all hope of forcing the Chiuse [a kind of Maginot Line at the entrance of Langobardic Italy] and not suspecting that there might be another way for invading Italy, had made up his mind to return the next day to France, when a deacon, called Martin, arrived at the camp of the Franks. This man taught Charlemagne a secret mountain pass to outflank the fortresses and to descend into Italy. Charles, then, sent a picked army to that difficult passage. The Langobards, at the unexpected thrust, turned to disorderly flight, and the King with the bulk of his Franks passed through the abandoned Chiuse.

According to other sources the pathfinder of Charlemagne was an itinerant minstrel. If that is so, he could not even rank with the "editors" whom Mr. Roosevelt, supported by Livy, has taken so severely to task. He was nothing but a poet. As for the conqueror of Sardis, he was a Mardian, that is, one of a nomad Persian tribe, obviously illiterate. Perhaps as a wanderer he had learned to look at things.

Neither Hyroeades nor Martin—deacon or minstrel—had a seat in the Cabinet or rank in the General Staff. The lion of the fable does not know whether or when a little mouse may help him out of the net in which he may happen to be caught. Cyrus and Charlemagne were successful generals. It did not harm them to listen occasionally to "amateur strategists."

In the Wind

WENDELL WILLKIE and Thomas E. Dewey are still fighting each other for control of the Republican machine in New York State. Willkie has told friends that if Dewey is nominated for governor this year, he will bolt his party and support Lehman. Dewey, for his part, is seeking a new base of support in the American Labor Party's left wing, whose hundred thousand votes are often enough to swing a state election. In a move interpreted as an effort to curry favor with the radicals, Dewey recently proposed to the Board of Higher Education of New York City that it permit fifteen college teachers suspended on charges of communism to resign rather than be expelled, thereby permitting them to seek jobs elsewhere in the school system.

AN ADVERTISEMENT of the Neponset Woolen Mills in the *American Funeral Director* tells of a new material for shrouds called "victory cloth." It is, says the ad, "made for the burial-goods industry so that we may maintain the American way of life."

TWO MORE MAGAZINES have ceased publication because of war-time economic difficulties—the *Living Age*, a century-old review of the foreign press, and the *Kenyon Review*, a literary journal edited by John Crowe Ransom.

AN EXECUTIVE of a metropolitan department store told reporters, off the record, that his firm's biggest hoarding story to date was about a $1,200 grocery order placed by a resident of a three-room apartment.

AN ITALIAN Socialist weekly, *La Parola*, published in New York, is presenting evidence of Fascist activity which the Dies committee had in its possession but refused to release. The paper has reproduced verbatim a rehearsal of testimony to be given by Girolamo Valenti, the anti-Fascist editor of *La Parola*, before the Dies committee. Although Valenti named men whom the government has since arrested, the committee called off the hearing after reading Valenti's evidence.

A FEW MONTHS AGO several divisions of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers agreed to donate part of their time and labor to making garments for the Red Cross. They requested that they be permitted to sew into each item an Amalgamated union label. Red Cross officials said that it was against organization policy to permit the union label, and so no Red Cross clothes will bear it.

[We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.]

5852

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 15, 1942

Military Personnel
Army Air Forces, Officers Section
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Captain Goetz

My dear Captain Goetz:

Enclosed is the necessary letter covering Major Donnell's release from this organization.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

RC

XXXX

July 3, 1942

Brigadier General H. L. George
Air Transport Command
Temporary Building "H"
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Major Geoffrey Harper Bonnell was detailed to the Coordinator of Information by War Department Special Order No. 115 Paragraph 10, 3 May, 1942.

The foreign mission on which the use of Major Bonnell had been contemplated has been dropped due to altered circumstances. I, therefore, request that Major Bonnell be released from duty with my office and returned to duty with the Air Corps Ferrying Command.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Bruce
Williamson
Cresswell
Ahoss

June 15,1942

Marian,

I am returning your file on Major Bonnell. His release is nowhere to be found. Would you let me know if you come across it sometime.

Stacy Lloyd

Bonnell G.H 5452
A 1201



June 13, 1942.

The Honorable

The Secretary of War.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

On April 28, 1942, Colonel Donovan wrote you to request the transfer of Major Geoffrey H. Bonnell to this office. This request was kindly complied with and Major Bonnell was detailed to the Coordinator of Information by the War Department's Special Order No. 115, Paragraph 10, 8 May, 1942.

Colonel Donovan had contemplated using Major Bonnell on a foreign mission. Due to altered circumstances, this project has been dropped. I therefore venture to request that Major Bonnell be released from duty with the Coordinator of Information and returned to duty with the Army.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Asst. Coordinator.

[redacted]

Date 4/21/42

TO: Mr. Nelson

Remarks:

This is another one which Major Bruce would like to discuss with the Colonel. Please hold with the others. Thank you.

Clara Clements

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: David Bruce

DATE: April 24, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: Major Geoffrey Harper Bonnell

We have had the matter of Major Bonnell's transfer up with Colonel George of the Army Ferrying Command, and he has consented to his transfer. When you have signed this letter, we shall then present it to Colonel George, although it is addressed to the Secretary of War, and see whether we can accomplish this matter speedily. The idea is to have Major Bonnell stationed at Khartoum and to attempt to introduce into the Ferrying Command a somewhat similar arrangement to that which we have set up with Pan American.

I enclose herewith copy of Major Bonnell's record.

DKCB

David Bruce

MEMO OF WAR SERVICE

MAJOR GEOFFREY HARPER BONNELL

Served as private and sergeant, 7th Battery, 2nd Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery from August, 1914 to November, 1915, eight and one-half months of which time was active service, France. My commanding officer during this service was the present General Andrew McNaughton, commanding all Canadian forces. During 2nd Battle of Ypres, Galloper to Major McNaughton, Colonel Chas. McLaren and Gen. Bristol, Commanding 1st Contingent Artillery. (By Galloper, I mean carrying orders while field phones are out of commission).

November, 1915 commissioned Second Lt. Royal Field Artillery.

December, 1915, attached Royal Flying Corps, attending first ground school, Reading, England, receiving flying training in England.

March 1916, attached to No. 32 Scout Sq, first complete Scout Sq. of the B.E.F. to serve in France, Colonel Reese, V.C., Commanding Officer, 9 months active service with No. 32.

September, 1917, promoted to rank of Captain and Flight Commander.

January, 1917, attached to General Hoar's staff R.F.C., Canada, appointed Commanding Officer to organized recruits' depot for training of mechanical personnel.

April, 1917, appointed second in command in charge advanced flying Camp Borden, Canada, commanding officer Colonel Oliver D. Filley.

June, 1917, opened recruiting for R.F.C. flying personnel, New York, N.Y.

June, 1917, commissioned Major, September, 1917, honorary discharge from British. At time of transfer to U. S., made Hon. Major, British Army, for life.

September, 1917, commissioned Major, Signal Corps, Regular Army, U.S. assigned command flying fields, Fort Worth, Texas; also in command British Troops at Fort Worth until arrival of General Hoar.

December, 1917, assumed command 147th U.S. Scout Sq.

February, 1918 sent to England to study combat and gunnery training R.A.F. Schools; July, 1918 appointed second command in charge of lying under Major McGill in the south of France, flying and gunnery training.

February 1918, C.O. Troops on [illegible]
New York, active services [illegible] C.O., [illegible]

August, 1918, appointed commanding officer [illegible]
Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Hiram [illegible]
early November, 1918, C.O. night [illegible]
November, 1818 attached to Gen. [illegible] data to write the American Air Service History. [illegible] covered visiting R.A.F. units in France [illegible] necessary information for a comparison of schools, [illegible] methods of supply, etc.

Commissioned Major, Specialists, February 2, 1941.

July 30, 1941, orders to report for active duty [illegible] Wright Flying Field, Ohio.

July 31, 1941, assigned to the Defense Aid Organization, Wright Field.

November 5, 1941, assigned to office Chief of A.C. [illegible]

November 14, 1941, assigned Air Corps Ferrying Command.

November 17, 1941, assigned Liaison office Air C.F.C. [illegible]

January 2, 1942, assigned Central Officer A.C.F.C., [illegible]

February 14, 1942, returned the A.C.F.C., Washington, D. C.

April 24, 1942

The Honorable

The Secretary of War

Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

It is respectfully requested that Geoffrey Harper Bonnell, Major, Specialist Reserve, attached to Air Corps Ferrying Command, be detached from his present duty and assigned for duty with this office.

Major Bonnell possesses qualifications which it is felt fit him for certain confidential special duty assignments under my direction.

It would be greatly appreciated if this assignment could be made at the earliest possible date.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Bruce
R.C
Crosswell

[redacted] U.L.A.1068, met.

Boegner 643B

SECRET

May 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Etienne Boegner came in to say "Goodbye" last night just before taking a plane for New York, en route to London for his "show-down" with General de Gaulle. He said that he had had most satisfactory and very precise conversations at the State Department.

I asked him about the attached article on de Gaulle which appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES of May 21, under a Washington date line. Boegner stated that the story in question actually came from London, but that he understood Tixier and others suspected, quite mistakenly, that he had put it out.

He continued that he had postponed his departure for some days, awaiting a telegram from General de Gaulle sanctioning his trip; this telegram had now been received. From Marchal he learned that Tixier had sent de Gaulle a telegram eulogizing Boegner's conduct of the affairs of the Free French Delegation during his recent absence in London. In view of Tixier's previous attitude toward him, he was at a

loss to account for this sudden benevolence, except possibly on the grounds that Tixier was endeavoring to establish some sort of alibi in anticipation of Boegner's arrival at the General's headquarters. Tixier, he went on, was very uneasy over his trip to London.

Finally, Boegner expressed great mystification over Tixier's attitude in general. He was convinced that Tixier was an entirely honest man, whose greatest fault was that of being overly ambitious. He felt, however, that there was something pathologically wrong with him; that he was definitely subject to aberrations.

Boegner seemed to think that he had pretty definitely succeeded in arranging for Albert Grand to go to London with him.

John C. Wiley.

DE GAULLE ASKED
TO END CONFLICTS

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/10 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100010001-2

Bruce Hunter Gillis
x Bouverie, Audrey, Pleydell
File

House of Commons
Canada

Ottawa, May 21, 1942.

Personal

Colonel William Donovan,
Coordination Office of Information,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill,-

Our friend "Audrey" in a recent letter to my wife, expressed her anxiety to receive a reply from you to a recent letter which she had written you. I told Angela to tell her that the time she gave for a reply, namely, 3 weeks, was much too short and that I had no doubt, if the letter reached you, you would reply in due time.

I hope you are keeping well and not working too hard.

We are here awaiting Mr. Mackenzie King's next move in regard to Compulsory Selective Service. He introduced a Bill about two weeks ago to remove Clause 3 from the National Mobilization Act which limited service to this Country, but, so far, has shown no hurry to bring it up for a second reading. In answer to a question of a member of the Opposition today, he said the Government must retain to themselves the right to select the time when they would bring this forward. The truth is that his French-Canadian followers from Quebec are giving him a great deal of trouble, as they do not want conscription and I think he is delaying matters in the hope that some event will happen to make it easier for him. Of course, the proper thing for him to do is to form a Union or Coalition Government and step aside and let somebody else lead such a Government. Eventually, I think, he will be forced to do this.

Angela joins me in kindest regards and all good wishes.

Yours very sincerely,

Booth 6447

file

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: F. L. Belin

DATE May 25, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT:

At Mr. Williamson's suggestion, I am sending you, herewith, a copy of a report from Booth, in Madrid, to Roseborough, dated May 5, 1942, which may be of interest to you.

F. L. B.

F. L. Belin

Attachment

SECRET

(COPY)

Madrid
5th May, 1942

Dear Arthur:

SECRET

I arrived in Madrid the 25th of April and the pouch which closes tonight is the first opportunity that I have had to write you from here. There have regularly been pouches between Madrid and Lisbon every fortnight but sometimes, of course, there have been people with diplomatic passports travelling between the two cities, who could supplement the service. Only holders of diplomatic passports (with a few special exceptions) are allowed to carry the pouch. Smith and I, for instance, having special passports could not help.

Supplementing my cables, the whole matter of couriers might be gone into closely with State. The Charge d'Affaires at Tangier has not had a courier for four months and, as I indicated, there is no service at all between the Embassy and the various Consulates. This condition is aggravated by the assignment of Petroleum Inspectors to consular territories. Any couriers assigned should be, in addition to competent observers, strong and healthy, for travel is very difficult and it may be necessary at times for them to ride all night on hard board seats.

SECRET

The transport situation is a difficult one, even on the main routes. Between Lisbon and Madrid there are three through trains weekly and three planes, upon all of which it is difficult to get reservations except well in advance. I had to change trains en route and it took from 11 a.m. to 9:45 a.m. (!) to cover a distance that requires two hours by plane. The plan is to assign me no particular territory but to have me a sort of general inspector covering all Spain, which is very desirable; particularly now that you have been able to arrange the car exchange. I will give you the details regarding that on a separate sheet.

The handling of funds appears to be somewhat catch as catch can. Through S.O.E. Lisbon I was able to exchange the $5000.00 that you sent me.* Through local channels I can, presumably safely, swing a maximum of $1000.00 monthly. Doubtless Lisbon can raise whatever might be required. However, a personal cheque on a U. S. bank is worth more than cash and a government draft is not acceptable. The whole thing requires care and it might be well in future to open Washington accounts under aliases, so that will be no record of the transaction even in Portugal.

*Though I have not yet got it.

SECRET

I will use my own code for all, or nearly all of my messages. In this, as in other respects, the Embassy is short handed and my code saves the clerk's time. The stenographic situation is also bad; hence my reports will be in longhand. It had been my intention to avoid copies in any case, so, if you can read my writing, this should not make any great difference. Please tell W.L.R. that in my letters to him regular mail it will be the 1st, 5th, 9th, etc.; I think that this is what I told him but I may have made it the 4th, 8th and so on.

As regards Spain I have reread some despatches which, in the light of having met the Counselor of Embassy, ad interim Charge d'Affaires, have for me taken on a new authenticity. For a political background I feel that I can do no better than refer you to enclosures to despatches numbers 1228 and 1332, dated October 14 and December 11, respectively. These present a contrast to the other more sensational material which we have in our library but I have been unable to find any evidence that the analyses therein are not correct as well as the conclusions drawn. I am convinced that they were developed from mature consideration of carefully weighed evidence. You will find these despatches in our files; Baker knows where they are.

I am sending you some newspapers and other clippings an article which you may have read and which is typical of some of the sort of reports that we were receiving before I left the States. It is an interesting piece but I have been unable to find any foundation for the assertions of the author, Tuchy. In fact, I was informed through the British Embassy that the man is not at all reliable, has not been in Spain in years and has no source of information here.

SECRET

There have recently been consular reports, which you will doubtless get, which have to do with petroleum supplies among other things. One of these brought information of deposits of aviation gasoline in Spanish North Africa and another stated that there was a cache of aviation gasoline in Tarrafa. If there is any information about this in C.O.I. or anything come in direct, please let me know; I understand that we have pretty complete personnel in French Morocco and Algeria and if they are getting anything from the Spanish side, we should like to know.

I am also sending you a group of photographs of the present cabinet as well as a brief sketch of Carcellier (?) the Minister of Commerce. The Embassy has submitted

SECRET

biographical sketches of other important figures to the State Dept. where you can obtain them. I will check here to see what is lacking and will attempt to fill in the gap.

The newspapers I hope will give you a clear background against which to place the summary prepared by the Second Secretary. This summary, though written over a year ago, appears to me to be as accurate and informative as though it had been done yesterday. The clippings are revealing inasmuch as they contain information, direct and indirect, upon morale, restrictions, cooperation with Axis, etc. I will continue to send the clippings each pouch.

You will notice mentioned several times the S.E.U. These letters stand for Sindicato Espanol Universitario and it is a bellicose youth organization apparently modeled after those in the other Axis countries. There are thousands of posters stuck upon the walls around Madrid proclaiming the active aid that the S.E.U. has given in the war against socialism and pointing the finger of scorn at those students who have not actively helped. The organization was, and is, an actual and vocal sponsor of the Division Azul and quite likely is prepared to produce a demonstration when and if necessary.

SECRET

I have been trying to get some idea of how many Germans there actually are in Spain. This has been difficult. The official register here at the Embassy shows something over 7000, resident and transient in the whole country. I have talked to nobody who believes this figure but neither have I been able to put my finger on a substantiated one.

As mentioned in the papers, von Stohrer, gave a reception to the German Colony on Sunday morning at the Palacio del Cine and I went along there to see how many would turn out. There were between three hundred and three hundred fifty all told, of which about fifty were children. About thirty men were in uniform; most were black uniforms but two or three were khaki. Nearly all the children, both boys and girls were in uniform.

I have had a number of conversations with people of all classes; poor, middle-class and nobility, all of which have tended to endorse the conclusions drawn in the Embassy reports to the State Dept. as previously mentioned.

To leave Spain; the other day the Embassy was informed that the Spanish Government had learned through Berlin that a Libyan offensive by General Rommel is, until Fall impossible due to lack of supplies. One of the Polish commanders, that

I wrote you about from Lisbon, said there that an offensive by anybody was now out of the question because of climatic conditions. Why should news from Germany make the basis supplies? This man's command is now in Egypt en route to Persia having been withdrawn from Tobruk and vicinity.

Another thing. I crossed in the Nyassa with a Frenchman whom I had met before; Francois Bachy, Capitaine Corvette, commander of a destroyer at Dunkerque and Naval Attache of the Vichy Government, destined for Tokyo when the declaration of war turned him back. I saw a great deal of him on board and we spent ten days at the same hotel in Lisbon. He was very worried about the government change and was much affected when his good and respected friends in Washington resigned. He said that his hope was Darlan; that he and his fellow officers admired and respected Darlan as a man and as a seaman and that the admiral had indicated to the commanders of French Naval vessels that at such time as he might be forced to give orders by the Germans they would come from him in such a form that it could be seen that the reverse was meant.

I hope to get moving about next week; in the meantime, all the best to all of you.

Sincerely,

/s/ Wally

P. S. - Please let me know anything specific you may want other than the general questionnaires.

P. P. S. - I see that I omitted living conditions. They are better than I expected but things are expensive. My room at the Palace Hotel costs pts. 50 per day with Embassy discount and meals cost about pts. 50 for lunch and the same for dinner.

SECRET

Bouverie 126703
x Donovan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Kenneth Mygatt

DATE: August 15, 1942

TO: Mr. James Murphy

SUBJECT:

I refer to our telephone conversation about Mrs. Bouverie and the fact that the priority people refused to place her and her two boys on a Transatlantic plane.

I hope that Colonel Donovan does not try to force this any further, as the offices in charge of priorities have very definite instructions about carrying people who are not considered essential to the war effort, at this time. If we try to force this matter any further, I feel it will jeopardize our standing when in the future we want to force a priority essential to us. Frankly, I have a pretty good guess as to how Mr. Bouverie feels about this matter, and I also know that Mrs. Bouverie, his sister-in-law, knows that she may have to travel by ship.

File

PERSONAL

28th April, 1942.

My dear Colonel,

I met Audrey Bouverie last night and she accused me of having failed to send on her letter to you. I denied the allegation. She is very anxious indeed to hear whether there is any chance of your being able to get her to America on temporary "duty". Could you send her a short cable about it? It would be very welcome, as she is fretting.

I had great hopes of accompanying the First Sea Lord on his recent trip to Washington, but the Prime Minister intervened. I have almost given up hope of ever getting off the leash!

Is it not time that you paid us another visit? You would be sure of a very warm welcome.

Sincerely yours

Hoskins Sims

June 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Col. Ellery Huntington

From: William J. Donovan

I have known Mr. William Brewster about five years. He was Paris representative of the Texas Oil Company, and also during the Spanish Revolution handled the business of the Texas Company with the Spanish. He has spent most of his time in Europe since the last war, when he was a staff officer of our Army attached to the British in the Near East. There is no doubt about his integrity and loyalty, and he has a very broad acquaintance.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE June 2, 1942

FROM: Security Office

TO: Mr. James Murphy

SUBJECT: William Macy Brewster

Mr. William Macy Brewster has sent in Colonel Donovan's name as a reference and we would appreciate it if you would send us a memo with any information you have respecting his character, integrity and loyalty.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Col., A.U.S.
Security Officer

disclosure

Foreign Service
F.B.I.
F.B.I.

June 6, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I am very grateful to you for your personal and confidential letter of June 3rd concerning Francois Briere, French Consul at Boston, Massachusetts.

We are very glad to have such information and hope you will continue to send us similar reports as you receive them.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan.

C. sent to Mrs Gilbert

CONFIDENTIAL
6/8/42

Bouverie 1703

Kenneth Mygatt

August 31, 1942

Major Bouverie

Mrs. Audrey Bouverie

After Mrs. Bouverie called me up from New York today and told me about the difficulties she had in getting a special listing in the Cunard Line for herself and two boys, I called up my friend George Rehman in the Cunard Line with whom Mrs. Bouverie has an engagement this afternoon at 2:30 p.m., and talked to him. Mr. Rehman is an assistant to Sir Ashley Sparks and Mrs. Bouverie has been referred to him by Sir Ashley. Rehman knew about Mrs. Bouverie case and repeated to me what you and I know, which is that she dislikes to go through regular channels.

Rehman told me that Cunard will be glad to help in transporting Mrs. Bouverie and the boys to England, but that they will insist that she go through regular channels, ask for a priority request in the usual way and go to the Barge Office to see about her exit permit. I asked Rehman to tell Mrs. Bouverie from me that my most sincere advice was for her to follow Mr. Rehman's instructions. I believe my telephone was helpful to Rehman and will really be of assistance to Mrs. Bouverie.

KM:beh

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 21, 1942

SUBJECT: Orders

TO: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D.C.

1. Request that necessary orders be issued directing Captain George E. Brewer, Jr., Serial No. 0-903213, A.U.S., to proceed at the proper time on temporary duty from Washington, D.C., to London, thence to such places in the British Isles as that duty may require, and upon completion of such temporary duty to return to his permanent station, Washington, D.C., the purpose of this travel being to carry out instructions of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. Cost of travel performed under the requested orders will be chargeable to funds pertaining to the Office of Strategic Services.

3. Travel by air to and from the United Kingdom will be arranged by the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan
Director

Brewster
x War Dept
x Service Command

August 21, 1942

SECRET

SUBJECT: Orders

TO: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D.C.

1. Request that necessary orders be issued directing Captain George E. Brewer, Jr., Serial No. 0-903213, A.U.S., to proceed at the proper time on temporary duty from Washington, D.C., to London, thence to such places in the British Isles as that duty may require, and upon completion of such temporary duty to return to his permanent station, Washington, D.C., the purpose of this travel being to carry out instructions of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

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3. Travel by air to and from the United Kingdom will be arranged by the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan
Director

Military Intelligence, Res

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D. C.

JHD/sbn/ed/1515

AG 210.31
(8-21-42)OA

September 1, 1942.

SECRET

Subject: Orders.

Auth: T. A. G.
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 9/2/42

TO : Director, Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

To : Officers Involved.

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in the military service that each of the following-named officers, AUS, proceed at the proper time on temporary duty, from Washington, D. C. and/or New York, N. Y. to London, England, and to such other places in the British Isles as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out instructions of the Director, Strategic Services, and upon completion of this temporary duty, return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. Hilary C. Huntington, Jr, 0469476

Captain George E. Drewer, Jr., 0903213

2. Travel by military or commercial aircraft, belligerent vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, army or naval transport, and rail is directed. TD by air from Washington, D. C. and/or New York, N. Y. to destination and return, is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission.

3. In lieu of subsistence, a flat per diem of $6.00 is authorized while traveling by military or commercial aircraft, and for the period of temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States, in accordance with existing law and regulations. A baggage allowance of seventy-seven (77) pounds while traveling by military or commercial aircraft is authorized.

4. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such other places, in such order and as often as may be necessary to carry out this mission. The duties to be performed in connection with this mission being exceptional, may require more than seventy-two (72) hours at different places for their performance, therefore, a delay for any period required at any place where necessary is authorized.

5. Travel is chargeable to FD 34 P 434-02,03 : 0425-23.

6. Reimbursement for the expenses incurred in connection with the travel will be made to the War Department by the Office of Strategic Services. The Finance Officer making payment in connection with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher, showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number, and citation of this order, by letter of transmittal to The Adjutant General's Office, attention Fiscal Section, stating that the enclosed copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

SECRET

AG 210.31
(8-21-42)OA

JHD/sbs/ed/1515
Br 2990-3021

September 1, 1942.

SECRET

7. Attention is invited to Sec II, Cir 220, WD 1941, regarding the preparation and distribution of extract copies.

Incls. (Pay Guide & Instr.Memo)

Adjutant General.

Distribution:
Officer (4)
Officers' Record Section, AGO

SECRET

HLCtmsg

August 25, 1942

Mr. Donald Alexander
Vice President
Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co.
2480 Hunting Park Avenue
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Alexander:

A member of my staff, Mr. Norman L. Crowley, would like to call upon you the early part of next week sometime at your convenience.

We are desirous of obtaining certain vital and strategic information, and in your case you may be of considerable assistance to us.

I will be pleased to hear from you in this connection.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Colonel Donovan

201 - Brewer, George E. Jr.

volved. In addition, he has recently spent more than a month in England studying training methods and the operations of British schools, and in consequence is particularly well qualified for the work which he is now doing.

4. The factor of relative rank has been considered in making this recommendation. There is no other available officer who has had the benefit of the special study and training referred to above, and who combines the characteristics and background for the position, and grade for which Captain Brewer is recommended in so thoroughly satisfactory a manner.

5. Filling the position of Training Officer of the Special Operations Branch and representative on the Training Directorate by the promotion of Captain Brewer and the promotion of any others who may have been previously recommended, on whom final action has not been reported, will not result in exceeding the number of authorized majorities under the jurisdiction of this office.

6. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this is the best fitted officer available in this command for the grade and position for which promotion is recommended.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Chief, Special Operations Branch

wjd/vmd

1st Ind.

Office of Strategic Services, November 11, 1942. TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Forwarded with approval.

2. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this is the best fitted officer available in this command for the grade and position for which promotion is recommended.

William J. Donovan
Director

BRINK-1818
x Far East
x Aleutian Is.

August 7, 1942 x G2

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

Subject: F. Brink, Colonel, U. S. A.

The above subject, formerly a military attache in the Southwestern Pacific area, is now connected with the General Staff of G-2, and has just returned from the Far East.

Subject was in Malaya for several months prior to December 7, 1941, as an American military observer attached to the British forces. He got out of Malaya before its fall and went to the Dutch East Indies. He left the Dutch East Indies before the Japanese came, and went to Australia. From Australia he went to the Aleutian Islands, where he spent several months as a military observer, returning to the United States one month ago.

Observations on Various Theatres

In both Malaya and in the Dutch East Indies, Allied failure was largely due to (1) lack of coordination within the Allied effort, and (2) intervention of selfish commercial and political interests, which interferred with sound military strategy. The subject was fearful that in the United States we were permitting political and selfish considerations to influence military decisions. He felt that it was necessary to have complete coordination and harmony, not only within our own country, but also between the United States and the other Allied powers, especially the British Empire. We could not afford to allow selfish or narrow selfish interests to handicap an all-out unified effort. Unless we can get together within our country and with our allies, defeat of the United Nations is certain.

Operations in the Aleutian Islands were a case in point. The public, in general, and local selfish interests in particular, have been clamoring to have us retake from Japan the bases acquired on Attu, Agattu, Kiska Islands. This could be done if we are willing to pay the price. It is not worth the price at this stage because of the strategic unimportance of such bases. Opinions of non-military men to the contrary notwithstanding, it would be impossible for the Japanese to stage an offensive against Alaska from the bases which she has taken. On the other hand, possession

of these bases would not greatly interfere with any offensive operations against Japan. Possession of them would not shorten the airline distance to Siberia by more than about 300 miles, because the meridian airline would clear those islands by that distance. The politicians, business men, and newspapermen should have enough confidence in their military leaders not to insist upon military operations which our military leaders consider poor strategy.

Need for a Secret Intelligence Organization

This is a global war. We should get away from the idea that military or naval intelligence should, or could be, gathered in the interests only of the local theatre commander. We should have an intelligence service operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff covering the whole world, taking its orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and gathering secret intelligence for the Government as a whole, not just for the local theatre commander. The local theatre commander could, and probably should, have authority to tell the field organization of this service just where it would be best to operate. Information gathered by the service should be made available to the theatre commander, but it should be considered as primarily intended for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should include much more than strictly combat information--that is to say, should cover political, economic, social, and psychological information as well.

Such service should have as little contact as possible with local U. S. military and naval attaches, and should operate as a civilian organization, completely undercover. It should use very largely natives of the country as agents, particularly in the Orient.

The American representatives of the organization would be supervisors and should be connected with each other and with the headquarters of the theatre commander by a network of secret radio stations.

How Useful Would Such Operations Be?

We are not getting the information now through existing intelligence organizations. The job of procuring information should be regarded as something which precedes operations. We have to have the information before we can carry on operations. Here again the value

of the information to the problem of broad strategy rather than of local operations is apparent. Accurate information concerning conditions in any given area might be just as useful and might save thousands of lives of American troops if it indicated where not to operate, as well as where to operate; where to stay on the defensive and where to take the offensive. In a war of this size we cannot attack on all fronts at once--we have to pick and choose, and that is a task for the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than for any theatre commander.

EBP/M

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Edmond L. Taylor

DATE July 27, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Report on Conversation with David Bowes-Lyon and Walter Adams.

I called on Bowes-Lyon and Adams at David's request yesterday afternoon and had a long conversation with them. David was very anxious to be filled in on organizational changes in this country and I gave him a comprehensive and objective picture of the situation.

I gathered that he was anxious to maintain contact with us and to cooperate in psychological warfare work.

In the course of the conversation, I mentioned casually that Phillips had cabled Saturday an account of a conversation with McLeish and Jim Warburg (Jim Murphy phoned me at home about this cable) which disturbed us slightly. I told David that according to this cable, Warburg and McLeish were apparently trying to convince Phillips that the OSS should not have any contacts in England with PWE except through the London Office of OWI.

I explained that while the London contact with OWI would probably be their principal one, there would

certainly be a number of matters arising from time to time on which direct contact between OSS and PWE would be essential. Bowes-Lyon agreed with this in principal and said that as far as he was concerned personally, he throught it very important that he should be kept informed of any propaganda activities involving cooperation with any branch of the British Government which OSS might undertake. I said to him that I thought the only way he could be kept informed would be by maintaining direct and official liaison with us in Washington, and that the same principal should apply in London as well. He agreed on both counts. I told him further that I did not think the responsible authorities at OWI had ever instructed Warburg and McLeish to insist on exclusive liaison with PWE in England and that they would be repudiated by Davis and Sherwood if a showdown developed on this point.

Bowes-Lyon seems somewhat worried about the attitude and activities of SOE in this country. I told him that SOE seemed very anxious to maintain direct contact with OWI and vice versa, that I did not think this association was of great importance or benefit to either party but that as far as we were concerned, I felt that you would probably regard this as a problem in which we have no interest. Our job was to work with all British and

American services connected in any way with psychological warfare and we refused to allow ourselves to be involved in any departmental quarrels or jealousies, British or American. We did not propose to tell SOE what American agencies they should or should not deal with and we did not think anyone should try to tell PWE what agencies they should deal with or not deal with. David said he thought this was a very sound position and corresponded exactly to his own.

He and Adams will be here for at least three months. David's wife accompanied him. They will be coming down to Washington probably Tuesday.

Bowes-Lyon expressed himself very vigorously about Solbert's Japan Plan which had been communicated to him. He said it was a very bad, "very soft" plan which could not possibly serve as a basis for cooperation in the field of psychological warfare between British and Americans in the Far East. Further, he thought that the procedure which had been followed was very improper and of a nature to discourage Anglo-American cooperation. As you may remember, the FIS Planning Board had worked out with Bowes-Lyon and Ritchie Calder while they were in this country, an outline of a joint Angle-American psychological warfare plan against Japan. It was agreed between

Bob Sherwood and Bowes-Lyon that this joint plan would be submitted to the proper authorities here and in England and would become binding upon British and American propaganda services as soon as approved at both ends. David submitted his draft to the PWE Executive Committee and to the Foreign Office and got it approved with insignificant changes. At this end, however, Sherwood allowed Solbert to call a conference to work up a new Japan Plan and the joint plan drafted with the British was thrown by the FIS into the melting pot as one of the ingredients out of which Solbert's final draft was concocted.

I wonder it it would not be a smart move to invite David to one of the meetings, either of the Senior Committee or of the Working Committee, to explain what happenned to the Japan Plan and use this to show the necessity of closer collaboration between British and American psychological warfare services?

E.L.T.

TO: Mr. Murphy

I append herewith the file regarding William Brewster, together with a letter prepared for Col. Donovan's signature to him.

Please note the final paragraph of Mr. Brewster's letter in which he requests the return of certain memoranda. Those memoranda were not in the file when it reached me and may have been retained in your office.

H.R.W.

From the desk of
HUGH R. WILSON

Out
card
the

field

of

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

Brews Feb. 750
x 50 2in
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////////////////////////////

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 28, 1942

Mr. William M. Brewster
417 Park Avenue
New York City

Dear Bill:

I have been looking into the subject matter of your letter of July 17th. We did desire to send you to Spain, but due to the change of plans we are unable to do so. I am sorry if you have been waiting to hear more definitely, but we had assumed that since Mr. Shapiro told you the Spanish matter had to be dropped that you had cancelled the subject. Mr. Shapiro thought he had been explicit in his statement. We are sorry if there has been any misunderstanding. As for the Near East, there are certain plans which might enable us to make use of your services. However, everything is in such a preliminary state that it would be impossible to be more definite at this time. Should it work out we shall get in touch with you in the hope that you will be free to be with us.

Hoping to see you some time soon, I am

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Colonel Donovan

November 10, 1942

Refer to: 201 - Brewer, George E. Jr.

Subject: Recommendation for Promotion

To: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D. C.

1. It is recommended that George Emerson Brewer, Jr., Captain A.A.F. (0-903213), be promoted to the grade of Major. Captain Brewer was commissioned a Captain in the Army of the United States on April 20, 1942 and has not subsequently been promoted.

2. Captain Brewer is now acting as Training Officer in the Special Operations Branch of this office and as the representative of that branch on the Training Directorate which is responsible for the combined training program of several related branches. If promoted, it is expected that his assignment to this position will be confirmed. It is considered that the responsibilities of the position are commensurate with the rank of Major.

3. Captain Brewer has clearly demonstrated his fitness for the responsibilities and duties of the grade for which he is recommended, during the entire period of his service with this office - a period which is in excess of six months. Captain Brewer was originally attached to the Security Office of this organization and was directly responsible for the security of the training program carried on by the Office of Strategic Services in connection with its secret activities. His duties and responsibilities included the formulation and enforcement of rules and regulations necessary for security as well as the investigation of personnel recruited in connection with the training program. He carried out these duties in a thoroughly efficient and competent manner, and in so doing displayed an unusual degree of judgment, resourcefulness, and determination. Approximately two months ago, he was transferred to the Special Operations Branch and given the responsibility of directing the training program for this branch. Because of his earlier work, he was already familiar with the requirements of this program and the particular problems in-

Bross, J. A. 201
X Army Air Forces
X Security Office

Colonel Donovan

November 10, 1942

Refer to: 201 - Bross, John A.

Subject: Recommendation for Promotion

To: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D. C.

1. It is recommended that John A. Bross, 1st. Lt. A.A.F. (0-903574) be promoted to the grade of Captain. Lt. Bross was commissioned a 1st. Lt. in the Army of the United States on April 28, 1942 and has not subsequently been promoted.

2. Lt. Bross is now acting as Assistant Operations and Project Officer in the Special Operations Branch of this office. If promoted, it is expected that his assignment to this position will be confirmed. It is considered that the responsibilities of the position are commensurate with the rank of Captain.

3. Lt. Bross has clearly demonstrated his fitness for the responsibilities and duties of the grade for which he is recommended during the entire period of his service with this office. He was assigned to duty with this office on June 18, 1942, having previously been on duty in the Office of the Chief of the Air Staff, A-4 Division. Lt. Bross was originally attached to the Security Office of this organization, acting as a special interviewing officer in addition to discharging important administrative responsibilities. The judgment and skill with which he accomplished his works clearly indicated that he was capable of assuming increased responsibility and approximately two months ago he was transferred to the Special Operations Branch. Lt. Bross has received at a British School, a special course of training which renders him particularly well qualified for the work of this branch.

4. The factor of relative rank has been considered in making this recommendation. There is no other available officer who has had the special operations training referred to above or who combines the characteristics and background required for the position, for which Lt. Bross is recommended, in so thoroughly satisfactory a manner as he does.

201 - Bross, John A.

5. Filling the position of Assistant Operations and Project Officer by the promotion of Lt. Bross, and the promotion of any others who may have been previously recommended on whom final action has not been reported, will not result in exceeding the number of authorized captaincies under the jurisdiction of this office.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Chief, Special Operations
Branch

1st Ind.

wjd/vrd

Office of Strategic Services, November 11, 1942.
TO: The Adjutant General, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

1. Forwarded with approval.

William J. Donovan
Director

JFM/jp-1505.

AG 201 - Bress, John A.
(9-25-42)MX

Orders.

September 28, 1942.

First Lieutenant John A. Bress 0903574, A. U. S.,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in the military service that you proceed on or about October 3, 1942, from Washington, D. C., to Toronto, Canada, and such other places as may be necessary, on temporary duty for the purpose of carrying out the instructions of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services, and upon completion of this temporary duty return to your proper station.

2. In lieu of subsistence a flat per diem of $6.00 is authorized for the period of temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States in accordance with existing law and regulations. FD 34-P 434-02 & 0459-43.

3. The finance officer making payment in connection with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher, showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number and citation of this order. The copy of the voucher will be forwarded by letter of transmittal to The Adjutant General's Office, Attention Fiscal Section, stating that the enclosed copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

J. M. McGuire

Adjutant General.
Officers Branch, Maj. McGuire tel 3059.

DISTRIBUTION:
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, 25th AND E STREETS, NW WASHINGTON, D. C.
FIRST LIEUT. BRESS, A. U. S.
MR. [illegible], ROOM 1505.

September 25, 1942

SUBJECT: Orders

TO: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D. C.

1. Request that necessary orders be issued directing 1st Lieutenant John A. Bross, Serial No.0-903574, A.U.S., to proceed on or about October 3, 1942, on temporary duty from Washington, D. C., to Toronto, thence to such places in Canada or the United States as that duty may require, and upon completion of such temporary duty to return to his permanent station, Washington, D. C., the purpose of this travel being to carry out instructions of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. Cost of travel performed under the requested orders will be chargeable to funds pertaining to the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan
Director

James F. Lawrence

JWM/39-1505.

AG 201 - Bruce, John A.
(6-25-42)OF

July 3, 1942.

Designation as Acting Quartermaster.

MEM: The Security Officer,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

TO: First Lieutenant John A. Bruce (0-[illegible]74) A. U. S.

You are designated as Acting Quartermaster for the purpose of issuing such transportation requests as may be necessary for travel on official business in compliance with orders issued you.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. F. McGuire

Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, WASHINGTON, D. C.
GO, WASHINGTON, QM. DEPOT, WASHINGTON, D. C.
FINANCE OFFICER, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C.
THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.
MR. TUCCI, ROOM 1505.

Bross 6913
X Security file
X Arrival file

June 18, 1942

FROM: Colonel G. Edward Buxton

TO: Lieut. John A. Bross

Subject: Assignment to Duty, June 18, 1942

1. Having reported for duty in the Office of the Coordinator of Information in accordance with confidential orders of the War Department, dated June 18, 1942, you are hereby assigned for duty with the Security Office of this Agency.

2. You will report to and receive your instructions from the Security Officer of this Agency, Lt. Col. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Bureau plus 1 to 3
Liaison Office

CONFIDENTIAL

June 8, 1942

Director of Personnel
Army Air Forces
Maritime Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

We are anxious to obtain the services of Lieutenant John A. Bross, who is, I believe, now assigned to the Appointment and Procurement Section, A-1 Division, Office of the Chief of Air Staff.

Lieutenant Bross is particularly well qualified, by experience and attainment, to assist in a special training program upon which this office is now engaged. This program is being carried forward pursuant to a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We have received verbal information from the Office of Colonel F. Trubee Davison indicating that Lieutenant Bross can be spared from his present duties. It would be of great assistance to us if he could be detached for service with this agency.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

Hilary C. Huntington, Jr.(?)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

FROM: Captain Doering

DATE: September 2, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: Buxton Reports -- covering

Series 1 - #650 to 855 - 5/19/42 to 8/26/42

Series 2 - Covers approximate period from 7/24/42 to 8/12/42

Series 3 - June and July 1942

Miscellaneous Documents - 6/30/42 to 8/14/42

NORTH AFRICA

(a) Allied Invasion

People would resist a British, but not an American, attempt to occupy North Africa. (Series 1, #811, 7/13/42)

The French North African Army and Air Force are definitely more pro-U.S. This is also increasingly so of the Navy. These units would support an overwhelmingly strong invasion force, particularly if it were strictly an American show without British or de Gaullist participation. (Series 2, Navy Interview 8/4/42 with U. S. Vice-Consul at Casablanca July '41 - July '42)

(b) General Opinion

The only remaining hope of the North African French is in America. When that goes, they will cooperate with the Nazis in order to shorten the war. It is very important that there should be more factual, written American propaganda written by Frenchmen in the best French, and introduced by planes or through underground channels. (Series 2, Navy Interview 8/4/42 with U. S. Vice-Consul at Casablanca July '41 - July '42)

In mid May French sailors manning anti-aircraft positions at Casablanca were ordered not to shoot at British planes. No reasons given. (Series 1, #790, 7/2/42)

FRANCE

(a) French Armistice Army

Recruiting is proceeding very badly. Only about 60,000 volunteers to date and these are of the poorest quality. The remaining 40,000 are made up of undemobilized troops from 1939 class. (Series 1, #790 and 816, 7/2/42 and 7/20/42)

(b) German Troops in Occupied France

Up to July 1942, reports from occupied France were that the number of occupying troops was diminishing and replacements (frequent) tended to be young boys and old men. (Series 2, Navy Interview Serial No. 7619-CT, 8/6/42)

(c) General Opinion in France

All reports indicate that the prestige of the British has fallen substantially since Tobruk. Nevertheless, the tremendous risks taken by the civil population to protect British airmen and parachutists in France indicate that much of this talk can be discounted. (See e.g. Series 2, Navy Interview Serial No. 7619-CT, 8/6/42)

SPAIN

(a) General Opinion in Spain

Up to Tobruk, Spanish opinion was increasingly pro-British. Since then the trend has been reversed. (Series 2, Navy Interview Serial No. 7627-CT, 8/7/42). Bermuda Travellers Censorship (Ships Passenger Report #150, 7/6/42), on the other hand, shows unanimous view that Spanish opinion very pro-British.

(b) Specific Pro-Ally Elements

The 1,000,000 political prisoners still incarcerated are a reservoir of potential Allied support. Reports are that General Yague and Queippo del Llano could be counted on to support the Allies. (Series 3, Imperial Censorship, Travellers Report 72-B, June 1942)

GERMANY

(a) Effect of Mass Air Raids

An Argentinian visitor at Cologne reports the dislocating effect of mass raids as tremendous, and recommends the increased use of contact bombs, for the purpose of shattering all windows in a wide area, which will have a highly deleterious effect on morale, especially with the approach of winter. (Series 3, Bermuda Air Base Report #308, July 1942)

The opinion that mass raids such as the Cologne raid causes great dislocation was supported by all testimony on the point.

(b) Peace Feelers

A Swedish newspaperman reports that a correspondent friend of his, after a visit to England in the spring of 1942, was approached by Prince Weid, Nazi Minister to Sweden, who sounded him out as to the English willingness to negotiate a peace treaty "to leave the white people free to rid the world of the yellow peril". Source thinks Germany would be willing to settle on the basis of retaining what she has gained in the East, relinquishing all Western gains.

Source confirmed New York Times (date ?) story on Baron Oppenheimer's peace talk with the British. At least, Baron Oppenheimer registered at a Stockholm Hotel, had talks with the British, and that night the British press attache flew to London. (Miscellaneous Documents, Interview with Alfred Oste 6/30/42)

SWEDEN

(a) General Attitude

Government pro-Nazi or at least appeasement minded, expecially King Gustav, Swedish Minister to U. S. and Military Attaches here. Swedish people, on the other hand, are pro-Ally. Labor unions, with 1,000,000 members, are the largest organized group in Sweden and are definitely anti-Nazi. Roosevelt is held in highest esteem by all Swedes. (Miscellaneous Documents, Interview with Victor Vinde, Swedish

Newspaperman, 7/9&13/42)

(b) Allied Invasion

All sources agree that Swedish army would resist an Allied invasion attempt to cut Germany access to mines. This source believes such an attempt would precipitate an internal Fascist coup d'etat. (Interview with Victor Vinde)

(c) Recommendations

Allied propaganda should be increased tremendously, especially U. S. propaganda, and Allies should make more peremptory diplomatic demands to offset those of Germany, which are not the most pressing. The Germans have a legation staff of 400 persons in Stockholm. (Interview with Victor Vinde)

FINLAND

All evidence on Finland was contradictory. A number of sources believe Mannerheim to be pro-Nazi while others thought that secretly he wished to resist the Germans. Similarly, there was no unanimity as to popular war aims among the Finnish people. The preponderant opinion was that the Finns would be satisfied with their pre-1939 boundaries. Everyone agreed that the economic plight of the Finns is desperate. (See e.g. Series 1, #650 and 652, 5/6/42, and #658, 5/11/42; Miscellaneous Documents, Interview with Alfred Oste, 6/30/42, and Interview with Victor Vinde 7/9&13/42)

C. C. D., Jr.

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
DIVISION OF INDUSTRY OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

BUREAU OF INDUSTRY BRANCHES

May 28, 1942

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Col. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25 ', and E Streets, N. W.
W ington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Colonel Buxton gave an inspiring talk to two hundred of my top staff this morning. It did us all a great deal of good and I appreciate immensely your having made it possible.

I hope to see you before long.

Sincerely yours,

Philip D. Reed
Bureau Chief

May 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL BUXTON

From: J. R. Murphy

Your engagement is at 8:30 A.M. Thursday morning, May 28, at the Auditorium in the Social Security Building. You are to address the Industry Branch under Mr. Philip Reed, President of General Electric Company. If you have any difficulty, you can reach him at WPB, extension 3394. He lives at the Shoreham Hotel, Room 209-D.

May 26, 1942

Mr. Philip Reed, Chief
Bureau of Industry Branches
Room 5006, Railroad Retirement Bldg.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Reed:

Let me tell you a little about Colonel Buxton. He comes from Rhode Island, his forefathers having settled there in the 17th Century. He graduated from Brown College and from Harvard Law School. He was a reporter and then Treasurer of the Providence Journal. He was a war correspondent for that paper in the early part of World War I. After our entry in the War, he commanded a Battalion You probably saw him enacted in the movie, Sergeant York as he was York's Battalion Commander and it was he who converted York from a conscientious objector into a good fighting man. Buxton then became Division Inspector and had one of the fine records of the War.

He returned and went into the textile business and up to the outbreak of this war, was manager of a group of textile companies in New England. He is now my Assistant Coordinator and as such is my chief executive here. I think your men will like him and he will talk frankly to you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Buxton 1.27.
XCO3
Administration
Hall

file

May 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. DONOVAN

From: G. Edward Buxton

We sent off a letter to Marshall which I thought was excellent on all points and in all of which Jim Murphy concurred. I then went down to see Hall and gave him a revised copy of the letter. He was inthusiastic and well satisfied.

I talked to Elmo Roper about his friend Corrington Gill. Gill sounded extremely interesting. He has had 16 years with the Government and was Hopkins' right hand man in the Administration, has an attractive personality and is a very able administrator. All of these statements are Roper's. Gill is sick in the hospital where he will be for two weeks. Elmo has written him and if Gill is interested he will call you and you could probably go out and see him. I hope you will be able to do this because I am satisfied that a good administrator is indespensible. If Gill is not interested, I think it would be worth while to see if Hall would be interested. I am impressed by his quiet assurance and common sense. He has been with the Budget for two years and before that he was with a chain of Oregon cities doing re-

sponsible administrative work.

During the day the following suggestions occured to me as being part of an order you might like to issue later. First, the Finance Section will give monthly statements to all Branch Heads showing the amount of money spent during the month and the amount left in the budget to be spent in the future. Second, I think that all Branch Heads should be required to make a report monthly of the general activities in progress in their branches with a brief statement of their immediate objectives in the coming month. I think this will do the Branch Heads as much good to have to think as it will be informative to your office. Third, I suggest an order to Branch Heads on the matter of jurisdictional questions with other agencies. If any action contemplated by Branch Heads seems to run into the twilight in other executive branches, I think that Branch Heads should be required to report fully to me or to some other person in charge so that the matter can be taken up with the other agencies concerned and all uncertainties disposed of. I got this suggestion from Hall during lunch.

He was also informed by one of the Budget Committee that Congress is sensative about the amount of money being spent and they question whether the results being obtained justify the many large Information Agencies. One of the Committee (I

do not know his name) said to me in a letter chart that the Committee proposed to make a careful investigation so they could justify our Budget. He found our presentation this week before the Budget uniformily interesting and much more impressive than our appearance some months ago.. This man added that he thought the President would like to get the question of reorganization settled before the general budget goes to Congress because of the reasons stated above.

At the Budget Hearings today I heard Sherwood, Barnes, and Brophy lasting all forenoon. I thought they did a good job and the Committee seemed impressed. This afternoon Stanley talked for about two and a half and handled himself in his usual adroit manner. I heard Ginsberg for about a half hour and thought it was a straight forward, common sense exibition.

The most interesting critisim of the general COI chart made in my hearing was a statement early this morning by Hall. He said the several independent branches created seemed to him to make top administration more difficult and to remove your office unduly from close personal contact with the branches. I indicated that you were already aware of the fact that the present number of independent units would require changes in top supervision and that I knew it was in your plan to interpose deputies or heads between your office and the branches

so far as detailed supervision was concerned. This satisfied Hall. I told him that the present set up was temporary and represented only the first phase.

I can be reached all day tomorrow through the New York Board. I will be in Providence Saturday, back in New York Sunday evening where I propose to spend two or three days living with Stanley's unit up on 57th Street and Broadway after which I hope to have some definite recommendations.

Top ↑

Burton 503

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cable-gram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION

1201

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter

NT=Overnight Telegram

LC=Deferred Cable

NLT=Cable Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

A. N. WILLIAMS, PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

NAC01 43=TDX WASHINGTON DC APR 17 309P

COLONEL WILLIAM J DONOVAN=

HOTEL ST REGIS=

DEAR BILL: NED SHOWED ME THE ORDER YOU DICTATED TODAY THIS IS IN MY OPINION A WISE AND HEARTENING MOVE WHICH WILL BE GREETED WITH ENTHUSIASM BY ALL OF COI THEY DONT MAKE THEM ANY BETTER THAN NED HOPE TO SEE YOU TOMORROW=

BOB SHERWOOD=

345P=

COI= RPT COI=

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

[Even No. rolls]

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3]

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Number: 8
Issued: 4/17/42
Effective: 4/17/42

SUBJECT: DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANT COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

1. Effective this day, I herewith appoint Colonel G. Edward Buxton to serve as Assistant Coordinator of Information.

2. Colonel Buxton is authorized to act in my name in all matters affecting this Agency and he will be recognized accordingly.

William J. Donovan
Coordinator

Gomes
Cape Verde Islands
Bill

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
~~[illegible]~~
NEW YORK

21 East 40th Street

March 26,1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel Wm.J.Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which I gave Mr.Russell for Colonel Goodfellow.

Mr.Russell tells me today that Mr.Gomes will be down in New York to see him this weekend.

In addition to the men referred to in the memorandum I have already had them in conference with Mr.Mario Rose who is all ready to go and is an excellent choice.

The other man I sent to them, Lt.Ramos, has not yet decided whether he can do it or not.

Mr.Russell tells me that he is going up to Camp Edwards and will ask Gomes to go with him.

Sincerely yours

Ned

G.Edward Buxton

GEB JS
enc

~~[illegible]~~

copy for Col.Goodfellow
copy for Colonel Donovan

Memorandum for Mr.Bonsall

March 23,1942

Alfred J.Gomes, 460 Cottage St., New Bedford, Mass. (business address 8 Public Market Place, New Bedford) was with me for an hour yesterday in Providence.

I told him that Mr.Benamuda was now ready to talk with him.

It is understood that Mr.Gomes will come to New York to see Mr.Benamuda. Mr.Gomes' first convenient opportunity will be either next Sunday or next Monday. If it were vitally necessary that he come before, he would endeavor to do so.

Mr.Gomes will tell Mr.Benamuda that the Cape Verdians in New England through their various associations; one in New Bedford, one in Central Falls, Rhode Island and another in Connecticut, some time ago gave $3000.00 cash to Mr. Dinnes, the Portuguese Minister to the United States, to be used for food relief in the Cape Verde Islands. No evidence has reached them in the intervening months that such food distribution has ever been made. There is about $1000.00 which has been raised by Cape Verdians in addition to the above $3000.00 and is now in hand. Mr.Gomes will ask Mr.Benamuda if he has a boat which can carry food supplies and a "Committee" to supervise distribution of this food to the Cape Verde Islands and on what date.

I think Mr.Gomes should also tell Mr.Benamuda that he proposes to ask the Red Cross for assistance. I think that the boat should carry 100 to 150 tons of food on the first trip to be distributed by the "Committee".

Mr.Gomes will then, after he secures Mr.Benamuda's consent, return to New England and report to the Presidents of the three Cape Verdian Associations located in the three areas above mentioned.

I think Mr.Gomes, when he comes to New York, should first talk with you or Colonel Goodfellow before talking with Benamuda.

Mr.Gomes understands that he will not assume any knowledge of any of our plans but will "play it straight" and will simply ask for assistance in getting supplies to his people on the Cape Verde Islands.

As to further [illegible] for the "Committee" Mr.Gomes tells me that some of the Cape Verdians are in a [illegible] as the Portuguese [illegible] Cape Verde Islands [illegible] have [illegible] the [illegible].

 March 23, 1942

Memorandum for Mr. Donovan

3. There is a Cape Verdian in Harvard, who he says is a very smart lad and when his association in New Bedford helped support in his endeavor to get a college education.

3. There are at least 30 Cape Verdians in the Service Company No.37 of the Quartermasters Corp at Camp Edwards, Cape Cod.

Gomez suggests, and I approve, that any further personnel required be taken from these 30 or more American soldiers after consultation with their Company Commanders.

I should think Colonel Goodfellow could arrange this with H.Q. Camp Edwards, so that Colonel Goodfellow's representative could visit the Camp, meet the Company Commander and then talk with men recommended by the Captain who has had them under observation for at least six months. These men could then be assigned to this special duty and sent to school for instruction in radio work, demolition, etc.

If desired, contact could be made with the Harvard student and the Dorchester air man.

GMG:ms

C. Edward Austin

Burton
My Unit

February 7, 1942

Colonel J. Edward Burton
41 East 40th Street
New York, New York

Dear Ned:

I have your letter of the 3rd on the subject of widening the usefulness of your Unit. I agree with all of this. Of course, you should be sure that whatever you do (as I know you would be) be done in connection with the particular division immediately concerned.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

NEW YORK

21 East 40th Street

February 5, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel Wm. J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and "E" Streets
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Bill Vanderbilt and I have again been discussing this morning means for widening the usefulness of this Unit to your Organization.

We recognize that best loads of immigrants and clippers filled with people fresh from Axis or occupied countries will be much less frequent than heretofore. While our force of six field representatives is small neither we nor they would be happy if they were not very actively employed. We, therefore, suggest a policy of expanding our scope to cover some of the following activities:

1. The new division of foreign language groups and associations in this area in process of organization under Mr. Wiley and his director, Mr. Poole.

Our field representatives already have almost daily contacts with such groups and are well qualified by their experience here plus their original background and language qualifications to develop such information as is desired; either as a primary or a supplementary effort.

2. It now appears that Dr. Ascoli, representing the Rockefeller Committee, is about to utilize us for interviewing South Americans in this area. Dr. Ascoli has asked me to lunch with him this Thursday so that he can describe the service he would like to have from us.

3. If we are less busy with refugees and immigrants we could develop relations with people in this area having expert knowledge of different parts of the world in which this Government is particularly interested. We should be able to obtain from such people opinions and interpretations on current news which might be useful to your research and analysis group.

Colonel W. J. Donovan [illegible]

4. I believe we can also be very [illegible] to Robert Sherwood's press and radio propaganda [illegible] the effectiveness of present enemy propaganda [illegible] arguments with a cross section of individuals [illegible] who have lived for years in the countries in question.

5. I believe that we can [illegible] help Colonel Solberg find wanted personnel for [illegible] his activities although this would, necessarily, be more of a by-product of our work than a part [illegible].

I should be glad to know whether you approve of part or all of this.

Sincerely

Ned Burton

G. Ewart Burton

G-2 FS

See Memo No. 326

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

December 18, 1941

File Branch

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Seventh and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In view of your interest in points of possible danger and of protective measures on the West Coast, I thought you would be interested in the enclosed memorandum which summarizes a report I have just received from a confidential informant.

These data have not been verified by investigation and I am therefore unable to comment on the reliability to be given them. I thought, however, they should be made available to you.

Sincerely,

Edgar

San Francisco 3236

December 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM

The following is a summary of information received from a confidential informant outlining his observations of protective measures taken and of points of possible danger in connection with national defense in the San Francisco area. This source first referred to the protective measures taken and needed with regard to the principal bridges in the San Francisco Bay area.

He stated that the Golden Gate Bridge appears to be the best protected. He noted Federal troops with fixed bayonets stationed at frequent intervals the entire length of the structure and that no cars were permitted to stop. He also observed that the California Home Guard has men stationed at each end of the bridge and that these appear to be considerably above the general run of personnel of that organization in so far as general appearance is concerned.

The Carquinez Bridge over the Sacramento River at Vallejo was considered by him as the next best protected. He noted that members of the California Home Guard, which had just recently been organized in California and not yet inducted into Federal service, were in considerable evidence there. He was advised by one of the men on duty that they were operating on shifts whereby they were on duty for three hours and then off for eight.

The informant pointed out with regard to the Carquinez Bridge, and particularly with consideration to air raid precautions, that almost directly under this structure the plant of the C and H Sugar Company had its windows brightly lighted and was visible from a great distance. He also pointed out that a tall chimney in the same immediate vicinity was not blacked out and that there were a great many road flares (kerosene) lining the highway apparently for several miles through the oil refinery district, the town of Rodeo and almost into Richmond, which would undoubtedly serve as excellent guides to enemy airplanes. He noted that the Hercules Powder Plant was apparently the only structure of importance in the area which was well darkened.

This source advised that the Bay Bridge running from Oakland to San Francisco and one of the longest and highest in the world, is very poorly guarded. He noted that it was extremely well lighted with amber fog lights high overhead, and from Twin Peaks, a vantage point some distance away, the entire structure stood out clearly even through a heavy rain.

The informant advised that the guarding of the Bay Bridge was in the hands of the California Home Guard. A corporal of that organization, an ex-soldier from the World War, advised him that their services were voluntary and on the basis of two hours on duty and four hours off. This same corporal advised that there was a machine gun furnished for defense at the Oakland approach of the bridge, but had no knowledge of protective measures elsewhere. The informant subsequently drove over the structure and failed to find any other persons on guard until he had proceeded approximately two-thirds of the way across the Bay to the western end of Yerba Buena Island. He found there a disreputable appearing individual with a gun, but in conversation it was learned he obviously had no knowledge of its use or of what his duties were supposed to be. The only other person the informant could find on duty at this bridge was a guard at the San Francisco end and he was found alone and almost asleep when the informant approached him.

The reporting informant noted with reference to air raid precautions that there were four huge red "blinkers" on top of the Bay Bridge and that from the vantage point of Twin Peaks, they were an obvious and easily found means of identification.

The fourth important bridge referred to by this source was the Dumbarton Bridge which crosses the southern end of the Bay from approximately Menlo Park to Newark. He advised that he failed to observe any guards stationed there.

The informant also advised that during two crossings he observed no guards at all on the Yolo Causeway which connects all east-west traffic from Sacramento to San Francisco, nor could he observe any guards on the Yolo Railway Causeway. He also noted that there were no guards on the important new Sacramento River drawbridge on

Capitol Street about a half mile from the State Capitol, and commented on its importance in that it is the main artery there for east-west traffic and in the center of a principal warehouse district of Sacramento with many piers and docks and the freight yards of the Southern Pacific Railroad. He further pointed out that about 500 feet west of this bridge were located easily seen silver painted tanks of the Texico Company, the State Box Company with its vast lumber yards, Crown Zellerback paper warehouses, the Crane Company and innumerable other important plants. With further reference to Sacramento, the informant noted the fact that the city is surrounded by flood protection dikes with huge steel flood gates at all highway entrances to the city and that there was no evidence of any protective measures with regard to them.

This source of information next referred to the Marina in San Francisco where he stated he observed several sentries and what appeared to be "either anti-aircraft guns poorly concealed or machine gun nests". He stated, however, that automobiles were allowed to park freely within a few feet and that he counted forty-one there at one time. A short distance away at the San Francisco Yacht Basin, he saw men on guard duty but noted that there were also a number of cars parked there. He pointed out that this locality is at the immediate vicinity of the approaches to the Golden Gate Bridge. He also observed that the sentries, contrary to regulations, were talking freely with any passers-by who engaged them in conversation, and that many of the men who were apparently on sentry duty were merely "ambling about". In this connection, he advised that on Lands End, immediately below the Veterans Hospital and adjoining the Palace of the Legion of Honor, there were more cars parked even though it had been reported to him that the area thereabouts had been heavily fortified. He observed that automobiles could stop there at any hour of the night and park with or without lights.

The informant then turned his attention in his communication to the port and docks. He commented on the fact that the activities going on there were openly and generally well known among the people of the city. He made the observation that he could count fifteen fairly large ships, all in war paint, being loaded from open docks,

and that there were many large cases marked "Buick", "Chevrolet", "International Harvester" and "Dupont" which can be freely observed by anyone walking or riding by. He also pointed out that it is generally known in San Francisco that troops were being sent out of there to the Orient and that one individual advised him that a Marine had stated there were about 9,000 men departing by ship every night. This same local informant and other sources contacted by my informant, expressed the opinion that the blackouts which had been occurring in the San Francisco area were solely for the purpose of distracting the public and keeping them off the streets during the hours when the troop ships put out to sea, and that the planes reportedly heard at such times were patrol planes from the Army airport on duty in connection with the troop ship departures.

The source of this report pointed out that the troop and material movements were not well protected from observation since they were going on from open docks which could be observed from public streets and the famous Fishermen's Wharf. He could observe freight cars containing the fuselages of five pursuit planes, trucks, trailers, "jeeps" and many other types of equipment, and observed a long line of soldiers going up the gangway of one ship. He observed that within a distance of about 200 feet there was a group of civilians watching the whole operation and some 500 feet further on, there was located a line of "honky tonk fish and chip joints" frequented by persons of questionable character. In two visits during the night to a number of these establishments, he observed several soldiers, but only one Military Policeman.

With regard to the general situation in the Bay area for air raid precautions, the informant commented that the street lights of Vallejo appeared to be the most flagrant item. He stated he could see their reflection on low hanging clouds from as far as forty-five miles away when approaching the city, and that he could actually see the lights from a distance of thirty-two miles. The same applied to the Mare Island shipyard which was brightly lighted. He reported that he drove thirty-three miles down the Bay, thirty-nine miles north and approximately ten miles west and could observe this condition from all of those points. Other than for the lights mentioned hereinbefore, he stated that from Twin Peaks the other offenders noted were the double chains of street lights on Market, Mission and Townsend Streets in

San Francisco which were easily identifiable. He observed that Alcatraz was brightly lighted and the fact even its brilliantly illuminated outlook tower was unchanged during the blackouts, convinced local people the warnings were not serious since Alcatraz is such an unmistakable landmark.

Another item of possible interest reported by the informant was his observation of four lines of Army trucks, two going down and and two going up the peninsula, all with unprotected bright headlights. He stated he was told they were transporting troops from Fort Ord to the Embarcadero, and while waiting for them to pass, a local gas station employee volunteered the information that between 30,000 and 50,000 troops had been loaded on transports in that manner since December 7, 1941.

As a general observation, the informant stated that in his entire travels through the area referred to herein in the period he was there, he did not once observe an officer checking on an Army or Navy detail. He pointed out that he had an opportunity to observe numerous sentries, guards and other armed personnel, but no evidence that inspections were undertaken by the commissioned officers.

Further Notes of G. Edward Buxton on December 18, 1941.

DEC 20 1941

English Propaganda Agent Dumeresque came to me yesterday about a San Francisco Japanese named Shigeki Oka who operates the Kinmon Press at 1738 Post Street; also, publishes Japanese-American newspaper in Sacramento called American Shimbun.

This Japanese has been printing propaganda material in Japanese for the British. His press and newspaper have been shut down by FBI at the order of the Treasury Department, freezing Japanese assets in this country.

The British believe that he should be allowed to operate his press and newspaper under strict censorship, and that this constitutes an excellent method of getting certain arguments and data before the Japanese-American population on this Coast.

I have talked to Mr. Pieper, head of FBI in San Francisco, and he says that any arrangement of this character will have to be taken up with the Treasury Department. He also thinks that these facilities could be made useful, provided they were under strict censorship of government people familiar with the Japanese written language.

I spent the forenoon today at Berkeley with Major General Barrows, a man of 68, in splendid physical condition, fine personality, and keen intelligence. He had a letter on his desk from General Marshall, thanking him for his services in the recent inspection of ten National Guard divisions and his recommendations concerning top personnel of these divisions.

He knows many General officers in the Army, including General DeWitt. He was G-2 in the Philippines during the years 1917 and 1918, then went on a special mission to Siberia joining certain anti-Bolshevik forces, and later became the intelligence officer of the American-Siberian expedition.

He has been president of the University of California, and has conducted special courses in the ROTC. He is tremendously interested in the present situation and has a great deal of knowledge of Mexico. He was an exchange professor in Berlin in 1932 and 1934 and knows many of the present German leaders.

He made some suggestions which I will give Colonel Donovan personally when I see him next Monday.

I lunched again with Mr. J. F. Neylan at the Huntington Apartments. He said that he was not in any way retracting any of his praise for Gen. Barrows, but that thinking overnight he had still another suggestion to make; namely, "Navy Bill" Ingram. Mr. Ingram, after graduating from Annapolis where he had a distinguished athletic record and later coached the Annapolis football team, left the Navy some nine years ago at about

the age of 34. He coached the University of California football team for two years, and then through the influence of Mr. Heylan, was associated for a short time with one of the Hearst newspapers. And then for the last six or seven years has been a vice president in charge of public relations and labor relations for the Safeway Stores, a national organization doing about $600,000,000 worth of business. Mr. Ingram gets $25,000 a year and is now just reaching his prime at about 43 years of age. He is anxious to become active in the war in some capacity. He has some trouble with his back, which might prevent his entering the Navy actively, although he would be glad to do so.

Mr. Heylan says that he would try to arrange to have the Safeway Stores pay him part of his salary if we ever took him as our representative. Mr. H. says that Mr. Ingram is one of the most influential and popular men on the Coast with all classes of society, from the Southern Pacific Club and the Bohemian Club to labor circles, where he has successfully negotiated many contracts. He believes that Ingram could exercise more influence with Beck, the labor leader in Seattle, than any businessman on the Coast. Mr. Heylan says Mr. Ingram's personality and capacity are both very unusual. He thinks this name should be considered with that of Gen. Barrows.

He also suggests two very promising young men, but realizes that neither of them has any previous service background. Lewis Lapham, son of Roger D. Lapham of the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company; and Malcolm McNaughton, a young stockbroker. Both men are friends of Turner McBaine.

In addition, Thomas Adams of British Intelligence has given me the name of William Whitely, formerly with FBI in this area, now security manager for Vultee Aircraft. Mr. Adams says Mr. Whitely has a host of friends in this area and knows it like a book. His thought was that if we had one man specializing in anti-subversive activity, this man would be most excellent.

Mr. Adams tells me that he has a agent connection very close to the Japanese who are thought to be dangerous in this community. He believes this connection very important and very trustworthy. He gave to me with a long list of names (Japanese) secured from this quarter. The man is not willing to deal with the FBI for several reasons not necessary to state here which do not reflect upon the man himself.

I have arranged to have Mr. Adams give these names to Commander Garrigan, Capt. McCollough's assistant at ONI. Mr. Adams already has excellent relations with Commander Garrigan. He also has been working with Col. Forney, G-2, Ninth Corps Area, and I have asked Mr. Adams to give the same list of names to Col. Forney. I have also arranged to have him put through an emergency call to my office in New York when he believes that instant help is needed from our organization. Mr. Adams is the permanent representative of the English here.

More concerning the Japanese, Oka, described at the top of this report:

Mr. Adams says that this man had the courage to publish the Admiral Tanaka Memorial, which fact alone proves his opposition to the Japanese government, because the latter has made every effort to deny the existence of such a statement. Admiral Tanaka is said to have written a pamphlet at the time of Japan's entrance into Manchuria stating that this was only the first step. The succeeding steps outlined in the Tanaka statement called for occupation of China, then South China, then Indo-China, then Malaya, the Philippine Islands, and Hawaii.

Adams says Oka is well liked by loyal Japanese and should be allowed to operate both his press and his newspaper for local consumption under competent censorship. Oka has a nisei daughter, Mrs. Ozuma. This daughter is well known to Mr. Adams, who regards her as both loyal to the United States and very intelligent person.

GEB:dj

Further notes from G. E. Buxton - December 16 and 17, 1941

DEC 19 1941

December 16

Talked an hour with Mr. Clarence Lindner, publisher of the San Francisco Examiner. He is anxious to help our office in any possible way. He says the morale of this community is excellent and sentiment has solidified all opinion into one purpose--to win the war. He thinks the pioneer spirit is still alive in San Francisco.

He says the only question that he has heard is whether or not all sports are to be blacked out in California and allowed to run without hindrance in New York and Florida. Is the East going to take the sport business away from them, although there is a war, as they understand it, on two oceans? I enclose a clipping from this morning's Examiner along the same line.

December 17

Spent two hours with Mr. John Francis Neylan at his apartment. Mr. Neylan regards Mr. Charles Kendrick as a very high-grade and greatly respected citizen. It is his opinion, however, that Maj. Gen. David Prescott Barrows would be the best representative Col. Donovan could obtain as a liaison officer on this coast. I asked Mr. Neylan about Gen. Barrows because he had been recommended to me by Dr. Hayden of our organization. Later this afternoon I talked with Capt. McCollough of ONI, and he confirmed Mr. Neylan's opinion. He believes Gen. Barrows would be even more satisfactory than Mr. Kendrick. I enclose copy of comments given me by Dr. Hayden. Both Mr. Neylan and Capt. McCollough agree that Gen. Barrows is a man of great personal distinction and keen intelligence and would be treated with great respect by anybody connected with the government, Army and Navy, or FBI--provided he is interested in assuming such duties. I am told that he regards himself as a soldier rather than as a college professor, and has been very active in urging preparedness and active intervention. Mr. Neylan has arranged an appointment for me to see him at 10 o'clock tomorrow in Berkeley.

Capt. McCollough asked me to come to his office to meet an American who he says is probably better known on the West Coast of Mexico and to the highest authorities in Mexico City

than any other American businessman, James W. Swent, 300 Montgomery Street, executive vice president of the San Luis Mining Company; director of the Homestead Mining Company; president of the Triumph Mining Company, Idaho; officer and director of numerous other mining companies and director of several banks in Mexico. Fifty per cent of the San Luis Mine was once owned by Mr. Hearst, although it is now a smaller interest.

I talked to Mr. Neylan about Mr. Swent. Mr. Neylan checked him and endorsed 100% everything said by Capt. McCollough. He further said he knew him in person and would rather have his opinion on Mexico, and particularly the west coast, than anyone else. Mr. Swent has lived for 25 years in that section. He has been able to run his mine without interruption during all of the changing Mexican administrations during that 25 years.

Mr. Swent's son speaks Spanish like a native and has grown up spending much of his time on the west coast of Mexico. His son is now an ensign in ONI. The father sent the son to investigate a report of a great natural air field near La Paz, a little harbor near the extreme southern end of the Lower California peninsula. It was this report which Capt. McCollough wanted me to see. Photographs showed a perfectly flat, hard field one and a half miles long, three quarters of a mile wide, with not even a bush or a ridge. It was once the bottom of an arm of the bay and became separated from the ocean by a sand dune and dried out.

After talking with Mr. Swent I decided that we should give this information to G-2 of the Fourth Army. Capt. McCollough went out with Mr. Swent and me to see Col. Stroh, the head of that office. Col. Stroh seemed very much interested and said that the whole interview would be referred to a general who is charged with making the reconnaisance. (I understood his name to be Stillman or Stillwell; I am not sure.)

Among other things Mr. Swent said that Gen. Rodrigues controls the northern half of the peninsula and is friendly to the United States. He was formerly governor of this territory and now controls the fishing industry in that section. The governor of the lower half of the peninsula is Governor Mujica. This man is anti-gringo and has never liked the United States. He was a trouble-maker when he was Minister of Communications and was placed by the present administration as far away from Mexico City as possible.

Mr. Swent says that many of the inhabitants of the Lower peninsula, and minor officials, also are unfriendly. He thinks they are more friendly, however, to the Germans than to the Japanese, probably because the Germans have been our enemies for a longer period. He regards the central government in Mexico as friendly, particularly because it has been in their interest to be friendly. The following places are regarded by Mr. Swent as dangerous areas, with dry lake beds suitable for planes to either land or take off:

1. Upper Sonora - dried lake beds.
2. North Singaloa - dried beds and beaches.
3. The lower half of the peninsula, with special attention to the field at La Paz above referred to.

Mr. Swent says that any temporary reconnaisance will not be particularly valuable. Conditions change rapidly, and some area might be white today and black tomorrow. He thinks the situation calls for permanent observation. He is willing to assume a confidential relation with our organization and put about six of his Mexican employes and two of his engineers, together with his son, into these potentially dangerous places. He says, of course, it is very important that such arrangements shall not be suspected. Mr. Swent wants no compensation himself. Very modest bonuses paid his employes would satisfy them. I will discuss this with you when I see you if you believe it is important. I think it should be given consideration.

GEB:dj

(Col. Buxton had to leave the office immediately after dictating the above report; therefore he has not seen it in its typed form. --d.j.)

Copy of recommendation from Dr. Hayden:

Dr. David Prescott Barrows - Dr. Barrows for many years has been chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of California, and for a time was president of that institution. Perhaps Dr. Barrow's main interest, however, has been in the United States Army. He holds, or has held the rank of Major General in the Reserve Corps and for years was very active as the senior reserve office(r) in the Corps in San Francisco. His experience in the Far East began about 1901. In 1919, as a colonel in the Reserves, he was the intelligence officer of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia. Dr. Barrows, I believe, has retired, or is about to retire, but I am sure that his counsel would be of value to you. In my opinion, too, he is one of the most interesting men on the Pacific Coast.

Sports
San Francisco Examiner
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1941

Hialeah, Tropical Crowded; Stakes Lists Completed

Southern Officials Want to Help Pacific Coast Owners, But Haven't Accommodations; Whirly 'Shut Out'

NEW YORK, Dec. 16.—(INS)—Florida would like to supply stables for race horses made idle by the Army's ban on racing in California, but Florida has no accommodations for them, according to John Clark, president of the Hialeah race track today.

"We haven't three vacant stalls at Hialeah," said Clark. "While we want to do everything possible to cooperate with racetracks everywhere, we simply haven't got accommodations for all the horses of Hialeah.

"All our major stakes were closed yesterday and that would make it impossible to get new entries. It is a pity, for instance, that a horse like Whirlaway will not be available for the $50,000 Widener Cup Handicap."

By FRED L. STRUZER

MIAMI (Fla.), Dec. 16.—(AP)—All the big names of the racehorse world—except Whirlaway—already are listed for such important Florida stakes as Hialeah's $50,000 Widener Cup and Tropical's $50,000 Whitney Handicap, the running legs here would be given their first cut when the Oregon [illegible] Jockey Club cancel its [illegible] Santa Anita [illegible] California.

But while the elite of thoroughbred society is assured entry to the big events, racing leaders say [illegible]

Army Chief Explains His Racing Ban

"If on January 15, or any other date, the situation is alleviated, there will be no objection to opening the Santa Anita Race Track."

This reiteration of Army policy was made last night by Lieut. General John L. De Witt, Fourth Army commander, in answer to a plea by Dr. Charles Strub, general manager of the Arcadia track, for clarification of orders.

General De Witt, through the Fourth Army's public relations department, wanted it made plain that cancellations were not his personal doings—that he only made recommendations to the proper civil authorities and that it was up to them to decide what action should be taken.

Concerning the closing of Santa Anita he pointed out:

1—That he deemed January 1 opening of the track unwise.

International News Service Photo

Sports Parade

Fans Puzzled By Sports Ban 'Blackouts' Here But Not in East

By Curley Grieve

The Pacific coast sports followers will grin and bear the blackout that has descended upon major sports events.

It's the war—a war that must be won.

But it is true that they are asking questions and are a little puzzled by the situation.

It is difficult for them to understand why the West Coast is considered too dangerous for large gatherings while the East Coast, 4,000 miles closer to the enemy, is considered safe.

A crowd of 10,000 is forbidden in San Francisco.

Yet in New York it hardly rates an eyebrow.

Madison Square Garden, with its hockey matches, basketball games and prize fights, packs in throngs of 16,000 to 21,000—and when Joe Louis and Buddy Baer battle January 9 all standing room will be commandeered.

Santa Anita, on the West Coast, cannot open its race track.

Hialeah, on the East Coast at Miami, is unaffected by military regulation and plans to open on schedule.

Actually, the Atlantic seaboard is 3,000 miles from the enemy while the Pacific coast 7,000.

It would seem that the enemy is just as capable of a quick raid on the East as the West Coast.

In view of this, more than a few sports fans have been puzzled.

Of course, the man in the street doesn't understand the military problems involved, the difference in the situation between the west and east coasts and he is not master how long this [illegible] will be [illegible]

[illegible] Germany's continental [illegible]

of run-of-the-mine horses from the war-threatened West coast to Florida's tracks.

The trouble isn't stable room, because many of them would find quarters. The view of racing leaders is that only a limited number of horsemen can make their feed

(Continued on Page 25, Col. 1)

2—That it would be unwise to open the track at any subsequent date if the situation remained the same.

3—If the situation was alleviated it would be all right to open the track.

However, General De Witt would not predict when the situation might be eased.

Little Room for Coast Horses at Fair Grounds

NEW ORLEANS, Dec. 11.—(AP)—Owners of the Fair Grounds race track here said today they will start immediate construction of barns for 300 additional horses to aid turfmen whose winter plans have been upset by cancellation of the Santa Anita and Bay Meadows race meetings in California because of the war.

Tony Pelletieri, whose Bay View last year won the $100,000 Santa Anita Handicap, and associates in operation of the historic Fair Grounds here, said the move was under way.

"If most of the owners at Santa Anita will split their stables, sending here only the horses that can be in action for our meeting, we'll be able to give many stables some work to do," he said.

To Col. Donovan -
From G. E. Buxton.

Further Notes of G. Edward Buxton, Continuing from December 14, 1941 to

December 14

Late Sunday afternoon, I visited Mr. Pieper in his office. He told me of the meeting held that afternoon of nearly 10,000 air raid wardens and other volunteers, addressed by San Francisco Chief of Police, Mr. Dullea. It was an excellent morale meeting and great applause greeted him when he told the strict discipline was to be imposed upon everyone, and that full recognition would be given the cooperation of the Red Cross and the FBI.

Mr. Pieper still has not received orders to arrest dangerous American citizens. He believes that a decision on this important matter will reach him at any time. He is setting up three police schools for training war volunteers.

December 15

Secured the assistance of Colonel Ahrends, M.I.D., and went with him to call on the air corps headquarters for the San Francisco sector in the Stock Exchange Building at 155 Sansome Street, where they occupy substantial space.

The Air Command is as follows: Major General Jacob Fickel has command of all air forces from Dutch Harbor to Mexico, but is directly responsible to Lieutenant General DeWitt. General Fickel is 58 years old and has been connected with the air service since August 1920. He is a graduate of all Army air schools and is an honor graduate of Leavenworth, and also a graduate of the War College. His personal headquarters at present is Hamilton Field outside of San Francisco, but understand he is moving into offices in San Francisco shortly to be nearer to Army and Navy headquarters.

The Fourth Interceptor Air Command covers the state of California and is under the personal command of Brigadier General William Ord Ryan. General Ryan is 50 years old, West Point 1914, and transferred to air service in 1928. He is a graduate of Leavenworth and of the War College and also a graduate of all air schools.

General Ryan's Interceptor Command is divided in two sectors. The northern sector running from Bakersfield to the Oregon line is commanded by Colonel Ira C. Eaker with headquarters and control and information center located in the Stock Exchange Building. Colonel Eaker is 45 years old, was a Lieutenant of infantry, First World War, and transferred to the air service in 1920. He has had 21 years in the air service in all officer grades to and including Colonel. He is a Leavenworth graduate and a graduate

of the Air Corps Tactical School. He has the D.F.C. with oak leaf cluster. He has recently returned from six weeks spent in England attached to the Royal Flying Corps.

Colonel Baker had known Colonel Ahronds well in the Philippines and spent more than an hour in showing and explaining in detail his control room system, with filter boards adjacent to the control room. This entire information center and operating room, he said, is practically a replica of the system finally adopted by the Royal Flying Corps after two years of war experience and experiment. The system seemed to me an admirable one.

The young air corps officers seated about the circular gallery looking down on the control board impressed me as an alert, competent group of young airmen. After listening to an explanation of the various features in the control room, he permitted us to talk for a while with a young captain who had been acting as control officer but was relieved by another officer for this purpose.

Under this system there can at least be no delay in making decisions. The control board commander has final authority in any emergency. When a plane of any character is reported anywhere in this sector, he asks for immediate identification from someone in the semi-circle of officers sitting with headphones on each side of him. These associates are connected by direct wire respectively with army interceptor and bombing units in this sector, with all naval air units, Coast Guard air units, and with all commercial air units. After a thorough check by everyone with their several unit headquarters, the plane is identified as either a friendly or an unknown plane.

The control board commander can order interceptors to attack at once, or if at night, order a blackout. I understand that he must be the judge as to whether or not to order American planes into the air at any time of day or night.

We then watched the operation of one of the filter boards which has direct telephone communication with scores of volunteer civilian observation posts. It is the duty of these posts to report all planes seen or heard.

The airplane detection instruments are in the hands of skilled signal corps technicians and are located at [redacted] points along the Coast in this sector. Colonel Baker said that these instruments operate on the principle of television and show a triangle in the field of the instrument when a plane comes within range. He said that the pyramid is caused by a stream of atomic emanations striking a solid body and rebounding to the field of the instrument.

These instruments are a new and secret device and have nothing to do with the ordinary anti-aircraft equipment in which sound waves are caught in horns. These new instruments are operated on a radio electronic principle.

This morning, Tuesday, December 16, Colonel Ahrends and I, by permission of Colonel Baker spent sometime with Captain Samson, commanding the Signal Corps attached to the Fourth Interceptor headquarters. Captain Samson showed us the artillery control board located on the floor above the aircraft control room.

Here a group of enlisted personnel and certain carefully chosen civilian women sit about a board, and as information is telephoned concerning presence of planes from the control room below, the ~~presence~~ is indicated on the artillery board. The officer in command of this room is in direct connection with the anti-aircraft batteries and with the searchlights and is ~~in power~~ authorized to order instant action by the anti-aircraft batteries and searchlights.

~~The~~ Cards are fitted onto a small stick and the stick is placed on the board in the correct location. The cards indicate the number of the raid, whether the plane has a single, multiple, or bomber motor, and whether the plane is known or unknown, also whether it is flying high, medium, low, or very low.

Captain Samson furnishes all trained technical personnel to operate instruments. He is also in charge of the 2,000 civilian spotters who occupy the 24-hour posts requiring about 15 persons per post. This civilian personnel is a volunteer body furnished largely by the state civilian defense authorities, and Captain Samson says the FBI has not been asked to check this personnel. He says that errors, intentional or otherwise, in these posts would be caught almost immediately by reports from other posts.

One post is located in every 32 square miles throughout the state of California. It has not yet been possible to communicate with them other than by telephone or radio. He says they are working with surprising speed considering the recent date of organization.

The ~~[illegible]~~ detection instruments are not really effective beyond 70 miles. However, the Signal Officer in charge of these instruments (Captain Samson) states that they have picked up planes as far out as 150 miles, depending upon weather conditions.

I liked Colonel Baker's frank statement that while he was well satisfied with his technical equipment in his control room and filter rooms, he felt that he did not yet have sufficiently experienced personnel. Although the human material was excellent, it would have to work together like any good football team before becoming superior.

He said that in the large body of volunteer ground observers, there were many substitutions that would have to be made. The war had caught them just as they were setting up a maneuver and before detailed inspections could be made of the personnel.

Each post is on a 24-hour basis and requires about 15 people for the 24-hour tour of duty. At one post, he had discovered that there was a woman over 80 years of age with bad hearing and eyesight. Another post was supposed to be operated by a troup of boy scouts. When the weather turned cold and rainy, the parents required the boys to return home at night and the post was vacant during the night. This has been corrected by securing proper adult personnel.

He said that while theoretically a failure in one post could be corrected by other posts in the line of report, nevertheless, a mistake or a failure in any post might be important.

The control board commander told us that they felt that they had been bothered some in the southern part of their sector by Mexican planes. He did not know who the operators of those planes were but believed some interference might have originated in that quarter.

Colonel Baker impressed Colonel Ahrends and myself as a leader, very cool and capable of quick intelligent decisions.

Colonel Donovan!

December 13, 1941

I left Washington with Curtis Munson by sleeper plane at 8:45 p.m. December 3, 1941, and I arrived in Los Angeles at 11:00 a.m. December 4, 1941. I was met by Lieutenant-Commander Ringle, USN. We conferred with Commander Ringle and Captain Canega, USN, Retired, who is the District Intelligence Officer for the Eleventh Naval District headquarters in San Diego. Commander Ringle is Captain Canega's representative in Los Angeles. Ringle is an extremely efficient intelligence officer, with an unusual understanding of the Japanese situation on the West Coast. He has many personal connections with Japanese Americans.

Captain Canega drove Munson and myself to San Diego that afternoon. Upon arrival at the San Diego Hotel, we conferred for about an hour with Messrs. Nathan, Hood, and Pieper, the FBI special agents for San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, respectively.

December 5.

Captain Canega called at the hotel at 9:00 a.m. and took us to the Naval Base, where we spent an hour and a half with Captain Ravenscroft, Chief of Staff of the Eleventh Naval District; with the Public Relations Officer, and with a Lieutenant Roppe, ONI, charged with the duty of organizing anti-sabotage in defense plants.

The Chief of Staff wanted the city of San Diego to give the Navy the right to enforce the exclusive use of the ramp for the launching of P.B.Y. bombers from the Consolidated Aircraft plants.

The Public Relations Officer made special reference to a letter of Rear Admiral Blakely in the San Diego paper asking people to treat loyal Japanese Americans with understanding and sympathy. He showed me copies of appreciative letters from leading Japanese.

Lieutenant Roppe said that employees at the Consolidated plant, in his opinion, were not adequately checked, and "It is difficult to see how such checking can be accomplished." Men with no criminal record cannot be caught by fingerprints. He says the management has a hundred people who should be put out, but that this cannot be done because they have no criminal record. They associate, however, with known Nazis, but this is not at present grounds for discharge.

Lieutenant Roppe further recommends that a joint informal committee be organized, consisting of one representative each from the following organizations: (1) Labor Relations Board, (2) Organized labor, (3) Management, (4) ONI, (5) ~~MNI~~ M.I.8., and

(6) FBI. He believes this committee should vote on whether or not an employee should be discharged, and the vote of the majority of this committee shall be binding.

Consolidated has thirty thousand employees and 125 guards divided between inside and outside. Buildings are of sheet metal, the spray room is insulated, and the city fire department and police respond promptly on call. The city police force has 260 men and are considered good. He regards the Fire Department as excellent.

I talked with Mr. C. A. Perkins, Inspector in Charge of Immigration at San Ysidro. He is disturbed at the situation among Mexican officials. He found recently that a suspected German sympathizer in Mexico knew he was suspected. Mr. Perkins thinks some of the information gets out because Hilda Krueger, a German agent, is the mistress of Alaman Ministro DeGovernacion, a prominent cabinet officer. He thinks that many local Mexican officials are Nazi sympathizers.

Captain Ravenscroft, ONS, said the Eleventh Naval District is ready. His only comment was that the local Army Commander does not have discretionary powers to guard utilities and munition plants in the absence of such orders from higher authority.

Mr. Nathan, head of the San Diego FBI said, "There are seven dams in this area in addition to a large lake, and these facilities furnish water to San Diego. The dams are guarded at the points where the control machinery is located by employees of the city--an engineer and twoor three guards at each point.

"The electric generating plant is also guarded by civilian guards. The telephone central station should be guarded. It is not guarded at present. The Santa Fe Railroad is mostly single track with one or two very vulnerable spots along the bottom of cliffs near the ocean. The Imperial Canal runs for miles along the Mexican border, but this Canal is not particularly vulnerable to sabotage."

The FBI has reported on such sensitive points to Washington and to the Army at San Diego, and has also conferred with the County Sheriff and local police. Mr. Nathan believes the dams would require heavy bombing from the air before suffering important injury. Such a contingency he regards as a combat situation and not a police situation.

Spent some two hours with General VanDeman and consider him a man of unusual capacity and mental vigor. We discussed the general intelligence situation. He believes that all intelligence services should interchange every report made. He thinks that withholding any report from a sister agency is detrimental to the confidence of their relations as well as a denial of the

mission which is to equip all government agencies with any pertinent information obtained by any one agency.

His views on Communism and probable infiltration at this time were interesting and alarming, although he does not think that American Communists will attempt to destroy our form of government until the close of a long war when millions of men return to unemployment. He believes American Communism has broken with Moscow and intends to work for world revolution from Chicago.

That night Munson and I took the train for Los Angeles with Hood and Pieper and stayed at the Biltmore Hotel.

December 6

Left Hotel immediately after breakfast with Lieutenant Ringle and Munson and visited the Naval Base at San Pedro Harbor, Captain Coffman accompanying. He is the Commandant of the naval operating station at San Pedro.

Within a thirty-mile radius is 50% of the total United States assembled aircraft. A ship a week is being launched by the Maritime Commission in the 10,000-ton Liberty freighter class. Los Angeles shipyard and Bethlehem Steel Shipyard both have Navy contracts for destroyers and other vessels.

He believes that present Executive Order 8403 of 7 May 1940 should be amended under Section 44 of the Criminal Code to establish a naval defensive sea area covering inner harbor docks, and land area immediately adjacent at San Pedro and Long Beach. The Order referred to exempted the inner and outer harbors.

I was taken on a naval vessel throughout the inner harbor and into the outer harbor. I saw scores of oil tanks and many scores of active oil wells operating at the water's edge, some of them in the midst of lumber yards. At one dock was an Argentine ship and on an opposite dock a Swedish ship. There was no control over the two main traffic bridges for entrance onto Terminal Island.

The following oil companies were operating on the Inner Harbor: Standard Oil of California, General Petroleum, Richfield, Shell, Texaco, Union, and ten or twelve little companies.

In the Outer Harbor was a Japanese fishing village where both Japanese and Yugoslav fishermen were crowded into a small area with boats and equipment. There is no control over this personnel. Any incendiary could easily start a holocaust in this harbor in five minutes at night in this poorly guarded area. This whole section is located in an earthquake country and is a peace-time fire hazard and in war-time there is the added danger of land and air sabotage.

Colonel Hicks, Commanding Fort MacArthur, is a forceful and capable officer, who happened to be a classmate at Annapolis of

Captain Coffman, and this results in an unusually close liason between the Army and the Navy at this point. Colonel Hicks was the Inspector General in Hawaii and was at one time FDR's aide, and will retire next March at the age of 56. This seems unfortunate because he is brigadier-general material.

He has 1500 men in two battalions of the Third Heavy Artillery. He should have twice this number to man his present equipment. His equipment consists of two 14" railroad guns and four 14" disappearing guns located on crest of Hill. He also has eight old 155 howitzers. He had that day obtained permanent assignment of "C" Company, 53rd Infantry (165 men) given him for special guard and police duty in the vicinity of Port MacArthur and Terminal Island. In addition, Col. Hicks had one company of anti-air craft -

Colonel Hicks and Captain Coffman showed us their emergency war orders, and the entire day was spent at the naval station and Fort MacArthur, returning that night to the Biltmore in Los Angeles.

December 7.

We were informed about 10:00 AM about the bombing of Pearl Harbor and Manila. Received a call from Tokutaro Slocum, who presented me with a Japanese sword on behalf of himself and a group of Japanese who served in the AEF, First World War. "Toki" Slocum was a Battalion Sergeant-Major in my war-time regiment, 328th Infantry, and had a fine record.

He was brought to the United States when he was six years old and on the death of his parents shortly after was adopted by a North Dakota family named Slocum. He was fiercely American. His brother was killed fighting in a Canadian regiment in the same war.

After the war, when Congress conferred American citizenship on all AEF aliens, Congress exempted from this Act Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans. Slocum crushed by this injustice came to me and I worked for nearly two years to get the Act amended, going before the Military Affairs Committee of the House. The Act was finally amended, and these few hundred of the three above nationalities were given their citizenship.

Slocum has spent the last twenty years of his life preaching Americanism among the Japanese on the West Coast. He has been very helpful to Commander Ringle and is connected with his staff. I trust this man implicitly.

The Los Angeles FBI received no orders to pick up aliens for about four hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Later that afternoon and throughout the night, however, dangerous aliens were taken in--a number of around 200.

Also, talked to Colonel Donovan around 6:00 that night. Throughout the day listened to radio and kept in touch with local Army, Navy, and FBI.

December 8

Spent forenoon in Lockheed-Vega airplane plants and later talked with Bill Guthrie, location manager at Warner Brothers, and former member of the FBI. Guthrie knows people all over the West Coast including ranking officers of Army and Navy. He is very anxious to be identified with some intelligence service. I suggested that Mr. Munson remain in Los Angeles so we could cover both points. Took 4:30 plane for San Francisco from Los Angeles, and when ten minutes from San Francisco plane was ordered to return to Fresno where plane was grounded. Had five-hour bus ride to San Francisco arriving 2:30 a.m., Tuesday morning, in the midst of a blackout. On bus were Edd Johnson and Mr. Gurnea, latter an official of FBI.

This report thus far is a copy of jottings from my notebook. They were intended only to show the itinerary. It was my intention to amplify all this in a report to be made on my return from the Coast. Most of the above is now ancient history and rendered valueless by the outbreak of war, so far as concerns any discussion of emergency white plans involving "D" day.

The question of security, however, which concerned us most when we arrived on the Coast is an issue, in my opinion, which is still of the profoundest importance. I was much interested in work being done by a Captain Riordan, Intelligence Officer at Fort MacArthur, in connection with Communist efforts to infiltrate the ranks of the Army.

The Captain received a hundred tickets inviting enlisted men to attend a picnic under auspices, he believed, to be Communist-controlled. He selected six enlisted men and had them assigned to his office and directed them to attend the pichic.

These men were taken in charge by young women and given a lot of propaganda against Army officers. They were told that the officers were comfortably living on large salaries, while they were getting $21 a month. They were told that these officers were helpless if the men ever acted together and refused to obey them.

There was much more of this general attack upon the loyalty of these men who, of course, made full reports to Captain Riordan. These same men were then invited by their new friends to many other Communist gatherings, and on each occasion were given more and more of the Communist Party "line."

Captain Riordan has a very complete and interesting file from these men, who have not thus far been suspected by the propagandizers. It seems to me that this situation should be handled the same way by all military camps and independent units. Both Captain Riordan and General VanDeman reminded us that Lenin's principal strategy lay in breaking down the loyalty of enlisted men in the armed forces, as a certain prelude to Communist revolution.

After giving full credit to the FBI for its urgency in picking up dangerous aliens in the first twelve hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, I do not see how we can rest easy until we have in custody scores of American citizens who are considered by all the intelligence services on the Coast to be equally or more dangerous than some of the Axis aliens now in jail.

Last Tuesday, December 9, I was told by Mr. Pieper, special FBI agent in San Francisco, that he had received permission to pick up dangerous American citizens but that a short time after receipt of the order, the permission was revoked.

Earlier in this report, I referred to the statement of Lieutenant Roppe at San Diego that one hundred people in the Consolidated Aircraft Company associate with known Nazis. I am trying to find out at present if those suspected people have been eliminated from that plant.

I do not doubt that the same situation existed in all of the aircraft plants on the Coast, and I am sure that Mr. Hoover will have moved in each of these plants if it lies within his authority to do so. I will continue to make inquiries myself.

Most of the intelligence units with which I have been or am now in touch favor a general dragnet for persons of Japanese origin on this Coast. I do not personally favor a general dragnet because "Toki" Slocum and others have convinced me that the great majority of the second generation Japanese are not dangerous to us, but on the contrary are good loyal citizens. I believe the same is true of many thousands of first generation Japanese, most of them humble farmers and good neighbors with sons now in the American Army.

I am wondering, however, if it is practicable to require all Japanese who are not citizens to furnish certificates from responsible American citizens in their neighborhood, stating the number of years in which they have known them and the opinion of the neighborhood concerning these aliens. Recently-arrived Japanese could not obtain such certificates from known responsible people and could be immediately picked up and thoroughly investigated. I have not discussed this with Mr. Pieper but intend to do so as soon as I can reach him.

Lastly, I think it is extraordinary that there has been no report of sabotage from any Axis nationalities thus far in the past [redacted]. It may be there are many such examples, and that the information has been kept secret. If it is true that there has been no sabotage in the nation, it could appear to indicate a definite policy in a disciplined organization, and that for some reason "D" Day has not yet arrived.

On Tuesday, December 9, I visited Mr. Pieper and Mr. Burnea at FBI and was furnished a card to visit the Presidio, where I had a conference with Lieutenant Colonel John H. Wilson, G-2, Ninth Corps Area, and Lieutenant Colonel Leslie R. Forney, Assistant G-2, Ninth Corps Area. That evening I dined with Captain R. P. McCullough, Head of ONI for the Twelfth Naval District.

On the morning of the 9th, I went with Major Harris of M.I.D. to hear the examination of the crew of the Anzac Clipper which had just arrived from Hilo Airfield in the Hawaii Islands. The crew said that they knew nothing of the damage on Oahu Island and Pearl Harbor because they stopped only for an hour to refuel. They stated that they heard a message in Japanese to their north-east when they were about one-third of the way between Hawaii and San Francisco. They saw nothing.

The next morning, December 10, Captain McCullough took me through all of his three floors at 717 Market Street. He has a personnel of 287. Their activities cover the entire Coast. It is the most complete intelligence organization that I have seen anywhere, and some of its activities I do not wish to describe in a report.

Later, Captain McCullough took me to call on the Chief of Staff of the Naval District Captain Kilpatrick, and then on Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade, the Commandant. This District has four destroyers and about 25 small submarines and converted yachts. It has a limited number of naval aircraft at its disposal.

Admiral Greenslade and Captain Kilpatrick stressed the vital necessity for more floor space in the Federal Office Building for the operating naval staff. I introduced Captain McCullough to Mr. Edd Johnson and received assurances that the Navy would exercise its censorship of our foreign radio activities with the greatest consideration and [redacted] confidence in our intelligence and judgment.

I also met Rear Admiral Thomas Kincaid, who is going to command the cruisers at Honolulu, and Rear Admiral Osterhaus who commands the patrol forces, the harbor control, and submarine mine nets.

In the afternoon I went to the Presidio and Colonel Wilson took me to call on General Benedict, Commanding the Ninth Corps Area. The General recommends that immigration authorities be

given discretion to accept enlistments from applicants having only their first papers instead of second papers whenever the same are approved by the Corps Area Commander. He cites an instance of a Canadian commerical pilot anxious to fly with us and refused because he has only first papers.

I then went to see Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt who kept me for about an hour. He said he was short of anti-aircraft guns and ammunition for the same and also short of planes, pilots, and adequate bomb reserves. He said his pilots were pretty tired after constant patroling. He said he was not complaining, and that he knew that strong reinforcements were moving into the area. He said that Seattle was in a particularly bad situation, that it had no anti-aircraft cannon, but that troops were on their way to Seattle.

We discussed at length the air raid alarms and the possible source of these. He said that he was taking his orders on blackouts from Brigadier General William Ord Ryan who commands the Fourth Interceptor Airforce, [redacted] who has a large force of volunteer civilians acting as observers. He explained that they knew at all times the presence of their own and naval aircraft, that alarms were given only when noise of plane motors was picked up in areas where there were no friendly aircraft.

He discussed the possibility of motors being attached to floating rafts to create unnecessary alarms. These could be set loose by a submarine or by a fishing vessel. It is possible to detect these decoys, however, because they do not change position but remain constant.

Admiral Greenslade had earlier discussed the possibility of a plane from a large submarine. He said the American Navy does not regard such an arrangement as practicable after a great deal of experimenting. The plane must be very small, it could only serve for reconnaisance purposes, it is awkward to handle, and in various ways imperils the safety of the submarine.

General DeWitt said he was particularly concerned with the possibility that enemy sea planes were based in the Gulf of Lower California and camouflaged in the daytime, operating at night. He also stated that there were lonely interior beaches where land planes could take off. He told me he had asked and obtained permission through Washington to send planes and ground investigators into Lower California for complete survey of this situation. He also hoped the Mexican authorities would cooperate.

The clipper from Wake Island arrived the afternoon of the 10th and Admiral Greenslade withheld the report because the clipper captain's information concerning damage at Pearl Harbor was believed to be erroneous and exaggerated beyond the facts already in possession of the Navy.

On December 11 I spent some time with Colonel Ahrends in charge of M.I.D. in San Francisco and his assistant Major Harris.

On December 12 I spent some time with Captain McCullough and Captain Kilpatrick, and also Mr. Pieper. That night a rumor spread along the south shore that an invasion was pending. Several hundred people left their homes and started east in automobiles with their families. This baseless rumor was caught and the excitement assuaged.

On the afternoon of the 12th, I went with Colonel Ahrends and Major Harris to the Presidio and informed General DeWitt and Lieutenant Colonel Stroh, G-2, Fourth Army, of the message just received from an agent warning of danger in Los Angeles.

On December 13, I called Colonel Stroh and gave him a second warning message concerning Los Angeles, and then went with Captain McCullough and Major Harris and told the story of both messages to Admiral Greenslade.

Friday night, Saturday afternoon, and Sunday afternoon, the 14th, worked on various matters in our office. Spent Sunday morning, the 14th, with Mr. Gooch of the British Intelligence.

G. Edward Buxton.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

San Francisco, Calif.

December 12, 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I enclose herewith a proposed staff and budget expense for the West Coast area, comprising headquarters at San Diego and operating units at San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington. This estimate was prepared by Mr. Candland following specifications which I outlined as to location and personnel.

We have made no provision for guards, believing that it would be better to buy second-hand safes. Guards can, of course, be had whenever desired. We have made no arrangements for switchboards in any city, although the San Francisco unit will have the benefit of a switchboard connected with the press and radio set-up at that point. We did not provide for direct wires between these units, although it is Mr. Candland's opinion that the same could be installed at a reasonable expense.

In criticism of my own report, let me say that the headquarters for the Coast should be in San Francisco and not in San Diego. The Commanding General of the Fourth Army has his headquarters in the Presidio, and he now exercises centralized control over all defense activities--land and air for[illegible] and to at least some extent land-based naval activities the way from Dutch Harbor to the Mexican border cover[illegible] inland to include Rocky Mountain states.

My only excuse for calling San Diego a headquarters is the presence of General VanDeman who lives in that city. The General is 76 years old, has an unusually clear and vigorous mind, and a body apparently at least ten years younger than his birthdays.

I have not found any Army, Navy, or FBI representative in San Diego, Los Angeles, or San Francisco who does not hold General VanDeman in great respect as the father of American military intelligence.

It is true that for the past twelve years he has been almost wholly occupied in a study of Communism in the United States and especially on the West Coast, and his library is filled to the ceiling with files containing

individual cards, photographs, and data concerning the personnel of that movement. General Miles is very familiar with what the General has been doing, so is the FBI and CNI because he has duplicated his material for their files especially in the last two or three years.

There is one important personality whom I have not asked about General VanDeman, and that is General DeWitt. I recommend that you authorize me to ask General DeWitt for his opinion of General VanDeman, and if the reply is favorable, I can (with your approval) ascertain by telephone whether General VanDeman would in an emergency be willing to live for a while in San Francisco. I do not think he would like to do it, but it is my guess that he would be willing to make this move.

If you decided that you wish to have posts in each of the other four ports, I would then consult with General VanDeman and assist him in securing suitable representatives to submit for your final judgment.

I would like to make a number of assumptions for your consideration: (1) that foreign intelligence from enemy-controlled areas will now be reduced to a trickle. Travelers, students, returning diplomats and businessmen, and immigrants will be few; (2) I assume that on the West Coast your mission has materially changed although I believe the need for your organization has definitely increased.

I think the mission now is one of liason with the general situation. With tact and judgment, I think the right representative can perform a very useful service. Like a good Army inspector, he should not clutter the Commanding Officer with a lot of small criticisms and complaints, but report only those things which involve conflicting jurisdictions or situations which appear hopeless if not corrected. I understand, of course, that your representatives have no authority over anybody but they can achieve the status of amicus curiae.

Now I do not believe that in these busy times that a man with a civilian background only, will be granted the same confidential relationship by Army, Navy, and FBI as would a man who has some known background among the armed services. Busy commanders and staff officers are not in the leisurely mood necessary to form friendships with likable and even distinguished civilians.

For example, Colonel Hicks, the very efficient commanding officer at Fort MacArthur, San Pedro, urged that if we considered establishing an office in Los Angeles, that we investigate Colonel R. H. Williams, USA, Retired, Los Angeles,

once military attache in Turkey, G2 of the Army of occupation on the Rhine, First World War; now 66 years old but active in mind and body. Colonel Hicks said he was sure General DeWitt regarded him favorably as an old friend and fellow staff officer.

General VanDeman said he regarded Colonel Williams very highly and would be happy to work with him any time he was asked to do so. Colonel Hicks says Colonel Williams is very anxious to get into some active service.

Today Captain Richard McCullough, head of the naval intelligence in this naval district (with an admirable organization of 287 people), mentioned as a possibility Mr. Charles Kendrick, to whom he introduced me. Kendrick is a prominent San Franciscan who was a Captain in the 26th Division AEF.

Mr. Kendrick has recently been President of the Bohemian Club, is a man of very pleasing presence and seemed to be very friendly with men like Captain McCullough and Captain Kilpatrick, Chief of staff of this naval district. (I knew Captain McCullough when he was on duty in Providence twenty years ago, and I have known Mrs. Kilpatrick since we were both children in Providence.)

There is an officer in your organization who is a very close friend of General DeWitt's. The General told me two days ago, when I gave him a message of greeting from Colonel Ross, that he was devoted to Colonel Ross and had made an effort to have him attached to his Fourth Army staff.

I do not know whether Colonel Ross would be interested in being your Chief for all the West Coast units, but I do know that he enjoys General DeWitt's entire confidence. I do not know whether the outbreak of war will make it possible for you to continue his present relationship with your organization.

I have not made any real attempt to uncover personnel for these stations, and I have not, as you know, visited either Portland or Seattle.

I regard San Francisco as a natural headquarters because it is the location of the central high command. I regard Los Angeles as the most important strategical area because I am told that 50% of all the aircraft assembled in the United States lies within thirty miles of San Pedro harbor.

In addition, the tremendous oil wells which are concentrated along the inner harbor at San Pedro and Long Beach are exceedingly valuable to the Navy and to industry, and constitute a frightful hazard to sabotage either from the ground or from the air.

The following oil companies store vast quantities of oil immediately adjacent to these wells: Standard Oil Company of California, General Petroleum, Richfield, Shell, Texaco, Union, and some ten or twelve little companies.

The Los Angeles shipyard and the Bethlehem Steel shipyard are both building important crafts for the Navy, including four destroyers. The Maritime Commission is proposing to launch one ship a week in the 10,000 ton Liberty freighter class.

For the above reasons, I think you should have representatives at both San Francisco and Los Angeles. General DeWitt regards Seattle as of strategic importance, second only to Los Angeles because of the Boeing Aircraft plants located there. San Diego is important because of the great Consolidated Aircraft works and the naval base. Furthermore, it is only twenty miles from the Mexican border. Mexican activities are a matter of great present interest to both Army and Navy. I am not prepared to discuss the relative importance of Portland, Oregon.

This is a hasty, incomplete, and perhaps confusing letter, but I am hastening to forward it for your comments, and I am prepared to make further reports.

The enclosed material will perhaps serve as a basis for discussion, and it is put in detail so you can eliminate any stations or personnel which you desire, and thus reduce the present total of expense.

Respectfully yours,

G. Edward Buxton.

P. S. I have arranged with Major Harris who is leaving this afternoon, December 13, to deliver this report to you personally.

In reading over this letter, I would like to add a few sentences concerning the services that can be performed on this Coast: While we fully understand that all information must always go through regular channels in the military and naval establishments, our representatives can be regarded as a supplementary agency which can stress certain points and make desirable short cuts in a special emergency or where more than one government agency is involved. For example:- the securing of necessary operating space for the Navy in the Treasury Department Building.

Also, we can be useful because of our direct wire where jurisdictions appear to be overlapping. All of this can be

accomplished only if we are regarded as helpful and understanding rather than critics.

Let me add a word about my impressions gained in a two-hour survey at the Lockheed-Vega plants in Los Angeles last Monday, December 8. They have 53,000 employees and are constantly adding more. These employees are all fingerprinted and checked from FBI files. The plant appears to have achieved very favorable employee relations.

The structure of the building is modern fireproof material. The arrangements to control fires seem intelligent and adequate. They have four hundred guards divided between outside and inside duties. They are superior-looking men, most of whom have had Army, Navy, or police training.

In spite of everything, no one can be sure that this army of employees does not contain some saboteurs. They have, I think, done everything in their power to guard against this chance; certain key machinery is not only watched by guards but is surrounded with iron netting which would prevent unauthorized people from getting quick access to this equipment.

This vast property is, of course, very vulnerable to air attack. There were four machine guns on the roof last Monday, and that was the only anti-aircraft equipment available at that time. I presume that by now more protection is being given.

I was disturbed by the sight of a large number of bombers close together on the field adjacent to the assembly line. I understood they were intended for the English and would leave in a few hours.

I saw the outside of the Consolidated plant in San Diego, but did not find time to make an inspection. The Lockheed management struck me as extremely alert--I talked with the Executive Vice President. The Security Officer Hanson is the former head of the Los Angeles office of the FBI.

San Francisco Unit:

Personnel

1 Chief of Unit	$4600	
1 Field Representative	3200	
1 Confidential Aide	2000	
1 Clerk	1440	
Total Salaries		$11,240

Other Expenses

02 Travel, per year	$500	
04 Communication Service	900	
05 Rent and Utilities	900	
08 Supplies and Materials	300	
09 Office equipment, safe, etc.	800	
000 Other	500	
Total other expenses		3,900
Total San Francisco Office		$15,140

Portland Unit:

Personnel

1 Chief of Unit	$4600	
1 Field Representative	3200	
1 Confidential Aide	2000	
1 Clerk	1440	
Total Salaries		$11,240

Other Expenses

02 Travel, per year	$500	
04 Communication Service	900	
05 Rent and Utilities	900	
08 Supplies and Materials	300	
09 Office Equipment, safe, etc.	800	
000 Other	500	
Total other expenses		3,900
Total Portland Office		$15,140

PROPOSED STAFF AND BUDGET FOR WEST COAST AREA

San Diego (Area headquarters):

Personnel

1 Chief of Area and San Diego Unit	$5600	
2 Field Representatives @ $3800	7600	
3 Clerks @ $1440	4320	
1 Confidential Aide	2300	
Total salaries		$19,820

Other Expenses

02 Travel, per year	$1500	
03 Transportation of things	100	
04 Communication Service	1200	
05 Rent and Utilities	1400	
08 Supplies and Materials	500	
09 Office equipment, safe, etc.	1400	
000 Other	1500	
Total other expenses		$7,600
Total San Diego Office		$27,420

Los Angeles Unit:

Personnel

1 Chief of Unit	$4600	
1 Field Representative	3200	
1 Confidential Aide	2000	
1 Clerk	1440	
Total Salaries		$11,240

Other Expenses

02 Travel, per year	$ 500	
04 Communication Service	900	
05 Rent and Utilities	900	
08 Supplies and Materials	300	
09 Office Equipment, safe, etc.	800	
000 Other	500	
Total other expenses		$ 3,900
Total Los Angeles Office		$15,140

Seattle Unit:

Personnel

1 Chief of Unit	$4600	
1 Field Representative	3200	
1 Confidential Aide	2000	
1 Clerk	1440	
Total salaries		$11,240

Other Expenses

02 Travel, per year	$500	
04 Communication Service	900	
05 Rent and Utilities	900	
08 Supplies and Materials	300	
09 Office equipment, safe, etc.	800	
000 Other	500	
Total other expenses		3,900
Total Seattle Office		$15,140

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES

01 Salaries	$64,780
02 Travel	3,500
03 Transportation of things	100
04 Communication Service	4,800
05 Rent and Utilities	5,000
08 Supplies and Materials	1,700
09 Equipment, safes, etc.	4,600
000 Other	3,500
Grand Total	$87,980

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

Burton

September 9,1941

Colonel Wm.J.Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

This morning at 11 o'clock I attended a meeting in the office of Commander Astor at which the following gentlemen were present.

Col. R. .Hardenburgh
Lt.Col. J.C.Burr
Major A.G.Lord - all representing Administrator of Export Control

Major G.F.Train- Army Intelligence
Lt.A.E.Chambers- Navy Intelligence

I explained your desire to avoid any interference with other regular routine and our hope that we might mutually supplement each others work. They were all most cooperative and anxious to work with us in any way which might later appear. It is obvious, however, that all of these Services regard themselves as charged with the collection of information in this area in the psychologic and economic fields as well as in the more limited matters of technical military and naval operations, tactics, equipment, personnel, etc. In fact, the two assistant Administrators of Export Control and their Intelligence Officer stated that they were exclusively in the field of economic research concerned with ascertaining the presence of types of raw material in this country and control the formal licenses by which they were permitted to leave the country. Both the Export Control Administrator and Army Intelligence have constant liaison with the Banks in New York and both pointed out that if your Organization also sought contacts with the Banks it would make one more Government Agency with which business institutions must deal. I did not comment on this statement although I felt it had some validity.

It is my opinion that weekly meetings are desirable in which the information Services in this area are represented and to some extent attempt to allot the field among them. For example, I suggested that when the Army Intelligence knew that a prominent American Banker from a branch bank in Madrid was arriving in this country on the Clipper that if they would make an appointment with him on arrival we might be represented at a later time when they held their regular interview. Major Train told me he had spent nearly two hours with this American Banker from Madrid and covered everything he could think of in all departments of inquiry

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

Colonel Wm.J.Donovan September 9, 1941

during the interview. Please let me have your comments on this situation.

Since dictating the above, another of our investigators reports that a Mr.Warren Irving has been interviewing refugee organizations on behalf of Mr.Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, on general information from recent arrivals from abroad. I am tempted to say the activities of so many Services further suggests the desirability of a coordinating conference in this District which would attempt to prevent some of the present duplication of effort.

It is my plan to be here in New York tomorrow, Wednesday, and Thursday until about noon when I am taking the plane for Providence, returning Sunday afternoon.

Very sincerely

Ned Buxton.

G.Edward Buxton

GEB FS

P.S. This morning I went to Major Train's office at his invitation. Lt. Chambers of the Navy Intelligence was also present. He showed me his files, general contents, map room and other secret activities. I do not think my suggestion of interviewing individuals in conjunction with Army and Navy will be practicable in light of my talk this morning. Both Services represented tactfully expressed opinions that more than two interviewers present did not have satisfactory results. Both men felt they would need instructions from higher authorities before making any formal suggestions. Off the record, they hope that it can be arranged for them to furnish us with reports on interviews with people who come in on boats and Clippers and that in most instances we might find this suitable for our purpose. I did not comment on this suggestion but merely told them that we would study the situation and certainly would not permit our activities to interfere with them in any way. I said that we did not propose to meet boats or Clippers. I told them that I would report the general situation as I found it to you.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

September 16,1941

To: Colonel Wm.J.Donovan

From: Colonel G.Edward Buxton

Subject: Suggestions for possible use of your Oral Intelligence Unit in Greater New York.

1.
Since there is already an Officer holding an Executive Appointment as Coordinator of Information in this District, it is obvious that unless there is a modification of the present arrangement your Unit must confine itself to cooperative and supplemental activity. If this is your wish it can be achieved as follows:

Either I or an Assistant will sit in on weekly conferences held in the Office of Commander Astor. Those present are:

Colonel Sharp or Major Train representing General Miles (not Corps Area G2)

Mr.Phillips and or Lt.Chambers representing O.N.I. in Washington but not New York

Assistant Administrator Export Control Commission and Major Lord, Intelligence Officer

Mr.Sackett or a representative of the F.B.I., Greater New York Area

Under the present set-up, Commander Astor is sole contact for all Services with British Intelligence, though he understands that I have a connection with Superintendent Bavin, former head of the Canadian Northwest Police I have no connection with Mr.Stevenson. These conferences will help us to understand the scope (and adequacy) of present operations in this area and will enable us from time to time to assist, cooperate and supplement.

2.
Suggest that Washington Embassies be requested to ask their Consular representatives to accept confidential relations with this Unit.

3.
That we continue to keep in touch with all foreign language organized sources and endeavor to become thoroughly familiar with opinion, morale and current events in such groups. I believe we can obtain connections with their underground sources of information over a period of time.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

Colonel Wm.J.Donovan

September 16,1941

In fact, we are already beginning to develop their confidence.

4.
That we maintain connections with organizations in New York conducting various social services such as Visiting Nurses, Salvation Army, Travelers Aid, Greater New York Fund, Maritime Union, International Institute, Etc., Etc.

5.
That this Unit be charged with the duty of investigating specific questions put to us from time to time by you and your study groups, evaluation committee, etc. For example: If there is doubt in your mind on some close point you might place upon us the responsibility for finding supporting or negative data through interviews with informed sources that we can find. Furthermore, I am certain that the news section of our New York Radio Unit would be very glad to furnish us with special requests for information from time to time. If I could be occasionally invited to sit with the propaganda committee and hear their discussions I could more intelligently seek material for radio use.

6.
I find that Army Intelligence does not have a list of people arriving in this country prior to the time of debarkation. Informal inquiry from an immigration official indicates that no advance information is lodged in that organization. They are dependent on the passenger list prepared by the Purser and presented on arrival. I assume that the State Department must have reports from foreign Consular Agents on visas issued containing answers to the most complete set of questions. If such lists and questionnaires exist in any Government Department it would be useful for this Unit to have them in advance of arrival. Undoubtedly, Army, Navy and F.B.I. would be glad to see such a list some days in advance of arrival; and this Unit would be particularly interested to check these lists with our friends in foreign language organizations. We could obtain, in many instances, hints as to people most likely to have reliable information. Whether such a list exists or not, we would in addition be glad to have the Immigration Department authorized to issue copies of lists of arrivals as soon as or before the boat docks. We understand monthly lists are compiled by the Immigration authorities showing the number of each nationality arriving. This information would help us in checking statements made by foreign language groups in New York. I have stated to other Services that our Unit will not join them in meeting boats or planes.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

Colonel Wm.J.Donovan

September 16,1941

7.
In our brief period of activity we are impressed with the very limited personnel existing especially in the Army and Navy Intelligence. We have already found a considerable number of people possessing general or special information in the foreign field of fairly recent origin who tell us they have not talked with any other Government Agency. An informal conversation with Major T. resulted in his suggestion that we exchange reports in cases which interest either of us. This seems in line with your feeling that we should be as helpful as possible to other Government information groups. Commander Astor favors a general exchange between all Services in any cases which seem pertinent. At present Army reads summaries at these weekly meetings and if any one present asks for a full report, he can either get it here or inform his Washington office that Army G.H.Q. has the full report. Would you approve and aid through Washington heads similar arrangements with Navy? At present we propose to furnish F.B.I. with any real suspicious evidences of subversive character which comes to our notice. Commander Astor has no objection to my dealing directly with F.B.I. or any other Service where I regard it desirable to do so. He would probably wish to be told about it afterwards.

8. As to contacts with Banks in this area - at least three Government Services already have liaison with New York banks. I think, however, that I can handle some connection with the banks through my long time personal relations with certain bank officials in New York and in a way which will not create any annoyance or confusion. I will ask those personal acquaintances to let us know when some individual comes along they think we ought to talk with.

Yours sincerely

Ned Buxton.

GHB PS

September 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM

With respect to the work of Major Buxton's office, it is thought that, if it has not already been done, a survey should be made showing the average of incoming refugees and other travelers, and their nationalities, from Europe and the Far East, and perhaps of Europeans and Asiatics coming into the United States from Latin American countries. The survey should be opportunely extended to cover the principal ports of entry into the United States on all coasts, but it is thought that fairly prompt attention is desirable with respect to the Pacific Coast ports. If it is desirable with pursue this type of work in New York, it would seem advisable to consider the question of spreading it to other important areas as well.

In connection with the related question of foreign language groups in the United States, it is suggested that the activities of Major Buxton as initiated in the New York area be extended by COI to cover such groups throughout the country. This would seem to be of particular interest to the division of COI which handles radio matters. Moreover, this field presents an interesting opportunity for effective coordination. If it is to be tapped haphazardly by the many interested agencies of the Government, such as State, War, Navy, etc., duplication and confusion would probably result. Since the State Department is perhaps not equipped to maintain regular contact with foreign language groups, it might be possible to recruit State Department support for this office to accept the major responsibility in the matter.

It is suggested that contact with Major Buxton's office and similar offices subsequently established, be placed in the hands of a responsible officer within this organization; that this probably would, for the moment at any rate, not be a full time job and might be assigned to an officer with other responsibilities as, for example, liaison work with the State Department. Such an officer could act as an executive assistant to a subcommittee of the Board of Analysts. One of his main duties would be to see that prompt and effective distribution was made of material sent in by Major Buxton's office. He would also be responsible for obtaining leads and suggestions from the Board of Analysts and section chiefs with respect to determining if there is desirable to secure from refugees Major Buxton interviews or from other sources.

It would be helpful if Major Buxton would furnish this office with a list of the types of questions he now presents to those he interviews, so that suggestions for possible elaboration might be considered.

It seems desirable that this group should examine a considerable amount of material from Major Buxton's office so that as soon as possible it could prepare for him data giving him a more definite idea of the type of information which is desired by this office. It is contemplated that the advice of the chiefs of the geographical sections, among others, would be asked, and that the information furnished to Major Buxton would be specific as well as general in character.

FIELD REPORTS

VOL. XIV

NAME	BRANCH	THEATER	TAB.
MC KINNON, RODERICK 17,417	Security	ETO	51.
RICCA, LT.COL. JOHN 17,420	SI	NATO	52.
BOOTH, LT.COL. WALLER 17,447	SI	IB	53.
LAURSEN, SVEND 17,459	R&A	ETO	54.
ALDEN, DOUGLAS W. 17,462	SI	ETO	55.
GARNETT, LT.(J.G.) JOHN R. 17,466	SI	ETO	56.
LEARY, LEWIS 17,505	SI	NETO	57.
LORD, WALTER 17,514	SI	ETO	58.
SOLIDAY, DONALD M. 17,515	Spec.Funds	MEDTO	59.
CALLISEN, S.A. 17,516	SI	ETO	60.
CROLL, JOSEPH D. 17,527	Spec.Funds	SEAC	61.
PARENTI, AURELIUS J. 17,528	SI, S&T	ETO	62.
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CONT'D

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

DATE: 24 August 1945

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. Col. John A. Ricca
SI/Italian Section

1. This report does not conform to General Order #63 and cannot be rewritten as Col. Ricca has been discharged from the service. He has made no specific recommendations or criticisms, feeling that he would duplicate reports filed by other returning members of Italian SI.

2. The covering memorandum was written by Earl Brennan.

Thomas Vietor
Pvt. Thomas Vietor
Reports Office

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

18 August 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report of Lt. Col. John A. Ricca

1. In compliance with OSS General Order No. 63, revised, I forward herewith the field report of Lt. Col. John A. Ricca submitted to me on 18 August by Mr. Earl Brennan, Chief, Italian & Albanian Section, SI, to which Col. Ricca was attached during his tour of duty in Italy.

2. Col. Ricca's report covers briefly his activities in Italy over a period of one year and a half, where his chief assignment was performing the duties of Liaison Officer for our organization with the Allied Control Commission, the Italian government, and various Italian intelligence agencies. Because of his Italian parentage, education and background, Col. Ricca was well qualified for this assignment. In addition to describing his duties in his report as Liaison Officer, Col. Ricca also describes his work as Mr. Scamporino's Deputy for intelligence work, and the period during which he acted as Acting Chief of the Italian Division, SI, in Italy, and also his being appointed by Col. Olavin as the head of the Rome Detachment.

Whitney H. Shepardson
Whitney H. Shepardson
Chief, SI

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/10 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100010001-2

SECRET

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 31 August 1945

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Mr. Roderick W. McKinnon, Jr. Security/London

1. This report should provide valuable guidance to the security officers of any future American intelligence agency. It is, therefore, recommended in full to the Director's attention.

Thomas Victor
Cpl. Thomas Victor
Reports Office